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Essays on Conflict, Money in Politics,
and Electoral System in Colombia
Abstract
This thesis focuses on the political economy of development, in particular on the
causes and consequences of political selection of leaders. It analyses how different
electoral systems can determine the type of politician that runs in elections, and the
effects of electing different politician types.
The first paper studies the consequences of electoral victory of newcomer political
parties in a context of newly-introduced local elections and weak institutions. Using a
regression discontinuity approach, we find that narrow electoral victories of previously
excluded left-wing parties to local executive office in Colombia result in an almost
one-standard-deviation increase in violent attacks by right-wing paramilitaries against
municipalities that elected-left wing parties. Violence can surge as a de facto reaction
of traditional political and economic elites when there is a victory of radically different
groups and in the absence of monopoly on violence. This paper shows that the intro-
duction of elections does not necessarily lead to less violence, but can lead to more
violence when the electoral winner are newcomers with radically different ideas.
The second paper focuses on the consequences of electing a politician funded by
donors, and how such politicians may benefit his/her donors disproportionately. Us-
ing a novel dataset that uniquely identifies campaign donors and recipients of public
contracts during a mayor’s incumbency period in Colombia, I find that barely elect-
ing a politician who received donations more than doubles the probability of donors
receiving contracts from a mean of 5.9% to 15.5%. Moreover, electing a donor funded
politician does not lead to lower local government deficit, nor increasing investment,
but it does increase the probability of having a disciplinary sanctions against them,
and investigations related to public procurement. I then study the role that campaign
contribution limits can play in undermining the role of money in politics. Results in-
dicate that campaign limits lead to less participation of donor funding in campaigns,
and as a result reduces the number of contracts that the mayor will reward to donors.
This paper shows evidence of the consequences of electing a donor funded politician,
and how campaign limits can reduce the influence of campaign contributions.
The third paper studies how open or closed lists in proportional representation
systems can affect electoral performance and political selection. In open lists, a candi-
date’s internal party ranking is determined by voter preferences, in contrast to closed
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lists, in which ranking is predetermined by party preferences. Colombia provides a
unique electoral system where parties can field open or closed lists in municipal elec-
tions, producing a mixed-list type of electoral system. Using qualitative interviews and
constructing a new dataset on politician characteristics and campaign investment, we
find that open lists (vs closed lists) produce better electoral returns to the party, induce
higher campaign efforts by candidates, and select higher-quality candidates–that are
less likely to have registered illegally to vote, and have more political experience. This
paper shows that voter discretion – trough open lists – can have a dramatic effect on
party performance and on the type of politicians ranked in elections.
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Abstract
We study the unintended consequences of political inclusion in a context of weak insti-
tutions. Using a regression discontinuity approach, we show that the narrow election of
previously excluded left-wing parties to local executive office in Colombia results in an
almost one-standard-deviation increase in violent attacks by right-wing paramilitaries,
more than tripling the sample mean. We interpret this surge in violence as a de facto
reaction of traditional political and economic elites, who seek to offset the increase in
outsiders’ de jure political power. Consistent with this interpretation, we find that
other types of violence are unaffected, and that levels of violence are not influenced by
the victory of right-wing parties in close elections. Moreover, we show that the surge
in paramilitary violence is concentrated in the year of the next election, which gives
left-wing parties a large incumbency disadvantage in Colombia.
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In many countries, despite the presence of nominally democratic institutions, some
political groups remain largely excluded from formal political power. De facto bar-
riers include fraud (Schedler, 2002; Lehoucq, 2003), clientelism (Anderson, Francois,
and Kotwal, 2015; Larreguy, 2013), uneven access to economic resources (Baland and
Robinson, 2008), violence (Acemoglu, Robinson, and Santos, 2013), and other con-
straints on political participation (Naidu, 2012). Yet in spite of these barriers, tradi-
tionally excluded groups may succeed in winning elections and entering the political
system. What happens when these outsiders gain formal political power?
One possibility is that giving excluded groups a voice and a stake in the politi-
cal process strengthens democracy and promotes political stability. However, another
likely implication is that, faced with electoral defeat by outsiders, powerful political
elites who have previously enjoyed a monopoly over access to power will feel that their
interests are threatened. Where de jure institutions such as elections fail to favor the
more powerful groups in society, these groups may strengthen their emphasis on de
facto means to avoid policy changes and prevent other groups from gaining formal
power (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008). Moreover, in weakly institutionalized environ-
ments in which political power is concentrated in a few hands, this may help explain
the relatively mild or null effects of democratic reforms on economic policies and other
political and economic outcomes (Mulligan, Gil, and Sala-i Martin, 2004). As long
as the underlying distribution of power remains unchanged, traditional political elites
may prevent these reforms from having the intended effect.
This paper examines elite responses to previously excluded (left-leaning) parties
gaining local representation in Colombia by winning mayoral elections. We focus on
the most direct form of de facto power: violence. We assess whether the victory of left-
leaning parties in mayoral elections (1) generates (or exacerbates existing) violence and
(2) if so, whether this prevents non-traditional parties from attaining political power
in the future.
Colombia is an ideal setting in which to study this question. Following a legacy
of power-sharing agreements between the Liberal and Conservative parties (which are
described in more detail in Section 1.2), Colombia introduced local elections in the
late 1980s to open up the political system and broaden access to power to formerly
excluded groups. These reforms included the introduction of single plurality rule elec-
tions to select municipal mayors. Previously, these were appointed by departmental
governors, themselves selected by the president who was historically a member of one
of the two traditional parties. A new constitution enacted in 1991 further weakened
the dominance of traditional parties. While the left remained a political minority, some
of its candidates were elected to local offices like mayoral posts and municipal coun-
cils, which represented an important change in the local political arena. These new
political actors began advocating different policy preferences than those of traditional
parties, including a stronger emphasis on redistribution, communal property rights,
land reform, and vindication of peasant rights.
To study the effect of left-wing victories on violence, we use a regression discontinu-
ity design (RDD) based on close elections and compare municipalities in which the left
narrowly won versus narrowly lost the mayoral race. Our results show that a narrow
left-wing victory leads to up to 6.8 additional yearly attacks per 100, 000 inhabitants
by right-wing paramilitary groups during the subsequent government term. This effect
is large: it is equivalent to almost one standard deviation and over three times the
sample mean. Importantly, we do not find a significant surge in violence when other
(non-left-wing) parties win by a small margin. Furthermore, we show that left-wing
parties suffer from an incumbency disadvantage that is almost six times larger than
that experienced by other parties in Colombia (which has been documented by Klasˇnja
and Titiunik (2017)).
Several additional findings support our interpretation that paramilitary attacks
following left-wing victories form part of a deliberate strategy by local elites to offset
(via de facto methods) the political power gained by the left through institutional
means. For instance, consistent with the idea that traditional elites incite violence to
prevent left-wing groups from increasing their representation in local government, we
show that the increase in violence is concentrated around the time of the subsequent
local election. Moreover, we find that this effect becomes much weaker after 2006, when
paramilitary groups signed a peace deal with the government and demobilized. While
splinter criminal bands continued to engage in violent acts against left-wing activists
after 2006, violence has been less politically motivated since then.
Ruling out some alternative interpretations of our results, we find no comparable
increase in paramilitary (or any type of) violence in the period before narrow victories
by left-wing candidates. Similarly, we find no changes in violence perpetrated by groups
other than right-wing paramilitaries after narrow victories by the left. Thus, our results
do not seem to reflect pre-existing trends in violence or an increase in overall violence in
constituencies where the left wins. Nor does increased violence appear to be a reaction
to corruption or poorer performance by leftist mayors while in office. We do not find
that left-leaning parties are involved in more corruption investigations or convictions
than other parties, or that their administrations exhibit worse governance indicators.
Our results are consistent with anecdotal and case study evidence (which we present
in detail in Section 1.8) that left-wing political activists have often been the target
of paramilitary groups following left-wing victories. We show that these patterns of
violence against the general population and party activists in areas where the left wins
local elections are systematic and do not represent isolated incidents.
The paper is related to several strands of literature. Our purported mechanism
of informal control provides evidence in line with Acemoglu and Robinson’s (2008)
15
idea that, when operating in weak institutional settings, elites may react to a loss
in de jure power by investing in de facto methods to avoid substantial changes in
equilibrium institutions and policies. They argue that following the enfranchisement
of freed slaves after the US Civil War, southern elites responded with the enactment
of literacy tests and poll taxes that de facto disenfranchised the black population.
Naidu (2012) shows that these strategies were successful in hurting schooling outcomes
and electoral participation of black citizens. Bruce and Rocha (2014) show that after
democratization in Brazil in the 1980s, turnout patterns were consistent with illiterate
voter manipulation by elites aligned with the former dictatorship. Consistent with this,
Fujiwara (2015a) finds that the introduction of electronic voting in Brazil enfranchised
poor illiterate voters, translating into a better electoral performance for leftist parties.
Other studies show how elites can use their control over economic resources such as
land to create patron-client relations and manipulate voter behavior. Examples include
Baland and Robinson (2008) for Chile and Anderson et al. (2015) for India. Finally
Bandiera and Levy (2011) provide suggestive evidence of the potential relevance of de
facto power for the political equilibrium by showing that in Indonesia, policy is tilted
towards the elites in areas where the poor population is more ethnically diverse and
therefore has a harder time organizing against the elites’ potential influence.
Yet, few papers have studied what is perhaps the most obvious (and potentially
damaging) form of de facto power: outright political violence. The Post-Bellum U.S.
South provides another example as Southern elites also responded with lynchings to
the enfranchisement of freed slaves. Naidu (2012) finds that lynchings and other de
facto methods of disenfranchisement such as literacy tests operated as complements
rather than substitutes during this period. More recently, for the Colombian context
Fergusson, Vargas, and Vela (2013) study the use of violence in the form of electoral
coercion by paramilitaries following media scandals affecting their preferred candidates.
Here, we instead study violent reactions to the election of formerly excluded groups
that threaten the interests of traditional elites. Acemoglu et al. (2013) and Dube and
Naidu (2015) also study the role of paramilitaries during elections in Colombia, though
their focus is on incentives not to consolidate the state’s monopoly of violence and on
the influence of military assistance on illegal armed group’s violence, respectively.
The reaction by elites that we document constitutes a response to democratization
reforms – i.e., the introduction of local elections to broaden access to formal political
power. While we study the effect of formerly excluded groups gaining access to power
rather than the introduction of elections per se, our results also relate to the literature
on elections and violence. Elections are said to provide an “antidote to international
war and civil strife” (Bill Clinton, 1994, in Snyder (2000)).6 Indeed some papers find
6Scholars have emphasized several mechanisms via which elections may lead to a reduction in vio-
lence: the preferences of the opposition receive attention as part of the political debate, which reduces
their incentives for violent opposition (Regan and Henderson, 2002); avoid social unrest by allowing
formal channels of dissent (Davenport, 2007); and elites can credibly commit to future redistribution
when policy concessions are insufficient to persuade excluded groups not to revolt (Acemoglu and
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evidence that political representation of formerly excluded groups decreases violence.
For the Indian case, Bhalotra, Clots-Figueras, and Iyer (2012) find that an increase in
the share of Muslim politicians in state assemblies results in a decline in the incidence of
Hindu-Muslim riots. Similarly, Chandra and Garcia-Ponce (2016) find that the success
of ethnic subaltern-led parties in India deters armed violence. Other studies find that
the introduction of elections more generally lead to a decrease in violence (Davenport,
1997; Fergusson and Vargas, 2013).
However, by creating winners and losers, elections may increase incentives for vio-
lent behaviors that could otherwise be avoided, for example, by power-sharing agree-
ments. As Chaco´n, Robinson, and Torvik (2011) put it, the key issue is the conditions
under which losers will peacefully relinquish power. Consistent with our argument that
elections may generate violence in weakly institutionalized settings, Collier and Rohner
(2008) find that the introduction of democracy leads to an increase in political violence
in poor (but not in rich) countries. Eifert, Miguel, and Posner (2010) also show that po-
litical competition may exacerbate (ethnic) identities, which represent another source
of conflict. Despite the conflicting theoretical effects, several authors suggest that
elections and “democratic transitions” nurture violence (Huntington, 1991; Horowitz,
1993; Sahin and Linz, 1995; Flores and Nooruddin, 2012; Casper and Taylor, 1996;
Snyder, 2000). Our paper shows that the identity and preferences of election winners
is critical for understanding when elections may exacerbate violence.
Finally, our study is also closely associated with the literature on “subnational au-
thoritarianism” (e.g. Gibson, 2005, 2014; Giraudy, 2010; Sidel, 2014). The patterns of
violence that we document are consistent with elites using “boundary control” strate-
gies to maintain control over their local authoritarian enclaves following the national
democratization reforms in Colombia in the late 1980s (Gibson, 2014).
While our empirical evidence focuses on the case of Colombia, our argument and
empirical findings are relevant for a wider sample of countries. Increases in violence
after previously excluded groups are newly elected to office have been observed at
the national level across the world: in Egypt, when the Muslim Brotherhood came
to power and enacted very different policies – including redrafting the constitution –
this triggered increased violence and a coup. Similarly, when Haiti transitioned from
dictatorship to democracy in 1990, Jean Bertrand Aristide, a priest representing a
new group in politics, won the election. Aristide proposed several reforms, such as a
military under civilian control and much more redistribution. These policies generated
violent reactions from the old elite, which culminated in a violent military coup in 1991
(Collins Jr and Cole, 1996; Naidu, Robinson, and Young, 2015). While these examples
suggest that political inclusion has a potentially destabilizing effect when groups with
very different policy preferences have access to power, it is hard to determine whether
the political inclusion of a formerly excluded group was what caused the increase in
Robinson, 2006).
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violence. Our study allows us to address this causal question more systematically.
Finally, our paper also relates to the literature on the incumbency (dis)advantage.
While Gelman and Huang (2008) claim that “incumbency advantage is one of the most
widely studied features in American legislative elections” (p. 437), an incumbency
curse or disadvantage has been documented in other settings, mostly in developing
countries, which are often characterized by weak parties and politicians’ incentives to
use local office opportunistically (Roberts, 2008; Uppal, 2009; Klasˇnja and Titiunik,
2017; Klasˇnja, 2015). Our findings point to the de facto reaction of elites as a com-
plementary explanation for the incumbency disadvantage of some parties in weakly
institutionalized democracies.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 discusses the general
context and describes the history of local elections in Colombia. Section 1.3 presents our
data and empirical strategy. In Section 1.4 we present our main result: the election of
a left-leaning mayor in Colombia leads to increased violence by right-wing paramilitary
groups. We also report some basic robustness checks. In Section 1.5 we address and
rule out alternative interpretations of our results. Section 1.6 provides evidence to
support our preferred interpretation of the reasons behind the increase in violence
following left-wing victories. In Section 1.7 we document the consequences of the surge
in violence after the electoral success of left-wing parties. In Section 1.8 we discuss
some anecdotal evidence, and in Section 1.9 we conclude and discuss the implications
of our findings and contribution.
1.2 Context: Local elections in Colombia’s political
landscape
Figure 1.1 provides a brief outline of Colombia’s recent political history. Colombian
politics were dominated by the Liberal and Conservative parties from independence
until the late 20th century (Bushnell, 1993). Inter-party violence was widespread, and
reached its height between 1948 and 1953 in a period known as La Violencia. In order
to pacify the country, both parties agreed to the Frente Nacional (National Front) deal,
which included alternating the presidency every four years between 1958 and 1974, and
ensuring parity in party representation in all government bodies.
The National Front blurred the ideological line dividing the two main parties and
consolidated a highly clientelistic system of political exchange. There were relatively
few differences in the socio-economic origins of supporters of both parties, which were
ultimately seen as agents of different factions of economic elites (Leal-Buitrago and
Davila, 1990; Da´vila, 1992, 1999). Indeed, the National Front openly excluded other
political movements from national and local political processes. Among the excluded
groups, peasants, workers and others ideologically aligned with the left stood out, and
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some of their most important demands, in particular land reform, were attempted
but always failed under an elite-friendly National Front (Safford and Palacios, 2002,
Chapter 14).
Bipartisan dominance persisted after the National Front formally ended in 1974,
and only collapsed in the late 1980s and early 1990s with the adoption of the 1986
electoral reforms and the enactment of the 1991 constitution.
The absence of political opportunities for outsiders, combined with the lack of state
presence in the Colombian periphery and the survival of Liberal rural guerrillas from
La Violencia, led to the formation of left-leaning guerrilla movements in the early
1960s (Bushnell, 1993), the most powerful of which was the Armed Revolutionary
Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – FARC), which
is currently in the process of disarmament and reintegration following the signing of a
peace agreement with the government.7
In the late 1970s, to finance their activities the FARC and other guerrilla movements
began kidnapping and extorting wealthy individuals, particularly landowners. This
precipitated the creation of paramilitary self-defense militias, which in many cases
operated with at least the implicit complacency of the national army, local politicians,
and the local elite (Dudley, 2004; Gutierrez-Sanin and Baron, 2005; Duncan, 2007;
Gutierrez-Sanin, 2008; Acemoglu et al., 2013).
By the early 1980s the Colombian state’s legitimacy was at stake: there were few
political options for third parties, violence in rural areas, and repression of left-leaning
supporters by the government of Julio Cesar Turbay, from 1978 to 1982 (Bushnell,
1993; Centro Nacional de Memoria Histo´rica, 2013). This situation motivated the gov-
ernment of Belisario Betancur (1982-1986) to negotiate with insurgents. As part of the
peace talks, and to signal a credible opening of the country’s democratic system, the
electoral system was reformed to allow the direct election of local mayors by simple
plurality rule (Maldonado, 2001). This reform sought precisely to give voice to ex-
cluded groups, especially the traditionally excluded left. It became effective with the
first local elections in 1988. The 1991 constitution further consolidated the opening
of the political system and increased resources and devolved responsibilities to local
governments.8
The reforms allowed left-leaning groups that had been historically excluded – such
as groups of peasants, union workers, and other political outsiders – to participate
in local elections. As part of the peace negotiations with the government, the FARC
created its own political party, the Union Patrio´tica (UP), thus combining “all forms of
7Other guerrillas include the still-active National Liberation Army (Eje´rcito de Liberacio´n Nacional
– ELN), and the Movimiento 19 de Abril or M-19. The latter demobilized shortly before the 1991
constitution and participated as a political party in the Constitutional Assembly.
8The 1991 constitution allowed citizens to collect signatures to either run independently without
the support of any party, or to create a new party. In addition, public financing (proportional to the
number of votes) and access to television was granted to all political parties. These reforms facilitated
the creation of third parties and made politics more competitive.
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struggle” – ballots and guns. Initially the UP openly supported and received support
from the FARC, and some FARC members participated in politics. This generated
widespread criticism from different sectors of Colombian society and forced the UP to
distance itself from the FARC, which reacted in turn by kidnapping several top UP
politicians (Dudley, 2004). By the early 1990s most of the UP hardliners in favor of
armed struggle had left the party and most of its remaining members openly criticized
the FARC, but many outsiders conflated the FARC and the UP, which led to the
assassination of UP supporters: two presidential candidates, eight congressmen, 13
deputies, 70 councilmen, 11 mayors, and thousands of militants were killed (Centro
Nacional de Memoria Histo´rica, 2013, pg. 142).9 Referring to violence against the UP,
Leal-Buitrago and Davila (1990) note that “facing any political movement representing
a challenge to the status quo, the long-standing state weakness induced informal and
illegal mechanisms to defend the system” (p. 85), which resonates with our results
and interpretation. These illegal and informal mechanisms represent de facto elite
reactions in their most extreme form: violence against left-leaning parties that had
recently begun to compete for local office.
The Colombian context we study is therefore characterized by three main features:
(1) the declining importance of traditional parties, which had been largely stripped
of their ideological differences and legitimacy with the signing of the National Front
agreement, with a resulting heavy reliance on clientelism, (2) (left-leaning) political
groups gaining access to the local political arena for the first time, and (3) the presence
of both left- and right-wing violence in various parts of the country.
The distinction between these two types of violence is important and helps ex-
plain the focus and findings of our investigation. Left-wing guerrillas are clearly anti-
establishment, question the legitimacy of Colombia’s democracy, and have not min-
gled systematically with institutional parties. Given Colombia’s history of political
exclusion and the power-sharing pact between traditional parties, the entry of the ex-
cluded left, with its radically different policy preferences, makes it hard to bargain a
policy compromise. This creates incentives for a de facto reaction by traditional in-
siders. Right-wing paramilitaries, instead, colluded with the establishment, especially
the army and local land-owning elites. Moreover, in 1997 they joined forces under
an umbrella organization called Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) with clear
political connections and goals. Its leaders signed a secret pact in 2001 in which politi-
cians (including state governors and members of Congress) called for an explicit role
for the AUC in electoral politics (Acemoglu et al., 2013). Their objectives were to
strengthen the agrarian model of large landholdings and to use violence and intimida-
tion to protect regional elites from social and political opposition (Centro Nacional de
9Steele (2011) studies the Uraba´ region in northwest Colombia and shows that residents of urban
neighborhoods that voted for the UP in local elections were selectively targeted by paramilitary groups
and thus more likely to flee after the elections than residents of similar neighborhoods where the UP
was less successful electorally.
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Memoria Histo´rica, 2013, pg. 170).10 The right thus had a comparative advantage in
exercising de facto power with institutional acquiescence in ways that the left did not.
In contrast, the election of traditional politicians from non-leftist parties with similar
policy preferences constitutes no threat to local elites, and thus violence perpetrated
by insiders is unlikely. Finally, left-wing sympathizers do not systematically respond
violently when non-left challengers are elected mayor because they do not enjoy such
close links with the local political establishment and security forces. Indeed, as we doc-
ument below, we find no comparable systematic increase in violence (from left-wing
guerrillas or other groups) when the right wins local elections by a narrow margin.
1.3 Empirical strategy and data
1.3.1 Data
Violence
Our violence dataset was originally compiled by Restrepo, Vargas, and Spagat (2003),
and was updated through 2014 by Universidad del Rosario. This dataset codes violent
events recorded in the Noche y Niebla reports from the non-governmental organization
(NGO) Centro de Investigacio´n y Educacio´n Popular (CINEP) of the Company of
Jesus in Colombia, which provides a detailed description of the violent event, date,
the municipality in which it occurred, the identity of the perpetrator, and the count
of victims involved in the incident. Noche y Niebla sources include (Restrepo et al.,
2003, p. 404): “1. Press articles from more than 20 daily newspapers of both national
and regional coverage. 2. Reports gathered directly by members of human rights
NGOs and other organizations on the ground such as local public ombudsmen and,
particularly, the clergy.” Notably, since the Catholic Church is present in even the
most remote areas of Colombia, we have extensive coverage of violent events across
the entire country.11 Violent events are coded for the period 1988 to 2014 as either an
uncontested one-sided attack (e.g., shootings against the population, assaults on police
stations, or an ambush on a military patrol) or a clash (in which two or more groups
exchange fire).
This dataset allows us to identify the three main perpetrators of violence in the
Colombian conflict: the government (armed forces), the paramilitaries, and the guer-
rillas. As explained in Section 1.2, we conjecture that paramilitaries are the main
perpetrators of violence against left-wing politicians or their supporters. Therefore our
10Most of the AUC demobilized in 2005 and 2006, following peace talks that started in 2003 under
President Alvaro Uribe. However, remnant paramilitary groups persist to date.
11Figure 1.6 in the Appendix shows two examples of events in our violence dataset. Both are
paramilitary attacks in the municipality of Viota´, in Cundinamarca. One local councillor was “disap-
peared” in the first case, and in the second a thirteen year old faced the same fate, this time with the
army’s acquiescence.
21
main variable of interest is the number of attacks perpetrated by paramilitary groups
during the mayor’s term following a narrow victory or defeat by the left. In order
to take into account the size of municipalities, we measure the number of attacks per
100,000 inhabitants. We also compute similar measures of violence perpetrated by
the guerrillas and government to help rule out some alternative interpretations of our
results.
Electoral results and party classification
We use the electoral data compiled by Pacho´n and Sa´nchez (2014), which is gathered
from the Colombian national electoral authority, the Registradur´ıa Nacional del Estado
Civil. Figure 1.2 describes the timing of local elections since their introduction and the
availability of electoral data for our analysis. Local elections take place in October,
and the term starts in January of the following year. For all elections between 1988
and 1994, there is no detailed information on the vote count of losers; only the total
votes cast for the election winners are available. Thus, our analysis covers elections
between 1997-2011.
Mayors who were elected in 1997 and 2000 (and who began their terms in 1998
and 2001, respectively) had three-year terms. However, starting in 2003, the terms
were extended to four years, so the remaining election years of our sample are 2003,
2007, and 2011, with associated terms starting, respectively, in 2004, 2008, and 2012.
Violence data, while starting early enough, are available only until 2014. Given the
difference in term lengths across the sample, as well as the lack of violence data for
2015, for our main results we focus on the effect of left-wing victories on violence during
the years available for the government term.12
A central part of our empirical exercise involves identifying and coding left-leaning
parties (we also need to identify and code right-wing parties for key robustness exercises
reported in Section 1.5). This is a challenging task, since there are 9,216 candidates
who were either winners or runners-up in the 4,608 mayoral races during our period
(we drop unopposed races from the analysis). We classified the ideology of 178 different
parties, and of 212 independent candidates who did not run on behalf of any party.13
The coding of parties as left-wing, right-wing, or neither followed a three-step
sequential procedure that is explained in greater detail in Appendix Section 1.11.1.
Here we provide a brief summary. First, following Beck, Clarke, Groff, Keefer, and
Walsh (2012), we check party names, mottos, and slogans for words that identify the
party as clearly left-leaning or right-leaning (e.g., “communist”/“socialist” or “conser-
vative”/“Christian,” respectively).14 For example, the Communist Party of Colombia
12The results using average violence during the first three years produce virtually identical results,
and are available upon request.
13There was a large increase in the number of parties after the enactment of the 1991 constitution;
recent reforms have sought to create incentives for the maintenance of fewer (but stronger) parties
(Rodriguez Raga and Botero, 2006).
14The Colombian Conservative Party is an exception for the reasons discussed in Section 1.2.
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was classified as leftist using this criterion. Second, since only a handful of parties can
be classified directly using this method, following Budge, Bara, Volkens, and Klinge-
mann (2001) we also search the party statutes (when available) for policy stances that
are clearly left- or right-leaning. In particular, we code a party as left-wing if the party
statutes include at least three of the following five leftist policy positions: (1) pro-
peasant, (2) advocates greater market regulation, (3) thinks that workers should be
defended against exploitation, (4) advocates state-owned or communal property rights,
and (5) anti-imperialist. In turn, we code a party as right-leaning if its statutes include
at least three of the following five right-wing policy positions: (1) economic growth is
emphasized over redistribution, (2) advocates free market, orthodox policies, and pri-
vatization, (3) believes that family and religion are the moral pillars of society, (4)
appeals to patriotism and nationalism, and accepts the suspension of some freedoms
in order to guarantee security, and (5) prioritizes law and order. Parties that do not
include at least three of the policy stances from either list in their statutes are classi-
fied as neither left- nor right-wing.15 Third, for parties for which official statutes are
not available, we look at the government plan that candidates submit to the electoral
authority before elections and, when available, search them for the same policy stances
as in the second criterion.16
Not all parties analyzed are included in our estimation sample, as some of them
compete in races with wide winning margins or compete in races without a left-wing
or right-wing party as a winner or runner-up. In particular, our baseline estimation
sample of races involving a left-wing candidate includes 51 parties of which 14 are left-
wing, 3 are right-wing, and 34 are neither. Once we focus on the sample of races with
a left-wing candidate and with a win margin within the optimal bandwidth of Calonico
et al. (2014), we end up with a sample of 43 parties (13 left-wing, 2 right-wing and 28
neither). It is worth noting, however, that all the left-wing parties that either win or
15For independent candidates who do not run on behalf of a party, we first check if they were
supported by a coalition of parties and assign the ideology of the coalition to them, provided that the
ideology matches across all parties in the coalition. Second, if there is no supporting coalition or if the
ideologies of the coalition parties do not match, we turn to the third step and search their government
plan. See Appendix Section 1.11.1 for details.
16Overall, we could find information on the ideological stance of 112 (62%) of the 178 parties
in the sample (and of 70 of the 212 candidates who ran independently). In the baseline analysis,
parties/candidates that cannot be classified in steps 1 to 3 of the coding procedure are assumed to be
neither left- nor right-wing, a reasonable assumption since i) Out of the 112 parties for which we could
find information, a large majority (87, or 78% of those analyzed) are neither (14 are left-wing and
11 are right-wing) and ii) Parties in the extremes of the ideological spectrum typically have clearer
signals (in their names and/or programs) of ideological stance and thus absence of explicit reference to
their left/right stance more likely means they are neither. Moreover, the fraction of parties for which
information on their ideological stance is available is larger in the baseline sample of races with at least
one left-wing candidate (68% or 35 out of 51 parties), and is even larger for races within the optimal
bandwidth of Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014) (70% or 30 out of 43 parties). However, we also
verify that our results are robust to dropping parties classified as “neither” due to lack of information
(and the associated races in which they compete) from the sample. We also explore the robustness
of our results to including a fourth classification step where parties that are factions of, or splinter
movements from, other parties (that in turn are classifiable in steps 1 to 3) are assigned the ideology
of the parent party (see Table 1.11).
23
come second during our sample period do so in at least one close electoral race. This
is important, because it implies that our analysis includes the entire set of left-wing
parties that successfully contested mayoral elections in Colombia between 1997 and
2011.
Additional variables
For some of our robustness and mechanism tests we use additional data sources. We use
data collected by Martinez (2017a) on local government performance and the extent to
which mayors and other local officials were involved in corruption. These will allow us
to test the extent to which municipalities under left-wing parties were targeted because
of their poorer (or better) governance and corruption. We also use data on the update
of the municipal land registry, a policy under the control of the mayor that facilitates
the increase of property taxes, a policy often favored by left-wing politicians. This will
allow us to test the extent to which left-wing politicians pursue policies that threaten
the interests of local elites. We also collected data on a broad range of predetermined
municipal characteristics to assess the validity of our identification strategy.17
Finally, throughout our analysis we drop cities with a population greater than
300,000. Institutions and state presence are much stronger in large cities and thus
guerrilla and paramilitary attacks are more rare.18 In Table 1.8 we present descriptive
statistics for our main variables of interest.
1.3.2 RD Design
The electoral victory of a left-wing candidate is plausibly correlated with a wide range
of municipal-level socio-economic characteristics. Thus, a naive comparison of violent
attacks across municipalities with and without newly elected left-wing mayors may be
confounded by the effect of other local characteristics. In order to address this problem,
we use an RD approach based on close elections.
We exploit the fact that a mayor’s partisan affiliation changes discontinuously at
the threshold between a left-wing party’s victory or loss.19 Our empirical analysis is
based on regressions of the form:20
yit = α + β1Lit + β2f(Xit) + β3Lit × f(Xit) + εit. (1.1)
17A detailed description of all the variables and their sources is available in Appendix Section 1.11.3
and Table 1.9, including those used for robustness, falsification tests, and testing the underlying
mechanisms.
18Of the 12 Colombian cities of this size, only four held elections in which a left-wing party won
or came second during our sample period. Only in Bogota´ (in 2003 and 2011) and Bucaramanga (in
2011) was the winning margin within our optimal bandwidth. Our main results remain unchanged
when we include these two cities (which had a total of three races that fit the criteria).
19Mayors cannot run for re-election in Colombia, thus our discussion focuses on the potential re-
election of (left-wing) parties.
20See Dell (2015) for a similar application of RD based on close elections in Mexico.
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where yit is the outcome variable and Lit is a dummy for whether a left-wing party
won the race. f(Xit) is a polynomial in our forcing variable, the left wing party margin
of victory,21 and εit is an idiosyncratic error term. Throughout our empirical analysis
we focus on the sample of races in which the left-wing candidate either wins or comes
second.
Estimation of our coefficient of interest, β1, can be done both parametrically and
non-parametrically. The choice of bandwidth involves a trade-off between efficiency and
bias. To deal with this issue, in our baseline estimates we use the optimal bandwidth,
bias correction, and robust standard errors proposed by Calonico et al. (2014). These
estimates are a refinement of the non-parametric local polynomial estimators usually
employed. For both our parametric and non-parametric estimates we verify the ro-
bustness to the choice of bandwidth and order of the polynomial (Lee and Lemieux,
2010a). Following Gelman and Imbens (2014a), we do so only for linear and quadratic
polynomials.
Our empirical approach relies on the underlying assumption that other covariates,
besides our treatment variable, vary smoothly at the threshold. Thus, any discontinu-
ous increase in violence is only attributable to the partisan affiliation of the electoral
mayor. To test this, in Appendix Section 1.12.1 (Table 1.10) we report estimates of β1
based on regression (1.1) for different municipal characteristics measured at baseline
(i.e. measured prior to the close race). Reassuringly, we find no statistically significant
differences at the threshold between treatment and control municipalities for most of
these variables. The only exception is the number of years since the land registry was
last updated, which is higher by about 4 years and significant at the 95% level in
municipalities in which the left won, an issue we return to below.
We also rule out manipulation of electoral results, which would violate our iden-
tification assumption. If the results are manipulated, then any subsequent violence
could be triggered by suspicions of fraud, rather than the political stance of the win-
ner. Testing for sorting around the threshold is a useful way of examining potential
manipulation (Lee and Lemieux, 2010a). We thus follow McCrary (2008a) and check
the distribution of our forcing variable around the winning threshold. A discontinuous
jump in either direction would indicate that the left is systematically more or less likely
to win close races. Figure 1.3 shows the results of this test, and reports the statistic of
the null hypothesis of no jump in the distribution. Reassuringly, there is no jump in
the density at the threshold.22
21Xit is the vote share of the left-leaning candidate minus the vote share of the non-left candidate.
The vote share is computed as a fraction of the total number of votes obtained by the top two
candidates in the race. Thus, our treatment variable Lit = 1 if Xit > 0 and Lit = 0 if Xit < 0.
22The estimate is 0.09 with a standard error of 0.24.
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1.4 Main results and robustness
1.4.1 Baseline results
In Table 1.1 we report our main result: electing a left-wing mayor leads to a substan-
tial and statistically significant increase in subsequent paramilitary violence. Panel A
reports the non-parametric estimates following Calonico et al. (2014) and Panel B the
parametric estimates of the treatment effect.23 Columns 1 and 5 include no controls;
Columns 2 and 6 control for time-invariant geographic characteristics of the municipali-
ties (such as altitude, average historical rainfall, distance to Bogota´, and region-specific
dummies); Columns 3 and 7 include pre-determined socio-economic and political con-
trols (such as the vote share of left- and right-wing presidential candidates in 1994,
rurality, literacy rates, presence of coca crops, and historic violence); and Columns
4 and 8 include all the controls simultaneously. While in principle the inclusion of
these covariates should not have a major impact on the coefficients, doing so may help
improve the precision of the estimates (Lee and Lemieux, 2010a).
The non-parametric estimates are positive and statistically significant across all
specifications. The parametric estimates are smaller and not significant under a linear
polynomial specification, but are statistically significant (and of similar magnitude)
to the non-parametric estimates under the quadratic polynomial. However, the para-
metric estimates should be interpreted cautiously since they do not include the bias
correction and the robust standard errors suggested by Calonico et al. (2014).24
Focusing on the non-parametric estimates, the election of a left-wing mayor leads
to an additional 4.4 to 6.8 attacks per 100,000 inhabitants per year during his or her
term. This increase is quantitatively important. It is equivalent to 2.2 to 3.4 times
the sample mean and 63–97% of a standard deviation. Despite our very small sample
by the standards of typical RD analyses, the coefficients are statistically significant
at standard confidence levels. Moreover, our results do not depend on our choice of
bandwidth, and are robust to considering less-competitive elections. Panel A of Figure
1.5 shows the estimated coefficient and the 95% confidence interval using a wide range of
bandwidths. The effect of a left-wing electoral victory on paramilitary attacks remains
23In Panel A, we implement Calonico et. al (2014)’s bias correction and robust standard errors,
as well as their optimal bandwidths for local polynomials of orders one (Columns 1 to 4) and two
(Columns 5 to 8). Optimal bandwidths range from 4.8% to 11.9% depending on the controls included.
Estimates in Panel B fit linear and quadratic polynomials (in Columns 1–4 and 5–8, respectively) and
restrict the sample to that defined by the optimal bandwidth computed for the non-parametric case
without including controls.
24As can be seen in Table 1.8, the distribution of our different violence measures is right-skewed.
However, our coefficients remain stable and statistically significant if we drop municipalities with
violence values in the top 3% of the regression sample (which given the distribution, implies dropping
the top 20% of observations with positive paramilitary attack values and is thus a demanding test).
Our results are also qualitatively similar if we measure our outcome variable as a dummy for whether
at least one attack took place, though the estimates are noisier. Point estimates in this case suggest
that a left-wing victory increases the probability of a paramilitary attack by 25 percentage points.
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positive and statistically significant for bandwidths as small as 0.07 and as large as
0.2.25 For bandwidths of 0.05 or smaller, the point estimates become small and noisy,
and the sample sizes become prohibitively small. For bandwidths larger than 0.2 the
coefficients remain positive and stabilize at around 40% of a standard deviation, even
if no longer statistically significant at conventional levels.26
Figure 1.4 illustrates these (non-parametric) findings. Observations within Calonico
et al. (2014)’s bandwidths for polynomials of orders one and two are displayed in the
left- and right-hand side panels, respectively. Each point represents the average of our
paramilitary attacks variable within bins of equal size, selected so that there are 10
bins at each side of the cutoff. Linear and quadratic fits (based on the raw, unbinned
data with no controls) are depicted together with the bin averages. A jump in the
number of attacks across the threshold is evident in both figures.
1.4.2 Robustness to party coding
Even after following a very strict three-step procedure to code the ideology of political
parties, some parties were left unclassified. As described above, these parties were
coded as neither left- nor right-wing in our baseline analysis. In Appendix Section
1.12.2 we show that our estimates remain similar if we drop these unclassified parties
(Panel A of Table 1.11), or if we code the ideology for some of them as the same as
their parent party (Panels B and C of Table 1.11).
1.4.3 Ruling Out Pre-Existing Trends
An important robustness check is to show that a left-wing victory is not correlated
with pre-election trends in paramilitary (or other forms of) violence. We study this
in Panels D to I of Figure 1.5, where we plot RD estimates (for several bandwidths)
of the effect of a left-wing electoral victory on pre-election violence. Panels D, E and
F focus on violence during the mayor’s term prior to the election. In turn, Panels
G, H and I focus on violence in the year prior to the election, since this may be
when armed groups are likely to try use violence to shape electoral outcomes. All
the point estimates are statistically insignificant across the six panels, for both small
and relatively larger bandwidths. The only exception is paramilitary attacks in Panel
D when focusing on a very short range of bandwidths just above 0.1. Even in this
case, however, the point estimates are just over half of our benchmark effect of close
25In order to compare the size of the effects across multiple outcomes, Figure 1.5 reports the effects
on standardized outcomes.
26As a validation test, we re-estimate the treatment effect at different “placebo” cutoffs other than
the threshold at which treatment occurs (in this case 0). This practice is especially useful when there
are other cutoffs of the forcing variable that may capture changes that are erroneously attributed
to the treatment of interest. While this is unlikely in close election settings, for completeness we
estimate the effect of left-wing electoral victories on violence for different cutoffs in the range of -0.14
to 0.14. Estimates at alternative cutoffs (not reported) are unstable, imprecisely measured, and not
statistically different from zero.
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left-wing victories on subsequent paramilitary attacks, and just marginally significant.
For other bandwidths, and for the case of paramilitary violence in the year prior to
the election (Panel G), the point estimates are very close to zero. This is also the case
for preceding guerrilla attacks.27 Overall, Figure 1.5 provides compelling evidence that
previous violent dynamics are unlikely to explain our main findings.
1.4.4 Were Left-Wing Victories Anticipated?
An intriguing question raised by our findings is why do elites not intervene strategically
before races expected to be close in order to prevent a left-wing victory. The McCrary
test in Figure 1.3 suggests that elites did not attempt or did not succeed in manipulating
the outcome of close races. Similarly, if voters anticipate the consequences of electing a
left-wing party they may change their electoral behavior and we would not observe close
contests between the left and other parties. In the absence of any local history of left-
wing victories in local elections (which is very likely, given the exclusion of the left from
politics throughout most of the 20th century (see Section 1.2)), it seems plausible that
elites and voters failed to anticipate, respectively, the outcome (or competitiveness) of
the election and the consequences of a left-wing victory.28 As noted by Benoit and
Dubra (2013) individuals often fail to anticipate events that have never occurred.
On the other hand, for elections in municipalities in which the left has previously
won, both voters and elites should be able to anticipate the possibility of this electoral
outcome and in this case we may be concerned that the occurrence of another close race
between the left and other non-left parties is correlated with implemented policies or
the reaction by the elites in the past. For example, we may only observe repeated close
races between the left and other parties in places in which the left was not a threat
to the elites, or places in which elites failed to deter the left from seeking incumbency
again. As a robustness check, we address this by dropping recurring municipalities
from the sample (i.e., those that show up more than once in our sample because they
have more than one close election with left-wing participation). Reassuringly, this
yields results that are similar and if anything larger in magnitude, in both close and
non-close races (see Appendix Figure 1.7, Panel A).29
27This is not to say that the guerrillas do not increase their attacks during election years (in fact,
they historically have), but our findings suggest that this is uncorrelated with the outcome of close
elections.
28Also, polling prior to elections in Colombia is very rare outside large cities, and often there are
many candidates competing. Thus, it is usually very hard to predict who will win local elections.
29At the optimal bandwidth of Calonico et. al (2014) the non-parametric (parametric) estimates
are 5.8 (5.1) and 6.1 (5.8) additional paramilitary attacks, on average, for local polynomials of orders
one and two, respectively. Moreover, Figure 1.7 (Panels B, C and D) confirms that for this alternative
sample, there are no statistically significant differences in pre-electoral violence (as measured by
paramilitary, guerrilla, or government attacks).
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1.5 Alternative interpretations
So far we have focused on single-sided attacks by the paramilitary, arguing that such
attacks best exemplify the type of de facto response that traditional elites might exert
when facing increased de jure contestation by left-wing outsiders with different political
preferences. However, there are other potential interpretations of our results.
We start by examining the impact of a narrow left-wing electoral victory on other
types of violence. It is important to rule out, for instance, the possibility that paramil-
itary attacks might have risen in response to either increasing or decreasing guerrilla
attacks. If the armed and democratic left are strategic complements (substitutes),
then we would expect a spike (decrease) in guerrilla violence following a left wing vic-
tory. In turn, because of their counterinsurgent nature, paramilitaries are likely to
react to these dynamics with violence, either by contesting an empowered armed left
or by filling the power vacuum left by a guerrilla retreat. Likewise, and through simi-
larly complex mechanisms related to the complementarity/substitutability of violence
across armed groups, the surge in paramilitary violence may be partly driven by a
change in the incidence of attacks by government forces following a left-wing victory.
Finally, another alternative is that left-wing mayors are simply unable to curb (any
type of) violence, perhaps because they do not prioritize security and law and order
(see Appendix Section 1.11.1).
We reject these hypotheses by showing that neither guerrilla nor government attacks
change differentially in municipalities in which a left-wing candidate narrowly wins
versus comes second. This is reported in Columns 1 and 2 of Panel A of Table 1.2:
not only are the point estimates not statistically significant, but the magnitude of
the coefficients for both guerrilla and government attacks is rather small (0.7 and 1.6
additional attacks per 100,000 inhabitants, respectively, which is much smaller than our
baseline effect for paramilitary violence). For completeness, we also look at two-sided
armed confrontations (clashes) between different groups, and confirm that no other
type of violence increases as a result of a left-wing candidate being elected mayor.
This is reported in Columns 3 to 5 of Panel A, Table 1.2 for close races (as defined by
the optimal bandwidth of Calonico et al. (2014)).30
Another hypothesis is that left-wing parties and politicians are targeted not because
they advocate policies that are contrary to the interests of traditional elites, but because
their governments are corrupt or perceived as inept. The contrary is also a plausible:
the left may be more honest and competent than previous local administrations, and
hence may be targeted for changing the way in which municipalities are traditionally
run. While measuring corruption is challenging, in Panel B of Table 1.2 we test whether
30While the coefficient for paramilitary violence is over three times the mean and almost a full
standard deviation, the estimated effect on guerrilla violence is about a fifth of the mean and less than
a tenth of a standard deviation. That said, the estimates for guerrilla attacks and clashes between
the government and the guerrillas are larger and noisy and should be interpreted cautiously.
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in places where the left won, the mayor (Columns 1 to 3) or other top municipal
officials at the rank of secretary (Columns 4 to 6) are more likely to be investigated for
misconduct by Procuradur´ıa General de la Nacio´n, the government Watchdog Agency
(Columns 1 and 4), found guilty (Columns 2 and 5), or removed from their post
(Columns 3 and 6). We find no evidence that left-wing mayors or their secretaries are
more corrupt than municipal executive officials from other parties. The point estimates
are statistically insignificant (especially in the case of mayors) and small in magnitude
compared to the average in the sample (Table 1.8). Furthermore, in Panel C we look
at the three indices of government performance described in Section 1.3.1 (Columns 1
to 3), as well as municipal capital and current fiscal expenditure, to check whether left-
wing mayors spend more than non-left-wing incumbents (Columns 4 and 5). We find no
evidence that left-wing mayors perform worse than those from other parties.31 In short,
the evidence does not corroborate the hypothesis that the violent reaction we observe
is driven by higher (or lower) corruption levels or the poorer (better) governance of
left-wing mayors.
Another potential interpretation of our results is that, due to the weak legitimacy
of the democratic system in Colombia, a violent reaction would have taken place after a
narrow victory of other parties as well. For example, increased violence may follow the
election of a candidate from any party on the extremes of the ideological spectrum. The
most natural comparison is assessing the impact of narrow electoral victories of right-
wing parties on levels of violence. Panels A and B of Table 1.3 report the estimated
impact on different types of violence of narrow victories by right-wing versus non-
right-wing parties in mayoral elections in Colombia during our sample period. There
is no significant effect on either total attacks (aggregated across all groups), or on
attacks perpetrated by the paramilitary or guerrilla groups. The effect on attacks
carried out by government forces is negative and significant, and the point estimate
suggests that, after narrow victories of right-wing parties, government attacks drop
by 0.5 per 100,000 inhabitants during the mayor’s term in office. However, this is
a comparably small effect, equivalent to less than 40% of a standard deviation, and
is significant only at the optimal bandwidth or relatively larger (greater than about
0.1) ones.32 Instead, the null effects for other types of violence are robust to varying
the estimation bandwidth across a large range of values (Figure 1.8, Panels A, B and
C).33 In addition, the magnitude of the coefficients is small compared to our baseline
estimates for paramilitary violence after left-wing parties win in a close election. The
point estimate for paramilitary attacks in Table 1.3 is 0.18, which is equivalent to 30%
31These estimates, especially those reported in Columns 2 and 3, are based on a smaller subset of
years due to data availability.
32Panel A of Table 1.3 reports non-parametric estimates and Panel B reports parametric estimates.
All estimates are based on local linear polynomials within the optimal bandwidth and include bias
correction and robust standard errors. The results for the second-order polynomials are similar in
magnitude and also not significant.
33Moreover, Appendix Figure 1.9 shows that there is no significant evidence of manipulation of the
running variable in close elections in which right-wing parties are either the winners or the runners-up.
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of the sample mean and 5% of a standard deviation, as reported for this sample in Table
1.12. In summary, and in line with our expectations given the nature of Colombia’s
political history, the right is not a political outsider, and thus its victories are less
threatening to existing interest groups with the capacity to react via de facto means.
Another possibility is that our estimates simply reflect the effect of the electoral
victories of new parties. As discussed in Section 1.2, the 1991 constitution facilitated
the creation of new political movements across the entire ideological spectrum, many
which (leftist or not) have been electorally successful in some places. Thus, the violent
response of paramilitaries may reflect a more general reaction to the threat of new
political actors to traditional elites’ grip on power, and not necessarily a reaction to
left-wing ideology. To address this possibility we first follow Galindo-Silva (2015) and
code as a new party any party in a given municipality that (1) is not one of the two
traditional parties (Conservative and Liberal) and (2) has never won an election in that
municipality. We then estimate the effect of a narrow electoral victory of a new party
on paramilitary attacks. Importantly, we drop from our estimation sample all left-wing
parties and thus isolate the effect of new parties that were not associated with a left-
wing ideology. The effect of narrowly electing a mayor from a non-left new party on
paramilitary attacks is reported in Table 1.13. The estimates are very small (about a
tenth or less of the baseline effects of Table 1.1) and statistically insignificant (with the
exception of the parametric estimates fitting a linear polynomial). This implies that our
results are related to the ideological stance of left-wing parties, and are not explained
by the fact that left-wing parties were simply new to the local political arena. In the
Colombian context, only left-wing parties seem to have been particularly threatening
to the interests of local elites.
One remaining question is whether our estimates reflect a widespread phenomenon
associated with all left-wing parties, or are simply driven by the persecution of the UP,
the party formerly associated with the FARC (see Section 1.2).34 The persecution of
the UP is partly the phenomenon that we are documenting in this paper, but we want
to show that de facto response of elites to the de jure accumulation of power is a more
widespread and systematic phenomenon that holds for any left-wing party, and not only
the party with past connections to communist guerrillas. To address this possibility, we
revisit the baseline empirical exercise of Columns 1 and 5 of Panel A of Table 1.1 but
add as controls a dummy for whether the left-wing party in the close electoral race is the
UP and the interaction of this dummy with an indicator of whether the left-wing party
won. The results are reported in Appendix Table 1.14. The point estimates become
somewhat smaller but remain statistically significant. This suggests that our baseline
estimates are not simply driven by the UP, and that paramilitary violence also followed
34Even as recently as this year, a UP leader who returned to Colombia from exile
in 2015 was the victim of a violent attack. See “Defensor´ıa pide esclarecer con urgen-
cia ataque contra l´ıder de Unio´n Patrio´tica,” El Espectador, May 7, 2016. Available at
http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/nacional/bolivar/defensoria-pide-esclarecer
-urgencia-ataque-contra-lider-articulo-631172 (last accessed May 16, 2016).
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the election of other left-wing parties. The interaction term between the UP and the
victory dummy is positive, as expected, suggesting that violence in places where the UP
narrowly won was much larger. However, the coefficient is not statistically significant,
probably due to power limitations (the UP contested eight elections during our sample
period, and won half of them).
1.6 Mechanisms
In this section we present additional evidence that supports our preferred interpre-
tation. We start by testing what happens to our overall effect after 2006, when the
paramilitaries (which by then had joined forces under the AUC umbrella organization)
demobilized after signing a peace agreement with the Uribe government.35 Table 1.4
interacts the dummy of a left-wing victory with a time indicator that captures all local
elections that took place after 2006 (i.e., in 2007 and 2011). The estimated interaction
coefficient is negative and statistically significant. Interestingly, we cannot reject the
null hypothesis that the effect of a left-wing victory in elections after 2006 is equal
to zero, which suggests that the increase in violence following the narrow election of
left-wing candidates has noticeably decreased after the demobilization of the AUC.36
Moreover, this suggests that our baseline estimates in Table 1.1 for the full 1997-2014
period are a lower bound, since they incorporate election years for which the effect on
paramilitary violence is very limited due to the demobilization of the AUC.
The timing of the observed increase in paramilitary attacks following left-wing vic-
tories also has implications for the validity of our interpretation. We argue that in
order to avoid the consolidation of political power in the hands of left-wing parties,
paramilitaries are likely to concentrate their violent reaction as the subsequent elec-
tions approach, thus preventing the left from winning again.37 Known paramilitary
tactics include “terrorizing voters to vote in particular ways, ... to stay away from the
polls so they could stuff ballots, voting instead of citizens by confiscating their identify
cards, terrorizing politicians so that they would not run against their preferred candi-
dates, and manipulating subsequent vote totals electronically” (Acemoglu et al., 2013).
Table 1.5 presents estimates of the effect of electing left-wing candidates as mayor on
paramilitary attacks during each year of his or her term in office.38 The results in-
dicate that the increase in paramilitary violence is driven by increased attacks in the
year of the subsequent election. The coefficient for the first year is positive (4.8), while
the coefficient for the second year is negative (though relatively small in magnitude,
35While splinter paramilitary groups persisted after this time, they were mainly guided by economic
rather than political motivations.
36We must nonetheless interpret this result cautiously, since a simple time dummy may also capture
other changes that took place after 2006 in Colombia in addition to the demobilization of paramili-
taries. For example, it may indicate an overall improvement in institutions and state capacity in the
last decade, or changes in the electoral law that may have shifted the incentives of political parties.
37This incumbency (dis)advantage is discussed further in Section 1.7.
38Recall from Section 1.3.1 that mayoral terms are either 3 or 4 years.
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-1.2). However, the coefficients for the third year (10.9) and the year of the subsequent
election (18.5) are not only positive but also substantially larger than the baseline es-
timates. These estimates are noisy, and only the one for the third year is significant
at conventional levels, which is a consequence of our small sample. But the point
estimates suggest a pattern in which violence tends to spike right after the left-wing
candidate is elected and, more significantly, approaching the year of the subsequent
election. The next section examines whether this paramilitary strategy of increasing
violence in the last year of a mayor’s term is effective.
1.7 The consequences of violent paramilitary re-
sponses
We now look at the performance of left-wing parties in the subsequent election – i.e.,
the one after the close race in which they narrowly won or lost – and establish whether
they suffer from an incumbency disadvantage, at least relative to other political par-
ties. There are several challenges in estimating incumbency advantage or disadvantage:
incumbency status is usually correlated with other party characteristics that explain
both why the party was successful in getting elected in the first place and its perfor-
mance in the next election. Moreover, as discussed in Section 1.3.1, the large number
of local parties in Colombia, many of which are short-lived and disorganized, makes it
harder to identify the electoral effects of incumbency.
To assess subsequent electoral performance we follow Klasˇnja and Titiunik (2017),
who use a close-elections-based RD approach very similar to the one we use in this
paper. For each electoral period t they focus on incumbent parties (those elected in
period t − 1) and estimate the effect of the (arguably random) arrival in office on
future electoral success. Our main measure of future success is a dummy variable for
whether incumbent parties run in and win the next election (in period t+ 1). For close
races, a dummy indicating whether the period t incumbent wins in t+ 1 compares the
subsequent electoral success of the incumbent party in municipalities in which it was
a close winner versus a close loser.
We report the estimates from this exercise in Table 1.6. Columns 1 to 4 of Panel A
estimate the average degree of incumbency advantage in Colombia.39 The estimates for
the election winner dummy are negative and very similar to those reported by Klasˇnja
and Titiunik (2017) for Colombia.40 This suggests that political parties in Colombian
local elections experience an incumbency disadvantage. However, in Columns 5 and 6
39Columns 1 and 2 follow the non-parametric approach using polynomials of orders 1 and 2, respec-
tively, while in Columns 3 and 4 we report estimates from a parametric approach.
40For this analysis we use a somewhat larger sample than the one used in the rest of the empirical
exercises, because the 1994 electoral results (which, as explained in Section 1.3.1, are not available
for election losers) allow us to identify incumbent parties that participated in the 1997 elections, the
first of our sample period. While we want our sample to be as large as possible, the incumbency
disadvantage estimates are not sensitive to this change.
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we extend the exercise of Klasˇnja and Titiunik (2017) and interact the winner dummy
with an indicator for whether the party is left-wing. The interaction term is negative,
statistically significant, and large. The point estimate suggests that left-wing parties
in Colombian local elections experience an incumbency disadvantage that is five to six
times larger than that of other (non-left-wing) parties.41 We argue that this may be
(at least partly) explained by the attacks targeted at left-wing incumbent parties right
before their potential re-election.42
The exercise presented in Panel A may hide an important consequence of the attacks
aimed at preventing left-wing parties from remaining in power. After being subjected
to violent intimidation, incumbent parties may simply decide not to run in the next
election. We explore this alternative definition of incumbency disadvantage in Panel B
of Table 1.6. The dependent variable is no longer whether the incumbent party that
competed in the election in period t runs and wins in t + 1, but simply whether the
incumbent party runs at all. In contrast to the results presented in Panel A, we find
no statistically significant average effects for non-left parties who win the election at
t. However, resonating with the results of Panel A, we find that the interaction term
of the winning party with an indicator for left-wing parties is negative and significant
(and larger in absolute terms than Panel A’s interaction coefficients). This implies
that left-wing incumbent parties are less likely than non-left-wing incumbents to put
forward a candidate in the next election.43
Another objective of local elites’ de facto responses to the election of left-wing
mayors is to prevent these outsiders from implementing elite-threatening policies. Table
1.5 hints that this is likely the case, as the attacks are concentrated during the first and
final years of the mayor’s term in office. While the higher intensity of attacks at the end
of the period is intended to shape the results of the subsequent election, the increase in
violence at the beginning of the term is likely designed to intimidate the incumbent into
maintaining the status quo in terms of policies. We present anecdotal evidence that this
is likely the case in Section 1.8. Here we focus on the policy that is the most threatening
41 To test whether paramilitary violence following close left-wing municipal victories affects vot-
ers’ support of left-wing parties in subsequent national elections, we estimate the effect of a narrow
left-wing victory in mayoral elections on the municipal vote share of left-wing parties in the next
presidential and congressional (Senate and House) elections. The results (not shown) suggest that
such violence does not affect support for the left in national elections.
42Admittedly, this conclusion is based on very few observations. There are just four instances
in which left-wing incumbent parties (in t − 1) won the election in t and contested a new mayoral
election in t+1. Of these, they lost three and won one. Since even fewer right-wing incumbent parties
(unsuccessfully) contest new elections, for these instances the interaction term is perfectly collinear
with the “right-wing party” dummy, which makes it impossible to replicate Table 1.6 for the right.
43While the evidence in Table 1.6 is obtained using Klasˇnja and Titiunik’s (forthcoming) approach
to studying incumbency advantage conditional on being an incumbent (that is, on having been elected
to office in t− 1), an alternative approach is to estimate the success in period t+ 1 of all parties that
won elections in t, regardless of their incumbency status. We estimate this alternative specification
and report the results in Table 1.15. In contrast to the results from Table 1.6, when departing from
the approach of Klasˇnja and Titiunik (2017), we find no incumbency disadvantage for the left. Our
argument that right-wing paramilitary violence following left-wing electoral victories generates an
incumbency disadvantage for the left should thus be interpreted with caution.
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to local elites, most of whom are landowners: land registry updates. Municipal mayors
have the constitutional authority to update local land registries in order to keep the
value of land up to date for the purpose of calculating property and land taxes. This
is the most important source of revenue for most Colombian municipalities, and one of
the few taxes collected at the local level (Vargas and Villaveces, 2016).44
We gathered data on land registry updates and estimated the effect of a narrow left-
wing victory on the probability that the registry will be updated at least once during
the new mayor’s term. The results are reported in Table 1.7. Columns 1 and 2 focus on
the non-parametric estimates and Columns 3 to 6 on the parametric ones. Odd (even)
columns fit a linear (quadratic) local polynomial. The results are not significant in any
specification, which suggests that, even if left-wing candidates are in principle much
more likely to adopt redistributive policies, they are unable to do so while in office.
This is not surprising since in equilibrium the violent intimidation we have documented
succeeds in preventing the implementation of these policies. But it is the threat of more
redistributive policies (off the equilibrium path) what motivates political violence in
the first place. Recall from Table 1.10 that municipalities in which a left-wing party
narrowly won present a larger lag since the last registry update. Columns 5 and 6
further control for this covariate, but we still find no effect of a left-wing electoral
victory on the probability of updating the land registry.
In addition to the regression evidence shown so far, a look at some qualitative
studies can help complement our regressions by further understanding the underlying
causal mechanisms (Franzese, 2007; Mahoney and Villegas, 2007). The next section
discusses some revealing examples about the nature of the paramilitary attacks used
in our analysis.
1.8 Evidence from case studies
Our interpretation of the econometric results is in line with abundant anecdotal ev-
idence on the nature of paramilitary violence. The Centro Nacional de Memoria
Histo´rica (2013, pg. 50), an autonomous group commissioned by the government to
compile the history of victims of violence in Colombia, notes that from 1988 to 1992
following the introduction of local elections, “big massacres were true expeditions to
punish social mobilization and reject the political success of the left, in particular the
Unio´n Patrio´tica and the Frente Popular.” This source cites some of the most em-
blematic cases of massacres of left-wing militants and the general population in areas
where the left scored important electoral victories. Perhaps the best-known massacre
took place in Segovia, in the department of Antioquia, on November 11, 1988 (Centro
Nacional de Memoria Histo´rica, 2014). This attack killed 46 people in retaliation for
44The others are sales taxes, fuel taxes, and temporal taxes on specific activities. The non-local
municipal sources of revenue are transfers from the central government and royalties obtained from
the exploitation of natural resources.
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the election of a UP mayor. Before the mayor’s election, leaflets were distributed with
the following message:
“We back the big caudillo in this region, Ce´sar Pe´rez Garc´ıa (...) We will
not accept Communist mayors or municipal councils made up of idiotic
peasants or vulgar workers like those who make up the Unio´n Patrio´tica.
They don’t have the intelligence to handle these positions and manage these
municipalities that have always been ours. Now we will get them back NO
MATTER WHAT IT COSTS! ... You wait ... We will hit you with a mortal
blow” (Dudley, 2004, pg. 121, upper case in the original).
In 2000, the UP candidate, Adelia Benavides, was narrowly elected mayor in the
Liberal Party stronghold of Viota´. In 2003, in the last year of Benavides’ term, Viota´
experienced almost 20 paramilitary attacks. While paramilitary leaders justified this
violence as a counter-insurgency strategy,45 the attacks were likely triggered by the
new mayor’s aggressive property tax plans, which threatened to substantially increase
the tax burden of local landowners.46 Viota´ has not elected a leftist mayor again since
experiencing these unprecedented levels of violence against civilians. In 2003 the left
placed third with only 11% of the votes, and in 2011 it received 3.5% of the votes. In
2007 there was no leftist candidate in the mayoral race.
In another example, Carlos Zambrano, the leftist party Polo Democra´tico’s candi-
date, was narrowly elected mayor of the municipality of Baranoa in 2003. Zambrano
planned to increase taxes on the relatively wealthy in order to subsidize the utility bills
of the poor, which made him unpopular with the local elite. He also forced local utility
providers to cut their tariffs.47 In 2004 paramilitary groups started killing local Polo
Democra´tico leaders who worked closely with Zambrano in this initiative.48 One of the
victims was El´ıas Dura´n, a board member of the Civic Committee for the Defense of
Utilities, created by Zambrano.49 Another victim was a community leader who led a
civic initiative in 2003 for citizens to stop paying their water bill because of the high
rates.50 In 2005 Zambrano was forced by paramilitary leader “Jorge 40” to flee the
45Paramilitary leader Mart´ın Llanos once argued that the Viota´ campaign was launched to “help
the displaced landowners of the guerrillas return to their lands.” However, our dataset indicates that
post-2000 paramilitary violence in Viota´ was entirely targeted against civilians; there were no clashes
with guerrillas.
46By 2003, Benavides had plans to increase property tax revenues by up to 70% after her Liberal
predecessor had allowed property tax revenues to drop to less than 30% of total tax revenues by the
end of the term in 2000.
47“Baranoa busca acuerdo con consecionario,” El Heraldo, November 1, 2010. Available at
http://www.elheraldo.co/local/baranoa-busca-acuerdo-con-consecionario-15703 (last ac-
cessed March 2, 2016).
48“Amenazas a 63 Alcaldes,” El Tiempo, June 10, 2004. Available at http://www.eltiempo.com/
archivo/documento/MAM-1533589 (last accessed March 2, 2016).
49http://www.nocheyniebla.org/files/u1/29/pdf/13Mayo2004.pdf (last accessed November
21, 2016).




In 2000 Oscar Quintero, representing the indigenous leftist political movement Au-
toridades Ind´ıgenas de Colombia, was narrowly elected mayor in the municipality of
Corinto. Starting in 2001, paramilitary groups killed local indigenous political leaders
who they labeled “guerrilla supporters.” In two roadblocks in 2001 and 2002, paramil-
itaries killed a leader of the “Indigenous Civic Guard” and three members of Corinto’s
Cabildo (the semi-autonomous indigenous government).52
On November 27, 2000, shortly before the end of his tenure as mayor of Ungu´ıa,
Rigoberto Castro was killed by paramilitary forces. Castro had won the 1997 election
by a small margin. Castro’s friends reported that his request to the local police chief
for additional protection after receiving threats by armed men was ignored. In 2015
the State Council found that the National Police was at fault for not protecting Castro,
and awarded his family US$ 400,000.53
These are just a few examples of a much wider and deliberate campaign by paramil-
itary groups to target left-wing politicians. In some cases the available information
makes it clear that, once in office, the victims intended to adopt policies that ham-
pered the interests of powerful local elites, which may have triggered the violence. In
order to study how systematic this pattern was, we reviewed the descriptions in our
conflict dataset (see Section 1.3.1) of every single paramilitary attack that occurred
during the term of a left-wing mayor elected by a narrow margin – or in the years fol-
lowing the narrow defeat of a left-wing candidate. Our dataset is comprised of reports
in national and local newspapers and other media sources; we particularly focused on
information about whether the victim was involved in local politics as well as his or her
political affiliation (see Appendix Section 1.11.2 for details on the coding protocol).
Two patterns emerge from this exercise, which are consistent with our hypothesis.
First, based on the reports we are able to establish that 3.5% of the victims of paramil-
itary attacks in municipalities in which a left-wing mayor was narrowly elected were
left-wing activists, compared with 0.8% where the left barely lost the election.54 That
is, the incidence of left-wing victimization in paramilitary attacks is almost four and
half times higher in places where the left won by a small margin than in places where it
lost. Second, 86% of the leftist activists killed by paramilitary groups in municipalities
in which the left won were actually involved in local politics (some were the elected
51Ibid.
52“Colombia: masacres en la zona rural de Corinto, Cauca; y en zonas rurales de El San-
tuario, Cocorna´, La Pintada, y San Carlos, Antioquia. Durante estos hechos fueron asesinadas
cerca de 25 personas,” Organizacio´n Mundial Contra la Tortura, November 22, 2001. Avail-
able at http://www.omct.org/es/urgent-campaigns/urgent-interventions/colombia/2001/11/
d16132/ (last accessed March 2, 2016).
53“La condena a la Nacio´n por el homicidio de un alcalde por parte de ‘paras,’” El Espectador,
March 28, 2015. Available at http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/judicial/condena-nacion
-el-homicidio-de-un-alcalde-parte-de-para-articulo-551888 (last accessed March 2, 2016).
54Notice that we often cannot determine the political orientation of the victims. Thus, rather than
focusing on the number of left-wing victims in each type of municipality, we emphasize the difference
between municipalities were the left won and lost.
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mayors), while the figure for places where the left barely lost is 75%.
1.9 Discussion
In the late 1980s and early 1990s Colombia undertook a number of democratizing
reforms, notably the introduction of mayoral elections. The opening up of the politi-
cal system marked the entry of traditionally excluded groups, particularly left-leaning
parties. But these reforms, and the overall shift towards a more inclusive set of insti-
tutions, threatened the traditional balance of power in authoritarian enclaves where
economic and political elites held a significant amount of both institutionalized and il-
legal (violent) power, a feature that is typical of countries with an uneven distribution
of functioning institutions.55
We show that left-wing party victories in mayoral elections in Colombia triggered a
surge in attacks by right-wing paramilitaries. As predicted in Acemoglu and Robinson
(2008)’s theory about the persistence of power and elites in weakly-institutionalized en-
vironments, we interpret this increase in violence as a de facto reaction of local political
and economic elites to counteract the increase in the de jure power of traditional out-
siders. We rule out several alternative hypotheses and provide evidence of mechanisms
that support this interpretation.
Our findings, however, raise some important questions. For example, why do polit-
ical elites agree to open up the political system in the first place? If they are powerful
enough to respond to the electoral success of outsiders with violence, shouldn’t they be
able to prevent reforms that threaten their local monopoly of power? We posit that this
is due to two main reasons. First, democratization is often conceded by national elites,
not by the local elites, following pressure from local interest groups and the interna-
tional community. Hence, these reforms are often imposed exogenously on local elites,
and thus their only alternative is to respond with strategies of boundary control that,
given the low state capacity in weakly institutionalized societies are able to coexist
with democratizing national reforms.56 The second reason has to do with uncertainty
about the outcome of future elections. Traditional political groups may overestimate
the electoral success (or underestimate the appeal of outsiders), thus gambling their
chances of losing power when the reform is adopted.
One implication of our findings is that several dimensions of institutions must ef-
fectively function together in order for democracy to prosper. Open elections that are
55This feature has been the focus of the “subnational authoritarianism” strand of political science
literature, which emphasizes the coexistence of national-level democratization and local authoritari-
anism (see Gibson (2014)).
56This was certainly the case in the Colombian context studied in this paper. The reform that
introduced local elections in 1986 was promoted by the central government (as an outgrowth of its
peace negotiation with the rebels), not by the local elites. In turn, the 1991 constitution (which
complemented the 1986 reform) was promoted by a student movement calling for a Constitutional
Assembly. The resulting coexistence of local elites’ control with democratizing national reforms in a
context of low state capacity is described in Robinson (2013) and Robinson (2016).
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not accompanied by a state monopoly over violence, or by checks and balances against
the disproportional accumulation of political power in the hands of a few individuals,
may have unintended negative consequences. The absence of strong and functioning
institutions across all dimensions is likely to lead to see-saw effects in elites’ use of dif-
ferent forms of power. When democratizing reforms strengthen political institutions,
elites may simply switch their investments away from the formal or de jure exercise of
political power, and towards other more violent means to preserve their influence and
power.
Our findings are thus relevant for other countries in which the political system is
opened up in a context of weak institutions and informal means of local authoritarian
control over the territory. This has been the case in many developed countries, and is
the case today in several developing countries with nominally democratic regimes. Fox
(1994) discusses democratization in Latin America and the attempts to eliminate local
authoritarian enclaves. Examples include the uneven nature of state democratization
in Mexico, where the PRI has held onto power via violent means: “This pattern was
most notable in Michoacan, the only state where the PRD had a serious chance of
winning a governorship. (...) Political violence against the opposition went unpun-
ished” (p.112). Gibson (2014), when referring to Santiago del Estero in Argentina,
also notes that “where institutional control and clientelism failed to neutralize oppo-
nents, outright oppression filled the void.” In the Philippines, after the restoration of
democracy in 1946, a new left-wing party representing the organized peasantry (the
Democratic Alliance, DA), participated in legislative elections despite being violently
repressed by the private armies of landlords, and won legislative races in six congres-
sional districts. However, an elite-controlled Congress illegally refused to allow the
DA to take its seats (Franco, 2001). Even in the US South, where authoritarian en-
claves could devise strategies of control through “perfectly legal” means, “the mixes
of boundary-control strategies –violent and nonviolent, legal and illegal – shifted with
features of the national territorial regime” (Gibson, 2014, p.73).
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1.10 Tables
Table 1.1: Effect of electing a left-wing mayor on paramilitary attacks
Dependent variable: Average yearly paramilitary attacks per 100,000 inhabitants during term in office
Linear polynomials Quadratic polynomials
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Non-parametric estimates
Left-wing mayor elected 4.351** 5.258** 6.366*** 6.757*** 5.750** 5.321** 6.121** 6.300**
(2.200) (2.247) (2.401) (2.555) (2.385) (2.348) (2.471) (2.594)
Observations 157 121 106 100 186 136 156 143
Bandwidth 0.0930 0.0620 0.0520 0.0480 0.119 0.0770 0.0930 0.0810
(Local) polynomial order 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2
Panel B: Parametric estimates
Left-wing mayor elected 3.654* 3.545 3.461 3.526 5.092** 5.049** 5.603** 5.664**
(2.035) (2.168) (2.126) (2.217) (2.453) (2.509) (2.645) (2.825)
Observations 157 157 156 156 157 157 156 156
R-squared 0.031 0.068 0.198 0.229 0.036 0.074 0.210 0.241
Bandwidth 0.0930 0.0930 0.0930 0.0930 0.0930 0.0930 0.0930 0.0930
(Local) polynomial order 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * is significant at 10%, ** 5%, and *** 1% level. Calonico et al. (2014)
optimal bandwidth and triangular kernel weights in all columns. In Columns 1 to 4 and in Columns 5 to 8 of
Panel A, the (unknown) polynomial is approximated with local linear and quadratic polynomials respectively. All
regressions in Panel A include the bias correction and robust standard errors of Calonico et al. (2014). Panel B
reports parametric OLS estimates that vary the polynomial degree consistently with Panel A. Columns 1 and 5
include no controls. All the other columns include pre-determined controls: columns 2 and 6 include geographic
controls (altitude, average historical rainfall, distance (in km) to Bogota´ and to the closest market place), and region
dummies (Caribbean, Eastern, Andean and Pacific); Columns 3 and 7 include socio-economic controls (vote share
for left and right presidential candidates in 1994 elections, rurality index, total population, literacy index in 1993,
presence of coca plantations in 1994 and historic incidence of political violence during La Violencia civil war in the
mid 20th century); and Columns 4 and 8 include all the controls simultaneously.
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Table 1.2: Effect of electing a left-wing mayor on other forms of violence,
corruption and government performance measures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A. Dependent variable: Average yearly attacks or clashes per 100,000 during term in office, by group
Attacks by Clashes between
guerrillas government guerrilla & guerrilla & paramilitary &
paramilitary government government
Left-wing mayor elected 0.731 1.602 0.228 1.776 0.281
(1.886) (1.544) (0.229) (1.437) (0.186)
Observations 135 177 148 142 129
Bandwidth 0.0761 0.112 0.0850 0.0787 0.0704
Panel B. Dependent variable: disciplinary prosecutions
Mayor is Top official is
investigated guilty impeached investigated guilty impeached
Left-wing mayor elected 0.168 0.173 0.0890 0.0468 -0.0675 -0.000592
(0.225) (0.166) (0.141) (0.103) (0.0505) (0.0340)
Observations 99 72 73 123 78 66
Bandwidth 0.0861 0.0580 0.0592 0.121 0.0648 0.0519
Panel C. Dependent variable: local government performance
Index of Capital Current
fiscal legal rules admin. expenditure expenditure
performance compliance capacity
Left-wing mayor elected -7.663 7.869 -11.19 0.210 -0.108
(4.947) (9.592) (8.909) (0.401) (0.365)
Observations 90 62 41 174 182
Bandwidth 0.0799 0.0871 0.0519 0.114 0.118
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * is significant at 10%, ** 5%, and *** 1% level. Calonico et al. (2014) optimal
bandwidth, bias correction, robust standard errors, triangular kernel weights and linear local polynomials in all panels and
columns.
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Table 1.3: Effect of electing a right-wing mayor on violence
Dependent variable: Average yearly attacks per 100,000 during term in office by:
All groups Paramilitary Guerrilla Government
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. Non-parametric estimates
Right-wing mayor elected 0.440 0.175 0.0440 -0.543**
(1.124) (0.612) (0.143) (0.274)
Observations 386 380 269 437
R-squared
Bandwidth 0.0657 0.0644 0.0443 0.0754
Panel B. Parametric estimates
Right mayor 0.274 0.186 0.0198 -0.508**
(0.864) (0.472) (0.118) (0.229)
Observations 386 378 268 436
R-squared 0.001 0.003 0.013 0.014
Bandwidth 0.0660 0.0640 0.0440 0.0750
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * is significant at 10%, ** 5%, and *** 1%
level. Calonico et al. (2014) optimal bandwidth, bias correction, robust standard errors,
triangular kernel weights and linear local polynomials in all panels and columns.
42
Table 1.4: Effect of electing a left-wing mayor on paramilitary attacks
Heterogeneous effects by timing of AUC demobilization
Dependent variable: Average yearly paramilitary attacks per 100,000 during
term in office
(1) (2)
A Left-wing mayor elected 5.659** 7.332**
(2.343) (2.942)
Post AUC demobilization 2.337 2.341
(1.792) (1.796)







A + B .314 1.903
Ho: A + B = 0
F-statistic .02 .86
P-value .88 .36
(Local) polynomial order 1 2
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * is significant at 10%, ** 5%, and *** 1%
level. Parametric estimates. Triangular kernel weights, bias correction and optimal
bandwidth of Calonico et al. (2014) in all columns.
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Table 1.5: Effect of electing a left-wing mayor on paramilitary attacks
Heterogeneous effects by year of violence after the election
Dependent variable: Average yearly paramilitary attacks per
100,000 inhabitants in year... of term in office
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Next
election
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Left-wing mayor elected 4.783 -1.203 10.90* 18.48
(3.375) (1.410) (6.355) (11.56)
Observations 148 149 150 100
R-squared
Bandwidth 0.0842 0.0860 0.0881 0.0677
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * is significant at 10%, **
5%, and *** 1% level. Calonico et al. (2014) optimal bandwidth,
bias correction, robust standard errors, triangular kernel weights and
linear local polynomials in all panels and columns.
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Table 1.6: Incumbency advantage in Colombia
Non-parametric estimates Parametric estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A. Dependent variable: Indicator of whether party elected in t runs and wins in t+ 1
Winner party in t -0.190*** -0.228** -0.176*** -0.212** -0.174*** -0.212**
(0.0725) (0.0981) (0.0599) (0.0833) (0.0600) (0.0834)
Left-wing party 0.572*** 0.575***
(0.0249) (0.0309)
Winner party in t × Left-wing party -0.918*** -0.926***
(0.0491) (0.0447)
Observations 995 1052 991 1053 991 1053
R-squared 0.019 0.019 0.022 0.021
Bandwidth 0.127 0.141 0.127 0.141 0.127 0.141
(Local) polynomial order 1 2 1 2 1 2
Panel B. Dependent variable: Indicator of whether party elected in t runs in t+ 1
Winner party in t 0.0747 0.0683 0.0550 0.0693 0.0571 0.0711
(0.0805) (0.0975) (0.0675) (0.0835) (0.0675) (0.0835)
Left-wing party -0.122*** -0.127***
(0.0289) (0.0298)
Winner party in t × Left-wing party -0.966*** -0.947***
(0.0462) (0.0486)
Observations 1046 1239 1045 1240 1045 1240
R-squared 0.004 0.007 0.011 0.013
Bandwidth 0.138 0.202 0.138 0.202 0.138 0.202
(Local) polynomial order 1 2 1 2 1 2
(Local) polynomial order 1 2 1 2 1 2
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * is significant at 10%, ** 5%, and *** 1% level. Calonico et al. (2014)
optimal bandwidth in all columns. Triangular kernel weights used in all columns. In Columns (1) and (2) the
(unknown) polynomial is approximated with local linear and quadratic polynomials, respectively, and include the
bias correction and robust standard errors of Calonico et al. (2014). Columns (3) - (6) are parametric estimates
with polynomials of the forcing variable not displayed. (3) & (5) Linear estimates with varying slopes. (4) & (6)
Quadratic estimates with varying slopes.
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Table 1.7: Effect of electing a left-wing mayor on land registry updates
Dep. variable: Indicator of whether registry was updated during term in office
Non-parametric Parametric estimates
estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Left-wing mayor elected 0.173 0.140 0.157 0.0622 0.116 0.0250
(0.177) (0.201) (0.141) (0.201) (0.148) (0.208)
Years since cadastral update 0.0119* 0.0108
(0.00693) (0.00688)
Observations 148 194 148 148 148 148
R-squared 0.015 0.030 0.035 0.046
Bandwidth 0.0851 0.127 0.0850 0.0850 0.0850 0.0850
(Local) polynomial order 1 2 1 2 1 2
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * is significant at 10%, ** at 5%, and *** at 1% level.
Calonico et al. (2014) optimal bandwidth in all columns. Triangular kernel weights used in all
columns. In Columns (1) and (2) the (unknown) polynomial is approximated with local linear and
quadratic polynomials, respectively, and we report the bias correction and robust standard errors
of Calonico et al. (2014).
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Figures
Figure 1.1: Brief historical timeline
Source: Authors’ own.
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Figure 1.2: Election years and available data
Source: Authors’ own.
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Notes: Observations within Calonico et al. (2014)’s bandwidth displayed. Left: linear fit. Right:
quadratic fit. 10 bins of equal size at each side of the cutoff.
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Figure 1.5: Effect of electing a left-leaning mayor on measures of violence
Attacks during term in office by group
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Notes: The solid line marks the Calonico et al. (2014) optimal bandwidth. Non-parametric
estimates with bias correction, robust standard errors, triangular kernels, and linear local polynomials
(Calonico et al., 2014).
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Appendix
1.11 Data appendix: description of coding protocol
and variables
1.11.1 Coding left-wing and right-wing parties
In this appendix we explain the classification of parties into left-wing, right-wing, or
neither left- nor right-wing. We apply the following procedure to the 505 parties that
either won or came second in mayoral elections during our sample period.57
1. As in Beck et al. (2012), we first code parties as left-leaning if they self-define,
based on their name, motto, or slogan as “communist,” “socialist,” “social demo-
cratic,” or simply “left-wing.” The parallel terms for right-leaning parties are
“conservative,” “Christian democratic,” or “right-wing.”58 Most parties, how-
ever, cannot be classified based on this criterion, in which case we move to step
2.59
2. When available, we look at the party statutes and, following Budge et al. (2001),
code the party as left-wing if at least three of the following five policy stances
are present in the document:
(a) pro-peasant or social re-vindication in nature,
(b) more market regulation,
(c) defense of workers’ rights against exploitation,
(d) defense of state-owned or communal property rights,
(e) anti-imperialism.
Also following Budge et al. (2001), we code the party as right-wing if at least
three of the following five policy stances are mentioned in its statutes:
(a) emphasis on economic growth/development over inequality and redistribu-
tion,
(b) endorsement of free-market, orthodox policies, a limited role for the state,
and the promotion of private enterprises,
(c) family and religion as crucial moral pillars of society,
(d) appeal to patriotism and/or nationalism and the suspension of some free-
doms in order to protect the state against subversion,
57It is worth noting that 78 of these parties (15% of the 505) simply represent individual politicians
who ran under their own name, even if they are often endorsed by a coalition of parties. In this case
the classification procedure is slightly different than for actual parties, as explained in the text.
58An exception is the Colombian Conservative Party, which in spite of its right-wing origins in the
19th century has been a centrist party since the start of the National Front in 1958 (see Section 1.2).
This is confirmed by the party’s policy stance, which is also the criterion used to classify both the
Conservative and Liberal parties as neither left- nor right-wing (see criterion 2 below).
59Using this criterion, we identified eight left-leaning parties and no right-wing parties. Note that
this criterion only allows us to classify left- and right-wing parties, but cannot be used to identify
those in the “neither” category; the subsequent criteria allow us to do so.
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(e) priority of law and order and a military approach to preserve the state’s
monopoly of violence.
Parties that, according to their statutes, are neither left- nor right-wing are clas-
sified as neither.60 If the party statutes are not available, we apply the next
criterion.
3. We look at the government plan that the party drafts for each municipality/election
and, as in step 2, we identify the policy stance associated with a left- or right-
wing ideology.61 Parties that, according to their government plan, are neither
left- nor right-wing are classified as neither.62
4. In some robustness specifications (see Table 1.11), we make further classification
attempts. Some short-lived parties for which formal statutes or government plans
(steps 2 and 3, respectively) are not readily available are factions of, or splinter
movements from, other (well-established and thus readily classifiable) parties, or
simply old parties that changed their name. In these cases we assign the ideology
of the predecessor party. Parties that, according to their predecessor party, are
neither left- nor right-wing are classified as so.63
We do not include splinter parties or factions in our baseline estimates, since
this category relies on the classification of other parties, and is thus indirect and
probably more prone to measurement error. For these estimates we prefer to
use a conservative classification procedure. However, as shown in Table 1.11, the
results are substantively unchanged if we include parties classified in this way.
The procedure for the 78 candidates that run under their own name is somewhat
different:
1A. Because we are interested in classifying the ideology of parties, rather than indi-
vidual politicians, we first determine whether these candidates in effect represent
a coalition of parties with a known ideological stance (using the 4-step proce-
dure described above). This information is available from the National Registry
Bureau. If this is the case, and the ideology of the parties forming the coalition
coincides (as either left-wing, right-wing, or neither), then the same ideology is
assigned to the candidate. However, if the candidate does not represent a coali-
tion, or if he/she does but the ideology of the parties forming the coalition does
not match, then we apply the next criterion.64
2A. Same as step 3 above.65
60Using this criterion, we identified seven left-leaning parties, six right-wing parties, and 15 parties
that are neither left- nor right-wing.
61Since all candidates running for municipal executive office are required to submit their government
plan prior to the election, in principle these plans are also available for runners-up.
62Using this criterion we identified no left-leaning parties, seven right-wing parties, and classified
141 parties as neither.
63Using this criterion, we identified nine left-leaning parties, 18 right-wing parties, and classified
105 parties as neither.
64Using this criterion, we identified no left- or right-leaning parties, and classified 36 parties as
neither.
65Using this criterion, we classified no left-leaning parties, three right-wing parties, and 24 parties
as neither.
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3A. Same as step 4 above.66
The resulting classification can be found online at: https://docs.google.com/
spreadsheets/d/1WP2sPWBl5p3bbfJuYWqLiZTeDmwvNmCRA-5Kgdf BiM/pubhtml
66Using this criterion we identified no left-leaning parties, one right-wing party, and classified four
parties as neither.
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1.11.2 Coding the ideological stance of victims
In this appendix we explain the classification of the ideological stance and involvement
in politics of civilian victims in paramilitary attacks following a mayoral election in
which a left-wing party narrowly won or came second. We focus on the sample of
such close elections that took place during our period of study and identify all the
paramilitary attacks that occurred during the mayor’s term in office. To code the
political ideology of the civilian victims of each attack, we follow a three-step procedure:
1. We search the main national and local newspapers for detailed information about
the attacks.67 If there is no information about the event, or if it is reported but
the available information cannot be used to classify the resulting victim(s) as
left-wing activists or not (for example because of the victim’s affiliation with a
union or a left-wing political party), then we turn to the next criterion.
2. We search the websites of human rights NGOs known for monitoring political
violence in Colombia for detailed information about the attack.68 If there is
no information about the event, or if the event is reported but the available
information cannot be used to classify the resulting victim(s) as left-wing activists
or not, then we turn to the next criterion.
3. CINEP’s Noche y Niebla magazine includes narratives with specifics on all the
events included in our violence data.69 Within these narratives we look for hints
that can be used to classify the resulting victim(s) as left-wing militants or not.
Victims who cannot be classified as either left-wing or non-left-wing after applying
the three criteria are coded as having an “unknown” ideology.
The results from applying this protocol are used to compute the figures reported in
Section 1.8.
67The newspapers include El Tiempo, El Espectador, El Colombiano, El Heraldo, El Nuevo Siglo,
El Pa´ıs, and Vanguardia.
68These include the World Organization Against Torture, the International Labor Organization
(ILO), Verdad Abierta, Asociacio´n Colombiana de Juristas, and Asociacio´n de Cabildos de Ind´ıgenas
del Norte del Cauca.
69Recall from Section 1.3.1 that CINEP is the main source of this dataset.
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1.11.3 Additional variables
The main source for variables used in balance tests is the municipal panel maintained
and hosted by the Center For Economic Development Studies (CEDE) at Universidad
de los Andes (Acevedo and Bornacelly, 2014). Specifically, we check balance across a
number of geographic and socio-economic variables, described in Table 1.9.
In addition, to explore whether the policies adopted by left-wing mayors differ from
those adopted by mayors representing other parties, we look at land registry updates,
which are available from the national land registry agency.70 Since land is mainly taxed
based on assessed values recorded in the registry, updates to this registry are a policy
tool that can be used to increase taxes on landowners.
Furthermore, in order to rule out the possibility that post-electoral violence fol-
lowing left-wing victories is driven by poorer performance by left-wing mayors relative
to incumbents from other parties, such as a weaker/ stronger fiscal management of
the municipal treasury, we look at the governance indices developed by Departamento
Nacional de Planeacio´n (DNP, the National Planning Department). Specifically we
use the DNP’s “index of fiscal performance,” “index of legal requirements,” and “index
of administrative capacity.” The first index summarizes the performance of municipal
governments based on the size of the deficit and the proportion of municipal income
that is spent on operational costs versus invested, as well as the proportion of income
that originates from national government transfers versus municipal tax revenue. The
second index assesses the compliance of the municipal administration with national
rules on how to spend the central government transfers (targeted specifically at items
related to improving the municipality health and education indicators). The third
index measures the municipal administration’s capacity to rule effectively, based on
the turnover of top officials, the share of top officials that holds a professional degree,
the share of top officials with access to computers, the administration’s access to spe-
cialized software that helps automate processes, and the use of protocols for internal
administrative controls.
Moreover, to make sure that post-electoral violence is not driven by the potential
differential engagement of elected left-wing mayors in corrupt practices, we build on
recent work by Martinez (2017a), who uses information from Procuradur´ıa General
de la Nacio´n (Colombia’s Watchdog Agency), to code disciplinary prosecutions of the
municipal mayor and his/her top officials, as a proxy for misbehavior.71 Specifically, the
author codes whether the official was investigated, found guilty, or impeached (which
entails removal from office and a temporal ban from public service).72
70Data for the department of Antioquia come from the department’s land registry agency, which is
independent from the national agency.
71Unfortunately, the performance and corruption data are only available for a shorter period, which
reduces the sample we can use to test for differences on these variables. Table 1.8 specifies the sample
years for which these data are available.
72Not all officials who are found guilty are impeached, as the sanction depends on the severity of
the misconduct. Some guilty officials are fined.
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Figure 1.6: Violence data: examples of attacks
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Table 1.8: Descriptive Statistics of main variables





Panel A. Average yearly attacks per 100,000 inhabitants during government period
Paramilitary 1.980 7.015 0.000 0.000 75.750
Guerrilla 3.820 7.948 0.000 0.065 89.908
Government 0.663 2.561 0.000 0.000 35.224
Panel B. Average yearly clashes per 100,000 inhabitants during government period
Guerrilla-Paramilitary 0.169 0.930 0.000 0.000 7.251
Guerrilla-Government 2.247 4.912 0.000 0.000 51.322
Paramilitary-Government 0.074 0.691 0.000 0.000 10.093
Panel C. Mean occurrence of land cadaster updates during government period
Land cadaster update 0.233 0.424 0.000 0.000 1.000
Panel D. Mean occurrence of corruption episodes during government period
Mayor is...
Investigated 0.204 0.404 0.000 0.000 1.000
Found Guilty 0.121 0.327 0.000 0.000 1.000
Impeached 0.089 0.286 0.000 0.000 1.000
Top local official is...
Investigated 0.064 0.245 0.000 0.000 1.000
Found Guilty 0.038 0.192 0.000 0.000 1.000
Impeached 0.025 0.158 0.000 0.000 1.000
Panel E. Average value of government performance indices during government period
Fiscal performance 61.687 7.950 39.210 60.793 87.715
Legal rules compliance 73.278 15.581 17.020 75.562 98.170
Administrative capacity 73.604 15.929 28.090 79.112 97.620
Panel F. Forcing variable:
V otes left−V otes non−left
V otes top 2
-0.012 0.133 -0.500 -0.000 0.382
|V otes left−V otes non−left
V otes top 2
| 0.094 0.095 0.000 0.067 0.500
Panel G. G. Forcing variable within bandwidth:
V otes left−V otes non−left
V otes top 2
0.004 0.047 -0.093 0.007 0.091
|V otes left−V otes non−left
V otes top 2
| 0.040 0.026 0.000 0.034 0.093
Notes: Number of observations: 254 in Panels A-C and F; 157 in panel D (only available since 2000);
and 157 in panel G. In panel E there are 152 observations for fiscal performance (only available since
2000), and 94 observations for the indices of legal rules compliance and administrative capacity (only
available for 2007 and 2011). In Panels A-F the sample includes all mayoral elections where a left-wing
party is either the winner or the runner-up and the corresponding variable is available. The sample in
Panel G is restricted to Calonico et. al (2014)’s optimal bandwidth (corresponding to the estimate of the
effect of left-wing electoral victories on paramilitary attacks, with first-degree local polynomials and no
controls.
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Table 1.9: Variables and sources
Variable Source Description
Panel A. Dependent variables: Violence
Total Attacks by
all groups
Total number of attacks, by all groups, in the municipality
during the first 3 years of the term in office (per 100,000
inhabitants). Attacks are defined according to (Restrepo
et al., 2003): a violent event in which there is no direct,
armed combat between two groups.
(Restrepo et al.,
2003) updated un-
























til 2014 by Univer-
sidad del Rosario.
Panel B. Dependent variables: Land registry, Corruption & Performance
Land registry up-
date
Dummy = 1 if the land registry was updated during the first














Dummy variables indicating whether the mayor was investi-
gated, found guilty, or impeached for corruption by Procu-
radur´ıa General de la Nacio´n, the government agency that








Dummy variables indicating whether a top local official (at
the rank of Secretary) was investigated, found guilty, or





eral de la Nacio´n.
Fiscal performance
index
Index of fiscal performance based on (+ improves the index,
- deteriorates it): size of the municipality’s debt (-), % of







Index based on whether the municipality complies with legal
spending rules, comparing budgeted and executed resources







Index aggregating: the stability of directives in the munici-
pality, personnel qualifications, the extent to which internal





Panel C. Forcing Variable
Continued on next page
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Winning margin (in %) of the left-wing incumbent, normal-
ized around 0. Values above 0 indicate that the left won










Panel D. Other predetermined covariates
Political covariates




% of total votes (in the municipality) for all left-leaning pres-










% of total votes (in the municipality) for Rodrigo Lloreda,









Dummy = 1 if there was historic violence in the municipal-
ity in (1948–1953). This variable is based on the magazine
Criminalidad published by the National Police from 1958–
1963, which described the municipalities affected by historic
















Altitude of municipality seat above sea level, in meters. CEDE, Universi-
dad de los Andes
Index of soil ero-
sion
Based on georeferenced information at the sub-municipality
level. Land is classified into seven ordinal categories, and the
number of acres in each category is counted to estimate an
index. The index is standardized between 0 and 4.5, where
high values represent more soil erosion.
Estimates by
CEDE Universi-
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Straight line distance to the capital of the department in
which the municipality is located.
Estimates by
CEDE Universi-






Straight line distance to the four main Colombian cities
(Medell´ın, Cali, Bogota´, and Barranquilla)
Estimates by
CEDE Universi-





















Index of soil apti-
tude for agriculture
Land is categorized into seven ordinal categories based on its
suitability for agriculture, and the number of acres in each
category is counted to estimate an index.
Estimates by
CEDE Universi-












1.12 Additional results and robustness tests
1.12.1 Balance on covariates
In Table 1.10 we report estimates of the effect of a narrow left-wing victory (Column 3)
on a large set of covariates. In Panel A we look at the election year to verify whether
left-leaning candidates were disproportionately more likely to win close races earlier or
later in the sample period. Panel B examines geographic variables including altitude,
rainfall, and distance to main cities and the department capital. Panel C includes
socio-economic and political variables, such as having experienced violence during La
Violencia in the 1940s and 1950s, and socio-economic conditions of municipalities like
the share of population living in rural areas, a dummy for the presence of coca planta-
tions, total population, and the literacy rate (all measured prior to our sample period).
In Panel D we look at variables related to land inequality and land policy, such as the
number of years since the land registry was last updated, measured in the election year
prior to when the winner of the close race would have taken office. In Panel E we look
at different measures of tax revenue, also measured in the election year prior to when
the winner of the close race would have taken office. Finally, Panel F focuses on basic
electoral variables such as the average number of parties competing in the race, the
average number of candidates, and overall turnout.
We find no statistically significant differences between treatment and control mu-
nicipalities for most of these variables. The only exception is the number of years
since the land registry was last updated, which is about 4 years higher and significant
at the 95% level in municipalities in which the left won. However, for the remaining
variables the estimated effect of a narrow left-wing victory is both small (typically
just a fraction of the mean and standard deviation) and insignificant. Thus, these are
precisely estimated coefficients that allow us to reject even small effects. Overall, the
results reported in Table 1.10 give us further confidence that our benchmark estimates
capture the causal effect of a left-wing electoral victory on paramilitary violence rather
than the effect of other municipal characteristics.
1.12.2 Robustness to party coding
Parties that could not be classified based on their name or slogan, statutes, or govern-
ment plan were coded as neither left- nor right-wing in our baseline analysis. This may
potentially introduce bias if a sufficient number of such parties is actually either left- or
right-wing. One extreme alternative is to drop all unclassified parties from the sample,
at the cost of drastically reducing the sample size. Panel A of Table 1.11 reports the
robustness of our main results to this alternative sample. The structure of the columns
is the same as that of Table 1.1. Note that the sample size drops in all columns rel-
ative to that of the baseline regressions. Reassuringly, most of the coefficients remain
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Table 1.10: Effect of electing a left-wing mayor on municipal
characteristics
Dependent variable Mean Standard
Deviation
Left victory Std. Error. Obs Bandwidth
Panel A. Election year
Year elected 2002.701 5.447 1.257 2.426 167 .1
Panel B. Geographic characteristics
Altitude, meters 1752.587 3469.152 69.265 671.765 94 .042
Average precipitation 93.010 18.665 1.505 8.379 152 .09
Distance to department capital, km 81.129 53.511 -1.778 23.432 152 .089
Distance to main city, km 145.999 91.279 6.226 41.881 129 .069
Andean region dummy 0.417 0.494 -.128 .203 142 .08
Pacific region dummy 0.398 0.490 .025 .165 156 .092
Eastern region dummy 0.098 0.298 -.065 .112 126 .066
Caribbean region dummy 0.087 0.282 .143 .105 166 .099
Panel C. Socioeconomic characteristics
Vote % for left-wing presidential candidates, 1994 0.067 0.070 -.019 .019 111 .056
Vote % for conservative presidential candidates, 1994 0.422 0.209 -.006 .103 129 .069
La Violencia incidence (1948-1953) 0.146 0.353 -.146 .16 142 .079
Rurality index 0.654 0.238 -.035 .091 178 .114
Initial population, 1993 26328.799 33888.293 18839.104 17523.015 148 .083
Coca, 1994 0.075 0.264 .089 .093 120 .062
Literacy rate, 1993 85.452 8.783 -.664 3.646 150 .088
Panel D. Land variables
Land GINI, based plot sizes 0.707 0.118 -.023 .05 81 .075
Land GINI, based on landowner holdings 0.722 0.103 -.013 .049 67 .06
Number of years since last cadaster update 5.435 5.109 4.157** 1.972 118 .061
Panel E. Tax revenue
Tax income (per capita) 0.071 0.308 -.191 .156 206 .145
Non tax income (per capita) 0.015 0.029 -.015 .012 199 .136
Tax income from land taxes (per capita) 0.017 0.057 -.046 .035 196 .129
Tax income from commerce and industry (per capita) 0.027 0.188 -.092 .087 216 .163
Panel F. Electoral variables
Number of candidates in election 3.949 1.968 .107 .647 135 .075
Number of parties in election 3.587 1.968 .455 .668 142 .079
Voter turnout 0.590 0.170 .014 .054 146 .088
Notes: Columns 1 and 2 report the basic descriptive statistics of each variable. Column 3 reports RDD point estimates of the effect of a
left-wing victory in Mayor elections on each variable, using Calonico et al. (2014)’s optimal bandwidths (reported in column 6), bias correction,
and robust standard errors (column 4), with linear local polynomials and triangular kernels. Column 5 reports the number of observations
including in each estimation.
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significant and of similar magnitude (4.1 to 5 additional paramilitary attacks during
the term in office).
Another approach is to use alternative criteria to code the ideological stance of
parties that could not be classified in steps 1-3. For instance, because many of the 505
parties that participated in local elections during our sample period originated from
previously established parties (notably from the two traditional parties), we could
assign to them the ideology of their parent party (see criterion 4 of the classification
procedure described in Appendix Section 1.11.1). This, however, is subject to some
caveats, particularly if the ideology of the faction or splinter movement is different to
that of its predecessor (which may have motivated the split). Since it is impossible
to know a priori whether including this additional party classification step (that we
refer to as step 4) represents an improvement over our baseline estimates, we take an
agnostic position and investigate the robustness of the baseline results to using the
ideology of predecessor parties as an additional classification criterion.
Panels B and C of Table 1.11 report the estimates after using this criterion (step
4) to code the ideology of parties that could not be classified in steps 1-3. As in the
baseline results of Table 1.1, Panel B assumes that all the parties left unclassified after
steps 1-4 are neither left- nor right-wing. In turn, similar to Panel A of Table 1.11,
Panel C drops from the estimation sample all parties left unclassified after steps 1-4.
Most of the point estimates (particularly in Panel B) remain statistically significant
and of similar magnitude to those reported for our baseline sample (Table 1.1). This
is reassuring, and suggests that our specific choices of party ideology classification are
not driving our substantive findings.
63
Table 1.11: Effect of electing a left-wing mayor on paramilitary attacks
(Alternative samples resulting from different codings of party ideology)
Dependent variable: Average yearly paramilitary attacks per 100,000 inhabitants during term in office
Linear polynomials Quadratic polynomials
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A. Dropping all unidentified parties after applying criteria 1 to 3 a
Left-wing mayor elected 2.807 3.038* 4.701** 4.473*** 4.170** 4.134* 5.064** 4.970**
(1.780) (1.692) (1.939) (1.704) (1.966) (2.196) (2.030) (2.052)
Observations 133 112 97 99 154 108 140 118
Bandwidth 0.0950 0.0770 0.0590 0.0600 0.119 0.0710 0.103 0.0790
(Local) polynomial order 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2
Panel B. Coding all unidentified parties as being neither left- nor right-wing after applying criteria
1 to 4 a
Left-wing mayor elected 2.896 4.228** 4.525** 4.734** 4.769** 4.351** 4.742** 4.393*
(1.899) (1.931) (2.189) (2.337) (2.036) (1.897) (2.236) (2.333)
Observations 191 137 120 112 202 152 178 154
Bandwidth 0.118 0.0760 0.0610 0.0540 0.129 0.0860 0.107 0.0900
(Local) polynomial order 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2
Panel C. Dropping all unidentified parties after applying criteria 1 to 4 a
Left-wing mayor elected 1.936 2.121 2.840 1.669 3.269** 3.131* 3.235* 2.698
(1.536) (1.451) (1.754) (1.536) (1.600) (1.632) (1.852) (1.900)
Observations 168 145 119 145 183 138 165 143
Bandwidth 0.107 0.0880 0.0650 0.0900 0.121 0.0800 0.106 0.0860
(Local) polynomial order 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * is significant at 10%, ** 5%, and *** 1% level. Calonico et al. (2014)
optimal bandwidth and triangular kernel weights in all columns. In Columns 1 to 4 and in Columns 5 to 8 of Panel A,
the (unknown) polynomial is approximated with local linear and quadratic polynomials, respectively. All regressions
in Panel A include the bias correction and robust standard errors of Calonico et al. (2014). Panel B reports parametric
OLS estimates that vary the polynomial degree consistently with Panel A. Columns 1 and 5 include no controls. All
the other columns include pre-determined controls: Columns 2 and 6 include geographic controls (altitude, average
historic rainfall, distance (in km) to Bogota´ and to the closest marketplace, and region dummies (Caribbean, Eastern,
Andean, and Pacific); Columns 3 and 7 include socio-economic controls (vote share for left and right presidential
candidates in 1994 elections, rurality index, total population, literacy index in 1993, presence of coca plantations
in 1994, and historic incidence of political violence during La Violencia. Columns 4 and 8 include all the controls
simultaneously.
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1.12.3 Dropping Recurring Municipaities
Figure 1.7: Effect of electing a left-wing mayor on violence
(dropping recurring municipalities)
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Notes: The solid line marks the Calonico et al. (2014) optimal bandwidth. Non-parametric estimates
with bias correction, robust standard errors, triangular kernels, and linear local polynomials (Calonico
et al., 2014).
65
1.12.4 Alternative Interpretations: right wing parties, new
parties and the UP
Table 1.12: Descriptive statistics of the main variables
Sample: Electoral races in which right-wing parties are winners or




Panel A. Average yearly attacks per 100,000 inhabitants during government period
Total attacks 1.910 6.451 0.000 0.000 93.864
Paramilitary 0.597 3.595 0.000 0.000 76.573
Guerrilla 0.511 2.143 0.000 0.000 30.315
Government 0.211 1.285 0.000 0.000 15.803
Panel B.Forcing Variable
V otes right−V otes non−right
V otes top 2
-0.000 0.113 -0.405 0.001 0.372
|V otes right−V otes non−right
V otes top 2
| 0.088 0.070 0.000 0.072 0.405
Panel C. Forcing Variable within bandwidths
V otes right−V otes non−right
V otes top 2
0.001 0.036 -0.066 0.000 0.066
|V otes right−V otes non−right
V otes top 2
| 0.031 0.019 0.000 0.029 0.066
Notes: Number of observations: 838 in Panels A and B (for 634 municipalities) and 386 in Panel C. The
sample in Panels A and B is the set of mayoral elections where a right-wing candidate was the winner
or runner up and the corresponding variable is available. Panel C in addition restricts the sample to the
Calonico et. al (2014) optimal bandwidth for our baseline estimates of the effect of right wing victories
on total attacks (by all groups) with first-degree local polynomials.
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Figure 1.8: Effect of electing a right-leaning mayor on violence
Robustness to bandwidth selection
Average yearly attacks (per 100,000 inhabitants) during term in office
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Notes: Attacks by paramilitary or guerilla groups (per year and per 100,000 inhabitants) during the 3 years
preceding each election (90% confidence bands). The solid line marks the Calonico et al. (2014) optimal bandwidth,
the dashed line the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) optimal bandwidth. Non-parametric estimates with bias
correction, robust standard errors, triangular kernels, and linear local polynomials (Calonico et al., 2014).
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Each point represents a bin. Bin size is .008
Discontinuity estimate (standard error): -.051 (.141)
Table 1.13: Effect of electing a mayor from a new (non-left) party on
paramilitary attacks
Dep. variable: Average yearly paramilitary attacks per 100,000
inhabitants during term in office
Non-parametric Parametric
estimates estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(Non left) New party elected 0.475 0.446 0.516* 0.300
(0.334) (0.424) (0.286) (0.410)
Observations 1099 1268 1100 1100
Bandwidth 0.0759 0.0941 0.0760 0.0760
(Local) polynomial order 1 2 1 2
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * is significant at 10%, ** 5%,
and *** 1% level. Calonico et al. (2014) optimal bandwidth in all
columns. Triangular kernel weights used in all columns. In Columns (1)
and (2) the (unknown) polynomial is approximated with local linear and
quadratic polynomials, respectively, and include the bias correction and
robust standard errors of Calonico et al. (2014).
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Table 1.14: Effect of electing a left-wing mayor on paramilitary attacks
(Differential effect of UP)
Dependent variable: Average yearly paramilitary attacks
per 100,000 during term in office
(1) (2)
Left-wing mayor elected 2.660* 4.558**
(1.521) (1.938)
Unio´n Patrio´tica (UP) -0.657 -0.736
(0.916) (1.049)





Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * is significant at
10%, ** 5%, and *** 1% level. Calonico et al. (2014) optimal
bandwidth and triangular kernel weights in all columns. In
Columns 1 and 2 the (unknown) polynomial is approximated
with local linear and quadratic polynomials respectively. We




Table 1.15: Incumbency advantage in Colombia using
alternative approach (not conditioning on past incumbency)
Non-parametric estimates Parametric estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A. Dependent variable: Indicator of whether party elected in t runs and wins in t+ 1
Winner party in t -0.0391 -0.0388 -0.0443* -0.0423 -0.0547*** -0.0450*
(0.0269) (0.0288) (0.0230) (0.0261) (0.0183) (0.0262)
Left-wing party -0.205*** -0.205***
(0.0204) (0.0204)
Winner party in t × Left-wing party 0.0127 0.0125
(0.0243) (0.0244)
Observations 5508 7842 5504 7834 7834 7834
R-squared 0.002 0.002 0.009 0.009
Bandwidth 0.0840 0.146 0.0840 0.146 0.146 0.146
(Local) polynomial order 1 2 1 2 2 2
Panel B. Dependent variable: Indicator of whether party elected in t runs in t+ 1
Winner party in t 0.0387 0.0461 0.0347 0.0411 0.0314 0.0382
(0.0315) (0.0349) (0.0265) (0.0314) (0.0219) (0.0314)
Left-wing party -0.335*** -0.335***
(0.0218) (0.0219)
Winner party in t × Left-wing party -0.0414 -0.0412
(0.0292) (0.0293)
Observations 5750 7682 5766 7692 7692 7692
R-squared 0.001 0.002 0.018 0.018
Bandwidth 0.0900 0.141 0.0900 0.141 0.141 0.141
(Local) polynomial order 1 2 1 2 2 2
(Local) polynomial order 1 2 1 2 1 2
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * is significant at 10%, ** 5%, and *** 1% level. Calonico et al. (2014)
optimal bandwidth in all columns. Triangular kernel weights used in all columns. In columns (1) and (2) the
(unknown) polynomial is approximated with local linear and quadratic polynomials, respectively, and include the bias
correction and robust standard errors of Calonico et al. (2014). Columns (3) - (6) are parametric estimates with
polynomials of the forcing variable not displayed. (3) & (5) Linear estimates with varying slopes. (4) & (6) Quadratic
estimates with varying slopes.
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Chapter 2
The Power of Money. The conse-




Do privately donor-funded politicians benefit donors disproportionately? This paper
examines the impact of electing donor-funded politicians using a novel dataset that
uniquely links campaign donors and recipients of public contracts during a mayor’s
incumbency period in Colombia. Using a regression discontinuity design (RDD) that
compares close elections between politicians who received campaign donations and
those who did not, I find that electing a politician who received donations more than
doubles the probability of donors receiving contracts from a mean of 5.9% to 15.5%.
The benefits to the donors of the donor-funded politician are significant: on average
total contracts received is 13.75 times the value of their donations. From a social
welfare point of view, electing a donor-funded politician does not affect local govern-
ment deficits and it has no impact on investment, however they are more likely to have
disciplinary sanctions against them and investigations related to public procurement.
Moreover contracts for donors have a short duration, have an inflated value compared
to similar contracts for non-donors, and tend to be given under a minimum value
threshold modality, in which there is less screening and lower chances of competitors
bidding for contracts. In order to isolate the effect of donor money from other personal
characteristics associated with being donor funded, I employ a fuzzy RDD approach
that uses arbitrary campaign limits as an instrument for the candidates’ proportion of
donor funds. Results indicate that looser campaign limits lead to more participation of
donor funding in campaigns, and as a result reduce the effect of favoring donors with
contracts. This paper shows evidence that political selection of donor-funded candi-
dates can have repercussions in public procurement, and that campaign limits can limit
the influence of money in politics.
1Thanks to Carlos Cardona for great research assistance and Paula Castaneda for helping with the
coding of sanctions. I am grateful for their comments to Karun “King” Adusumilli, Oriana Bandiera,
Jean-Paul Faguet, Dominik Hangartner, Selina Hofstetter, Ethan Ilzetzki, Jaakko Merilainen, Clement
Minaudier, Liliana Olarte, Pablo Querubin, Livia Schubiger, Sandra Sequeira, Abbey Steele, Janne
Tukiainen, Miguel Uribe, Juan F. Vargas and Stephane Wolton. Thanks also to the participants at
the EPSA 2017 annual conference, IEB Political Economy and Fiscal Federalism Conference, Oxford-
Nuffield Graduate Student Workshop, LSE-NYU Annual conference, LSE Comparative Politics Work-
shop, LSE Political Economy Political Science (PSPE) work in progress, and LSE STICERD work in
progress seminar. Finally, thanks to the invaluable effort of Colombian public institutions for making
this information public.
2International Development Department, London School of Economics and Political Science. 6-8th




The role of money in politics has been center in the study of political economy. For
instance Bakunin (1882) argued that elected leaders in democracies have a limited
ability to improve the conditions of working people if they are beholden to the power
of private money. Nobel prize winner Arrow (1978), argued that economic inequal-
ity and the presence of powerful elites who influence the political system produce a
form of democracy that represents the few rather than the majority, he proclaimed:
“democratic government is inevitably something of a sham” (Arrow, 1978, pg.479).
Recent events have placed the study of money in politics at the forefront of the
policy debate. In the 2016 US election, Hillary Clinton was perceived to be too close
to donors, which some analysts argue affected her chances of winning.3 Peru’s ex-
president, Alejandro Toledo, was recently found guilty of receiving money from the
Brazilian construction giant Odebrecht, and then awarding the company a big contract
to build a transoceanic road, that came under public scrutiny for its poor construction
and cost overruns. It was initially forecast to cost $800M USD and ended up costing
around $2,000M. According to Peru’s Ministry of Interior, the president received $20M
dollars, which would imply the contract was 100 times larger than the money received.4
Is electing a donor-funded politician detrimental to the economy?
Voters are often suspicious of donor funded politicians, because they could represent
donor interests rather than the interests of the general constituency. Donor funded
politicians could give favours to donors in exchange of donations (Snyder Jr, 1990;
Grossman, 2002; Coate, 2004; Ashworth, 2006), and these favours could be provided
in a nontransparent way, reducing competition, and potentially increasing the costs of
providing goods to society. On the other hand donor-funded politicians could be more
competent, if donations go to the most prepared politician. Moreover donations could
help increase campaign spending which could reveal the competence of the politician
to voters (Coate, 2004), allowing for a more informed political selection. Donor-funded
politicians, could also favour the best companies, at both selecting candidates via
donations and contracting, improving the allocative efficiency.
What does the evidence say of the potential costs (or benefits) of electing donor-
funded politicians? How do donors benefit? Progress in the empirical literature is
difficult due to severe data limitations: it is difficult to observe systematically how
politicians benefit donors. Furthermore it is difficult to disentangle whether companies
benefited from giving money to politicians, or whether their success is due to other
potential explanations.5 Despite the lack of conclusive evidence, countries have enacted
3BBC News, ”Is Wall Street a problem for Hillary Clinton?”, April 14, 2016. Available here.
4BBC News, ”Juez de Peru´ ordena el arresto del expresidente Alejandro Toledo por caso Ode-
brecht,” February 10, 2016. Available here.
5It is difficult to assess whether these companies would still have benefited if their funded politicians
had lost the election. For example, companies could benefit from the economic stability produced
by an election, or their economic success may happen to coincide with the timing of an election.
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limits to money in politics -in particular- campaign contributions, with the premise that
they will reduce the cost of society of money in campaign. But, are they effective?
I make progress on these issues by constructing a novel dataset that links campaign
donors and contractors during a mayor’s incumbency period in Colombia (2012–2015)
using unique national identifiers (IDs). I also make progress by exploiting close races
between politicians who received campaign donations by private donors and those who
did not6 using a RDD. I also exploit arbitrary campaign limits (which jump discon-
tinuously at arbitrary voter cut-offs)7 as an instrument for the candidates’ proportion
of donor funds using a fuzzy RDD. The latter allows me to to study the effects of
campaign limits and disentangle the effect of campaign donations, from the politician
personal characteristics associated with being donor funded. Using detailed contract-
ing data, I study the procurement process for donors and how they could enjoy a price
premium for the same type of contract executed. Therefore this paper aims to respond
two closely linked questions: i) What are the consequences of electing a donor-funded
politician? (Consequences in terms of contract assignment, economic policy, corrup-
tion, procurement process and contract cost). ii) Can campaign contribution limits
reduce the influence of money in politics?
Answering the first question provides –to the best of my knowledge– the first causal
estimates of the effects of selection of a donor-funded politicians, and could inform voter
decisions. Results show that the electoral success of a donor-funded politician (over
a non-donor-funded politician) more than doubles the probability of donors receiving
contracts from a mean of 5.9% to 15.5% (an in increase of 9.6%). The total value of
contracts awarded to donors when their funded politician wins is, on average, 13.75
times higher than the amount donated. Moreover the evidence shows that electing a
donor-funded politician does not lead to better economic outcomes in the municipality,
lower budget deficits or more investment. However it does increase the probability that
the mayor will be investigated and/or sanctioned by the procurement watchdog for
not following contracting procedures. Contracts for donors have short duration which
increases the likelihood they are paid during the mayors incumbency term. Compared
to regular contracts, contracts for donors tend to be given for supplies ensuring their
quicker pay. Moreover they tend to be awarded under a minimum value modality,
where it is only required to publish the call for bidders only for 24 hours or more, it
is not required to publish the call in the national on-line system, the sole criteria for
awarding contracts is the lowest bidder, and there is no need of a committee to evaluate
proposals. This modality allows the allocation of contracts to specific individuals in a
Recent papers that address this concern are: Boas, Hidalgo, and Richardson (2014); Szakonyi (2016).
However compared to those papers, this paper focuses on the selection of donor-funded politicians vs.
non-donor funded, rather than the effects of general electoral victory.
6Since not all politicians are recipients of campaign donations
7In particular at 25,000 registered voters cut-off, the campaign limits increase from 58M to 110M
COP. 1M COP is equivalent to $350 USD. And each donor can contribute up to 10% of the maximum
campaign total.
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less transparent way compared to regular contracts.8 Compared to regular contractors,
I find that donors on average receive more minimum value contracts, contract in less
number of municipalities (are more local), and contract in more sectors of the economy,
lacking specialization. Finally using text analysis, I match similar contracts for donors
and non-donors within donor-funded incumbencies, and I find that donors enjoy a price
premium of 2 M COP, which is equivalent to approximately 2 average monthly wages
in the municipality. 9
In the case of evaluating campaign limits, evidence shows that loosening campaign
limits from 58M to 110M does not change the underlying characteristics of the winner
politician, showing that more money in politics does not change political selection,
however it does increases the participation of donor campaign funds by 20%, which
in turn leads to an increase in the number of contracts given to donors. This is an
important finding, because this is the first paper -to best of my knowledge-, to causally
estimate the effect of campaign limits (donations) on benefiting donors, which could
be considered the main purpose of campaign limits: limiting the influence of donations
on public procurement.10
In sum this paper provides novel evidence by linking public records of campaign
contributions and contractors, which can reveal the consequences of electing a donor
funded politician; Electing a donor funded politician is associated with an increased
probability of donors being awarded contracts. Most importantly these practices can
be costly because they result in procurement processes that are less transparent, and
can limit competition by other bidders. Also because donor contracts receive a price
premium compared to non-donor contracts, however the size of the distortion does
not affect the overall budget deficit or investment in the municipality. Donor funded
mayors are associated with mayors being more likely to receive disciplinary sanctions.
Although not conclusive, the suggestive evidence shows that sanctions are related to
the level of corruption associated with the contracting transaction. The paper also
shows that campaign limits can be a useful public policy tool to reduce the benefits
for donors, as a result of participating in campaigns.
2.2 Related literature
Money can influence public policy through bribes, lobby, or campaign contributions,
and there can be a large prize given that over 15% of the world’s GDP is spent on public
8This is in sharp contrast with a regular bid, where it is required to publish call for applications
between 5 to 10 working days, this call has to be in the on-line system an evaluation committee can
be used, and the award of the contract has to be justified publicly.
9However a potential limitations of just looking at price, is that the price differential could be
justified by a quality differential. However the lack of specialization in an economic sector of donors,
could imply that it is less likely that quality of goods provided by donors are of a higher quality.
10Avis, Ferraz, Finan, and Varja˜o (2017) estimates the effects of campaign limits on the number of
candidates and how competitive the election is, but not if the donor-funded politicians benefit their
donors or general corruption.
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procurement (Baltrunaite, 2016). According to Witko (2011), there is a broad range
of anecdotal evidence regarding how donating money to election campaigns has led to
politicians benefiting the interests of donors, which in turn has resulted in corruption
cases. However, campaign donations have the potential to play a positive role: they
could serve as a mechanism to select the most prepared politicians for office, and those
politicians may in turn select the donor companies that could be effective at execution.
Furthermore, when a company donates to a politician, this could potentially reduce
the risk of adverse selection, because companies and politicians could determine each
other’s capacities and intentions in advance. Therefore it could be better to give a
contract to a known company rather than an unknown company that may have less
capacity.
Studying how politicians reward donors is challenging, because it is difficult to
measure what the exact benefits is. According to Stratmann (2005) there have been
two common approaches in the literature: looking at politicians’ roll-call votes and
the financial performance of donor companies. Regarding the former, the premise is
that politicians will vote in ways that benefit their donors. However, a large survey
conducted by Ansolabehere, De Figueiredo, and Snyder (2003) shows that most studies
find no effects of campaign contributions on voting.11 A potential issue with using
roll-call votes is that it is difficult to assess whether campaign contributions go to
candidates who are ideologically aligned with a company, or if the donations truly
changed a politician’s position.12 Another difficulty of using roll-call votes to measure
benefits to donors is that voting for legislation in favor of donors does not necessarily
produce immediate benefits. There could be a lag before the legislation is implemented
and the company realizes any benefits. Therefore it is uncertain when benefits (if any)
will materialize, and when they should be measured.
The other approach to quantifying the benefit to donors has been using a company’s
actual financial performance. For example Johnson and Mitton (2003) uses the stock
value of politically connected companies or Szakonyi (2016) uses the profit margin.
Alternatively, Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Ueda (2004) study the effects of soft money
given to political parties on firms’ excess rate of returns. The premise is that companies
that gave soft money may have received contracts or competitive advantages that could
be reflected in their profits and stock value. A potential concern with using companies’
financial performance is that performance can depend on many other determinants
beyond the political connection, and it will take some time for the benefits to materialize
(if any). So timing of the measurement can also be difficult. Due to these potential
drawbacks, I focus on the effect of donations on contract assignment as a directly
observable benefit to companies.
11(Stratmann, 2005) uses an alternative methodology to perform a meta-analysis on studies of
campaign contributions and roll-call votes, and shows that campaign contributions affect politicians’
voting records.
12To address this concern, Stratmann (2002) has used within-politician variations in contributions,
and Ansolabehere et al. (2003) has employed an instrumental variable approach.
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Empirically there is another paper with identification that use contracts as mea-
surement of benefits: Boas et al. (2014), find that electoral victory increases the
probability of conferring contracts for candidate’s corporate donors. However my pa-
per concentrates in a substantially different research question: the effects of electing
a donor-funded politician vs. a non-donor-funded politician – that is, the political
selection of a certain type of politician. In a related paper Szakonyi (2016) also studies
the effect of electing politician types on benefits for companies. He studies election of
firm directors in Russia, and find that politicians firms enjoy higher profits. This rep-
resents a different politician type to the one in my sample, which is politicians funded
by companies/individuals, rather than company owners running for office themselves.
This paper contributes to the literature that shows that elected leaders do make
a difference (see Jones and Olken, 2009). Most of the studies focus on the effects of
diverse politician types: education of leaders (Besley, Montalvo, and Reynal-Querol,
2011; Freier and Thomasius, 2012), women (Ferreira and Gyourko, 2014; Bagues and
Campa, 2017; Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004), their professional background (Matter
and Stutzer, 2015), and their minority status (Pande, 2003). This is the first paper to
causally estimate the effect of electing a politician is donor-funded.
2.2.1 Donors and candidates
Why do individuals or companies donate to politicians? Ansolabehere et al. (2003)
argue that campaign contributions can be considered a consumption activity in which
individuals mostly gain from participating in the democratic process. Most formal
models (for example see Snyder Jr, 1990; Grossman, 2002; Coate, 2004; Ashworth,
2006) assume campaign contributions are used to influence politicians’ policy stances
or obtaining favors.13 From a politician’s perspective, accepting donations could allow
them to further advertise their campaign and qualifications for office (see Ashworth
(2006) or Coate (2004)), which could increase their chances of winning the election. If
donations can potentially benefit both donors and candidates, why are there candidates
that are non-donor funded?
One potential explanation is that, although accepting a donation can help a candi-
date pay for more campaign advertisement, it could damage a candidate’s reputation.
Voters may perceive donor-funded candidates to be less trustworthy, and more likely
to represent special interests instead of their constituents. Ashworth (2006) argues
that rational voters can infer that donor funding could lead to policies contrary to
their interests. Moreover, Coate (2004) argues that informed voters are less willing
to be convinced by additional advertising if they know donors provided the funds to
pay for the ads. Therefore the cost of accepting donations could offset the benefits for
politicians if a large proportion of voters are informed about the sources of campaign
13Which could entail moving to a certain policy stance closer to the donor’s interests, or directly
conferring contracts to donors.
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financing.
Another potential explanation is that donors only give money to candidates who
are ideologically aligned with them. For example, donors may prefer financing a pro-
enterprise candidate rather than a leftist candidate who would prefer a higher taxation
rate. In my case I find that more right-wing14 politicians are donor funded. This is in
line with US evidence reviewed in (Stratmann, 2005), in which campaign donors fund
candidates who share their ideological preferences.
Donor funded candidates –if they win office– could be willing to give contracts to
their donors in exchange for support given during elections (Snyder Jr, 1990). For
the incumbent, awarding contracts is low cost since it is public money and in the
case of Colombia there can be low risk of punishment, given the lack of control offices
in local municipalities. Moreover since mayors serve only a single term in Colombia,
they do not worry that their actions while in office will harm their chances of re-
election. An immediate source of benefits for elected politicians, is that they could
ask a % of the conferred contract directly to the donor/contractor as further payback.
There is anecdotal evidence that shows that elected politicians do so.15 For the elected
politicians there could be also long term benefits to politicians where donor companies
may employ politicians once they leave office. Evidence by Eggers and Hainmueller
(2009) for the UK shows that politicians can be hired by companies once they leave
office.
A final piece of the puzzle is, why citizens would vote for a donor-funded politician if
they know he/she may be beholden to donors after the election? An explanation given
by (Coate, 2004) is that donor-funded politicians, using donor funds and advertisement,
could convincingly persuade non-partisan uninformed voters of their qualifications,
while informed partisan voters may be less willing to be convinced with additional
advertisement. Another potential explanation is that although rational voters know a
candidate accepted donations, they may believe that being donor funded could indicate
a candidate’s competence. They could think donor-funded politicians can do the job
more effectively than a non-donor-funded politician who was less skillful at raising
funds.
2.3 Context
2.3.1 Colombian institutions and electoral context
Colombia recently experienced political and economic decentralization (Bushnell, 1993).
In 1986 there was introduction of elections for local mayors in municipalities.This al-
lowed for first-past-the-post elections, in which every party could put one candidate
14For a classification of ideology see see Fergusson, Querubin, Ruiz, and Vargas (2017))
15This is informally known as “the bite”, see discussion here: La Silla Vac´ıa, “Santos, su N˜on˜o y su
Musa”. Available here.
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name forward. In 1991, a new constitution allowed increased social spending and decen-
tralization of fiscal resources to the regions. The new constitution made municipalities
and departments jointly responsible for the provision of basic public services (Faguet
and Sanchez, 2008). It also allowed new political parties to play a greater role through
an increased presence at the local level (Hoyos, 2005a). In recent years there has been
an increase in the number of parties participating in local elections.16
As a result, Mayors are currently responsible for designing the budget and imple-
menting an annual development plan in the municipalities. Although most municipal-
ities receive transfers from the central government that are tied to specific expenses or
the central government spends directly in the municipality, mayors have discretion over
an average of 20.24% of all local spending17. According to (Martinez, 2017b), most dis-
cretionary resources come from property tax revenues, which are used for the provision
of education, health insurance, water, and sanitation projects as well as the functioning
of the municipality. Most public services at the municipality level are provided by con-
tracting third parties. There are three main forms of contracting in Colombia: 1. An
open-bid process in which applicants submit their proposals. The call for applicants
have to be opened for 5 to 10 working days, and has to be published in an on-line
reporting system. A committee can select the winner, and the award of the contract
has to be justified publicly. 2. Minimum value modality contracts. This applies when
the size of the contract is below 10% of the total municipality budget. It is required
to publish the call for applicants only for a day or more, it is not required to publish
the call in the national on-line system, the sole criteria for awarding contracts is the
lowest bidder, and there is no need of a committee to evaluate proposals. 3. A non-bid
process that involves specific waivers that need to be formally justified18. In practice,
83% of all contracts during the 2011 mayoral incumbency period were given by the
non-bid modality: 53% using waivers and 30% were the minimum value threshold.
In order to limit the influence of money in politics, Colombian law19 establishes
limits for both total campaign contributions and individuals contribution size. The
National Electoral Commission sets the campaign limits for each election. These lim-
its jump discontinuously at arbitrary registered voter cut-offs, for example at 25,000
registered voters the campaign limit increases from 58M to 110M COP.20 In addition,
individual donors cannot give more than 10% of the total campaign limit.21 Limits are
16An average of 4.4 parties contested the 2011 mayoral elections.
17Data from 2012-2015 incumbency period.
18The waiver list applies to: 1. The acquisition or supply of goods and services of uniform technical
characteristics and common use by entities; 2. Contracting in which the tender process has been
declared abandoned; 3. Contracts for the provision of health services; 4. Goods produced by or in-
tended for agricultural purposes, offered on legally constituted product exchanges; 5. The contracting
of goods and services required for defense and national security; and 6. Disposal of assets.
19Article 28 of Law 130 of 1994.
20Subsequently at 50,000 registered voters the limit jumps to 330M COP; at 100,000 registered
voters the limit jumps to 659M COP; at 250,000 the limit jumps to 745M COP; at 500,000 the limit
jumps to 1,318M COP. For the capital city of Bogota´ the limit is 1,646M COP.
21According to article 23 of Law 1475 of 2011.
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announced before campaigning starts. For the 2011 elections campaigning was allowed
from the 30th of July; voting took place on 30th October 2011, and mayors did not take
office until 1st January 2012, therefore I measure the outcomes during the 2012–2015
incumbency period.
2.4 Empirical strategy and data
2.4.1 Data
I use electoral data compiled by Pacho´n and Sa´nchez (2014), gathered from the Colom-
bian national electoral authority, the Registradur´ıa Nacional del Estado Civil. This
data contains the results for mayoral elections for all municipalities in Colombia for
2011. Additionally I gathered data reported by candidates to the the National Elec-
toral Commission, on sources of income and expenditures of political campaigns. This
comes from a new campaign reporting system financed by the US Agency for Inter-
national Development in collaboration with Transparency International. This data is
available publicly and its intention is to increase transparency to the public in cam-
paign finance sources. In order to increase compliance, campaign finance reporting is
mandatory by law since 2009.22 Parties have to electronically submit this information
within two months after the election23, and subsequently the physical evidence of each
source of campaign income and spending. The National Electoral Commission fines
candidates or parties that do not comply with the reporting requirements.24. The data
reports the donors’ unique national ID numbers25, which allows me to link candidates
with publicly available information on contracting.
Table 2.1 illustrates the types of sources of campaign revenue reported in campaign
reporting finance forms. For example, candidates can self-fund their campaigns, obtain
personal bank loans, the party can organize fund-raisers, receive state funding, and/or
receive donations by companies and/or people. In order to generate the counterfactual,
I separate candidates who received campaign donations (code 102 in Table 2.1) from
those who did not.26
There are 1,098 municipalities in Colombia, in order to implement the RDD, I limit
the sample to races in which the mayoral winner and runner-up candidates report
22Resolution 1094 of 2009.
23Article 25, Law 1475 of 2011
24Compliance is fairly high: out of 4,460 mayoral candidates in 2011, 89% reported campaign
information. However, the commission’s capacity to fine candidates who do not submit the information
was removed in late 2012, which could limit the compliance after for the 2015 electoral period.
25In Colombia a unique national ID is assigned when a person turns 18 and is used for a many
purposes such as getting a mobile phone line, obtaining health care, or a loan. IDs are also assigned
to companies, and their assignment is mandatory to conduct any business. When a person owns a
company, the same ID is used for the individual and for the company
26As a robustness check I separated code 101, and coded family members as donors, but the results
remain unchanged.
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their campaign income (966).27 In order to implement the RDD, I must first ensure
that I have enough power – i.e. that enough races are decided between a candidate
who had donors and one who did not. Out of the 996 municipalities that report
information on campaign financing sources, there are 408 such races, while there there
are 209 races between donor-funded politicians and 379 between non-donor-funded
politicians. I concentrate on the first group since I am interested in comparing two
different politician types. One potential concern is that these close races are clustered
in a certain region of the country, but this is not the case. A map of the full sample
is available in Figure 2.3, and a sample of those within a winning margin of 6.5%28
in Figure 2.4. Furthermore, in the sample of a narrow margin I find no spatial auto-
correlation. The Moran I index, available in Figure 2.5, indicates that municipalities
included in the RDD estimate are randomly distributed. Another potential concern is
that municipalities that are contested between donor-funded candidates and non-donor-
funded candidates (408) are not representative of the entire country. I check with a
broad range of municipality covariates (see Table 2.31), and there are no statistically
significant differences between the municipalities included in the sample and those that
are excluded, which strengthens the external validity.29
Comparing sources of financing across treatment donor-funded politicians and non-
donor funded politicians (see Table 2.3), winners without donors finance on average
95% of their campaign using their own resources. When there are donor funds involved,
on average they represent 38% of the campaign financing, thus reducing the burden on
the candidate and their families. It is important to note that state financing is almost
non-existent in both the control and treatment groups, which increases candidates’
reliance on donor funds and self-financing. Also parties, on average, contribute only
3% of campaign funds30. In addition, having donors increases the amount of disposable
income available by campaigns by over 8.7M COP, and are able to finance more public
events (see Table 2.4).
In order to uniquely link campaign donors to contracts assigned in a municipal-
ity, I obtained detailed data on contracting, which was gathered in order to increase
transparency in public procurement.31 This data reports the entity in charge of con-
tracting, the contractor (and their unique ID), under which modality the contract was
made, the broad sector of the economy, the size of the contract, the detailed purpose
of the contract, the length of the contract, whether it was completed, and/or overrun
in costs. Figure 2.1 presents an example of information contained in the contracting
27Table 2.30 shows that the places where there is no reporting by the top two candidates, are more
remote, are more rural, and have more unmet basic needs. The lack of reporting can be associated
with the level of development in the municipality.
28For a discussion of bandwidth choice see the RDD set-up section
29This result is not surprising, considering that the Morans I spatial autocorrelation index shows
that the municipalities in the narrow sample are randomly distributed.
30Hangartner, Ruiz, and Tukiainen (2017) interviewed candidates for local councils, and in many
instances were told that parties just lent their credentials so candidates could run in the election.
31I am grateful to datos abiertos online portal, for posting the contracting data.
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form. I dropped contracts that were assigned by the national government, and exam-
ine only those under the municipality’s jurisdiction since mayors are not in charge of
the contracts executed by the national government. A summary of the contract data
descriptive statistics can be found in Panel B of Table 2.2.
A key aspect of this research is linking the donor and checking whether it is the
same person/company getting a contract. In Colombia, two types of legal entities
can contract with the State: individuals and companies, both with unique IDs. If
an individual donates money to a candidate and then receives a contract, the same
unique ID is used; when an individual gives a donation and his/her company receives
a contract, I can also link them uniquely since the same number is used for the person
and their company. This unique feature of Colombia allows people to be linked with
their companies even if they have different names. The only link that cannot be made is
between individuals and public companies or companies with multiple owners: It could
be the case that one of the owners gives a donation and then the company receives the
contract 32 Figure 2.2 illustrates which links were found.
Using the links above, I coded whether any donor – for the winner or runner-up
candidate in the mayoral election – received a contract. This is to take into account
the fact that donors of non-winner candidates also get contracts, since they can bid
for contracts. If contracts are given to the most economically competitive contractor,
the probability of receiving a contract would be orthogonal to the contractor making a
donation and their funded candidate winning the election. However it is not the case:
Table 2.6 shows that when a donor funded politician is elected 11.71% donors of the
winner politician obtain contracts, while only 1.13% runner-up ”donors” obtained a
contract. Therefore if I find that electing a donor-funded politician has an effect on
awarding contracts for donors, it would mostly be driven by contracts awarded to the
donors of donor-funded politicians. In the case when non-donor politician funded is
elected, 3.58% of donors receive contracts, driven by contracts given to donors of the
runner-up. Interestingly even when donating to the loser politician companies hold a
positive probability of obtaining a contract. Why? donor companies of the opposing
candidate could still be competitive in winning public procurement contracts, or they
could receive contracts by the elected politician to attract support for the party for
the following election. However given the lack of reelection and weak party system in
Colombia the latter is less plausible.
In order to measure politicians underlying characteristics, I made an extensive effort
to obtain candidate-level data. The registry office only holds data on the gender of can-
didates. I obtained data on disciplinary sanctions from Procuradur´ıa, which is the main
public watchdog in charge of prosecuting corruption charges. Via a formal requirement,
I requested the entire history of disciplinary sanctions for all mayoral candidates in
the 2011 election and the date the sanction was executed, which allowed me to code
32Of all local contracts given in the 408 municipality sample, 9.9% were for a multiple owner
companies. These companies can donate themselves, and(or), one of the owners can donate.
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whether the candidate had been sanctioned before or after holding office. On average,
only 2.5% of the mayors in the sample were found guilty of disciplinary sanctions after
they entered office. Disciplinary sanctions can happen for a variety of reasons, for
example if a mayor does not reply to a formal information request by citizens, running
for office without having the legal entitlement to do so, contracting improperly, or any
extended violation of the law. In order to code whether the sanctions and investiga-
tions were related to contracting, I followed the methodology by (Martinez, 2017b))
and web-scraped from the official Procuradur´ıa website33 all the public bulletins of
investigations or sanctions after the 2011 period. Using the mayor’s name, I organized
all bulletins associated with a particular mayor. Then using QDA miner and Word-
Stat and stemming analysis, I searched all bulletins of investigations or sanctions that
contained the root of the word ”contract” and coded as sanction/investigation related
to contract if the root of the word contract appeared in the news bulletin. I further
refined the coding by manually reading the contract-related bulletins and verifying that
the investigation/sanction was indeed related to contracting.
In addition to the disciplinary sanctions, I obtained information on candidates vot-
ing registration available at Registradur´ıa del Estado Civil and I coded if the candidate
was registered to vote and if he/she had previously illegally registered to vote.34 In
order to obtain further individual covariates, I requested all 1,098 mayoral election
ballots for the 2011 election, which contain politicians’ pictures, from the National
Registry Office. A sample can be found in Figure 2.6. Using a Python facial detection
API algorithm, I obtained an estimate of gender, age, and race from the politicians’
pictures. In order to validate these results, I compared the self-reported gender to
the gender predicted by the algorithm and there was less than a 3% difference. For
the sample, descriptive statistics in panel D Table 2.2 show that less than 11% of
mayors were female during the study period, 12% were categorized with indigenous
background, 35, and 5% are black. The average politician age is 44. I used the cod-
ing used in Fergusson et al. (2017) to measure ideology. In the study sample, 22%
of mayors were classified as right-wing, while only 10% were classified as left-wing. I
also wanted to code candidates’ experience in politics, since it could be the case that
donors choose to give money to more experienced candidates. To do so, I exploit the
fact that all descendants from the Spanish use two last names36 to code the number of
times the candidate participated in elections and held office. In order to account for
the possibility of homonyms in full names, I coded any names that appeared twice as
candidates in the same electoral year as missing, since it is only legally possible to be
33https://www.procuraduria.gov.co/portal/
34That is, the person either used a dead person’s ID to vote, changed his or her registration ballot
to another municipality in exchange for money, or tried to vote while underage. The most common
fault is moving to another municipality to vote.
35There algorithm predicted 12% Asians, but there are few Asians in Colombia. A further in-
vestigation of the pictures showed that they were actually Colombians with a distinct indigenous
background.
36One from each parent
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candidate for a single mayoral post. Only two candidates had exactly the same name
and both last names in the 2011 election.
Finally, to obtain municipality-level predetermined covariates, and potential policies
enacted by mayors, I obtained a municipality-level panel (2011–2014) with a broad
range of economic, social and institutional covariates, thanks to a pre-existing effort
by Universidad de los Andes. In order to complete the fiscal data for 2015 (since the
mayoral period runs from 2012–2015, and there was a year missing), I requested the
fiscal data from the National Department of Planning and created averages during the
incumbency period of different fiscal variables. I measure predetermined covariates in
2011, before the Mayor term starts in 2012.
Extended descriptive statistics of the base sample of 408 municipalities are available
in Table 2.2. On average, 17.2% of donor are awarded contracts. Of the contracts given
in a municipality, on average 40% were given directly with waivers that have to be
justified and 50% by minimum value modality, while only 10% are open to competitive
bid. On average, municipalities invest 86% of their budget; most of the remaining
income is for administrative operations.37
2.4.2 RD Design
The outcomes I want to study here – contract assignment, policies, and corruption –
could be determined by a broad range of constituency characteristics. For example,
bigger municipalities likely have larger budgets, which could lead to more contracting.
Mayors’ wages could also play a role: according to Besley (2004), higher wages could
make politicians act more congruently with voter preferences, and ensure better be-
havior. Furthermore, according to Martinez (2017b), municipality income from natural
resources, rather than taxation, can lead to more corruption.
Given all the potential explanations of the outcomes, it is difficult to disentangle the
effect of electing a politician from other constituency characteristics. To address this
challenge, I employ a quasi-experimental design: an RDD that examines close elections
in 408 Colombian municipalities between donor and non-donor funded politicians. The
premise is that within a narrow electoral margin, municipality characteristics are very
similar except the type of mayor who won. In order to test this premise, I check whether
other municipality characteristics jump discontinuously at the cut-off.
Since the campaign reporting system has only been in place since 2009, I can only
use the 2011–2015 election period. I check the mayors’ funding sources as well as the
effects on (Yi in eq (3)): contract assignment (explained above), disciplinary sanctions,
whether the investigations/sanctions are related to contracting, the types of policies
implemented. I also look at contract level data to check the difference contract modality
assignment for donors and non-donors during the 2012–2015 incumbency period.
37This expenditure is for the functioning of the internal administrative apparatus, such as municipal
public employees.
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A potential concern with this analysis is that there is systematic misreporting of
donors that leads to misclassification. Candidates with donors are most likely to under-
report donations, and therefore be misclassified as non-donor-funded politicians, while I
would not expect candidates to report donors who did not donate38. Therefore I would
expect several control units to be classified as treatment. If I was able to classify these
candidates correctly, I would expect to find even bigger effects of electing a donor-
funded politician because I would observe more potential links between donors and
contractors, so the effect I are finding represents a lower bound.
This section of the paper focuses on close races in which the donor-funded (DF)
candidate wins or is the runner-up.39 I count the winner and runner-up votes and let:
Xi = be the vote share of the DF politician in municipality i minus the vote share
of non-DF. Xi = is centered around 0, so DFit = 1 if (Xit > 0). In particular:
DFi =
DFi = 1 if Xi > 0DFi = 0 if Xi < 0 (2.1)
Note that when the donor-funded politician loses, this implies that the non-donor-
funded politician wins : If DFi = 0 then nonDFi = 1. So I compare across municipali-
ties that are similar except for the identity of the winning candidate.
If there is no manipulation of the electoral outcome near the margin (i.e., it is not
the case that donor-funded politicians always barely win), and if there are no other
predetermined factors that vary discontinuously when donor-funded politicians win,
the RDD allows me to estimate the causal effect of electing a donor-funded politician:
α = limx↓cE [Y1|X = c]− limx↑cE [Y0|X = c] , (2.2)
where c is the winning cut-off that has been centered around 0. Eq (2) holds when
a narrow margin h is close enough (Lee and Lemieux, 2010b). A first approximation
estimates the effect of electing a donor-funded politician on the outcomes studied here:
yi = α + β1DFi + β2f(Xi) + β3DFi × f(Xi) + εi (2.3)
For a close h bandwidth, I estimate f(Xit) non-parametrically with a variety of
polynomials to make sure it is not the functional form determining the evidence of
discontinuity at the c cut-off, so I use a polynomial that may vary for DF = 0 or
DF = 1.
I estimate α non-parametrically to make sure it is not the functional form driving
the result. As discussed in Fergusson et al. (2017) the choice of bandwidth h involves
a trade-off between efficiency and bias in the non-parametric estimation: very small
38There is no plausible gain from adding non-existent donors with their unique ID to the reporting
form, while doing this could increase scrutiny
39Since Colombia has a first-past-the-post system, I am only interested in close races between the
winners and runners-up.
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bandwidths are more likely to approximate the quasi-experimental assignment of the
treatment variable, which ensures that municipality characteristics do not vary dis-
continuously at the cut-off (Lee and Lemieux, 2010b). Yet they often produce small
sample problems and imprecise estimates. To deal with this issue, in my baseline esti-
mate I report the conventional estimates and the optimal bandwidth, bias correction,
and robust standard errors proposed by (Calonico et al., 2014). Evidence by Hyytinen,
Merillinen, Saarimaa, Toivanen, and Tukiainen (2017) shows that this type of bias cor-
rection produces RDD results that are similar to the experimental estimate. Following
Gelman and Imbens (2014b), I estimate α for first- and second-order polynomials to
avoid using higher-order polynomials.
A potential concern with this design is that politicians who received campaign do-
nations may have personal characteristics that are different to those of politicians who
did not receive campaign donations, and those characteristics themselves determine the
probability of giving contracts to donors. In the results section I test for differences in
individual covariates across treatment and control group and find that donor-funded
politicians tend to be more right-wing and have more political experience than their
non-donor-funded counterparts. To test whether ideology or political experience alone
increases the probability contracts awarded to donors, I control for these characteristics
and the main result holds. However these characteristics could be considered as part
of the treatment, so this specification has to be interpreted with caution. In addition
I employ a RDD using close elections between right-wing (politically experienced) and
non-right-wing (politically inexperienced) candidates, and find that neither has a sta-
tistically significant effect. This result is intuitive, since it is difficult to find a reason
why either ideology or political experience would cause politicians to award contracts
to specific donors, except for the fact that donors provided a financial contribution.
Moreover it is important to note that the current RDD estimate shows the effect
of electing a certain type of politician – being a donor-funded politician (a bundle of
characteristics) – rather than money received on its own. While my fuzzy RDD estimate
aims to isolate the effect of accepting donor funding from individual characteristics,
see section 4.4.
2.4.3 Text analysis and contract price comparison
The paper aims to determine whether there was a price reward for donor contracts com-
pared to non-donors contracts, for similar contracts. To maintain comparison with the
RDD design, I compare contracts within donor funded incumbencies that were elected
in a narrow margin. The narrow electoral margin allows the comparison to be made
within similar municipalities, since their predetermined covariates are smooth across
the cut-off (see Table 2.10). Moreover focusing only on donor-funded incumbencies,
helps capture differential conditions for donors and non-donors, that the donor-funded
mayor may be giving. Similarly I compare contracts for donors of the runnerup vs.
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regular contracts, in non-donor funded incumbencies 40 to check whether there is a
punishment in contract terms for donors of the runner-up candidate.
A first approximation involved comparing the value of contracts for the exactly
the same purpose contracts and in the same municipality, but the sample was limited.
However there could be several contracts that differ by one or two words but have
the same purpose. In order to look for these, I used a natural language toolkit in
Python, described in Bird, Klein, and Loper (2009). First I removed the stopwords
from the description of the purpose of the contract – i.e., words that are not relevant
to explaining the contents of the contract (i.e., is, the, by, or, with).A complete list of
stopwords used is available upon request. Then I compared the same wording (except
stopwords) for the purpose of the contract in the same municipality. This increased the
sample size of comparison, but still there could be several contracts that are similar
in purpose but slightly differ in words not identified in the stopwords. In order to
make this comparison I employed a composite index that contains: 1) similarity in the
sequence of wording that describes the purpose of the contract and 2) the Jaro-Winkler
edit distance41 between the two contract purpose descriptions. I used this to construct
an index of similarity that ranges between 0 and 1, where 1 is exactly the same wording
of the contract except stop-words. The following following table shows the process:
Example of text analysis
Donor-funded contract purpose Non-donor-funded contract purpose
Support to the administration in the
adequate management, organization,
collection and classification of the archives
and all its components, of the archive of the
administration of the municipality of
Betania
Support to administration in the
management, organization, adequate
collection and classification of the files and
all its components of the municipal
administration file
Stopwords removed Stopwords removed
support administration adequate
management organization collection








Since it is difficult to establish what is the minimum similarity score to be able to
ensure a comparison, I calculated the difference in contract value for a similarity score
from 0.9 to 1 in short intervals to ensure the result holds. Another potential concern
is that contracts in different municipalities could have a different real value. Economic
40Note that the only type of donor, in the non-donor funded incumbencies are donors for the
runner-up.
41For example, between the word car and cart there is an edit distance of 1.
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development, and therefore wages, vary considerably across regions in Colombia.42 To
scale the value of contracts relative to local wages, I calculated the average wage during
the contracting period (2012–2105) in each municipality.43
2.4.4 Fuzzy RDD Set-up
As discussed earlier, the main treatment in the first empirical design (i.e., having
received donor funds) aims to estimate the effect of electing a donor-funded politician
(a bundle of characteristics), but not the effect of donations themselves. To isolate the
effect of money, given a set of personal characteristics, I use looser campaign limits as
an instrument for the proportion of money received by candidates:
Second stage:
Yi = α + β1D̂FPi + β2f(Vi) + β3DFPi × f(Vi) + εi. (2.4)
Where DFP which is the percent of the winning candidate’s campaign funds that
came from donors. Yi is the probability of a donor being awarded a contract, and the
number of contracts awarded to donors.
In order to estimate the effect of DFP I employ a fuzzy RDD, that instruments the
proportion of donor funds received with campaign limits that jump discontinuously at
arbitrary registered voter thresholds. These cut-offs do not coincide with other public
policy cut-offs, since they use the registered voters’ cut-offs instead of population cut-
offs. This is important because according to Grembi, Freier, Eggers, and Nannicini
(2017), some studies use population cut-offs where several policies vary at the cut-
off, which would imply a compound treatment. Such approach makes it difficult to
disentangle the effect of one of the policies varying at the cut-off. Using this cut-offs I
estimate the first stage:
First stage:
DFPi = β1CampaignLimiti + β2f(Vi) + β3CampaignLimiti × f(Vi) + εi. (2.5)
Where CampaignLimits is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the munici-
pality is over the 25,000 registered voters’ cut-off that implies 110M COP campaign
limit, 0 under the 25,000 registered voters which implies 58M COP campaign limit. I
am unable to use other campaign limit cut-offs due to power restrictions, since most
of the municipalities are under around the 25,000 registered voters (see Figure 2.8).
Therefore the sample is limited to municipalities with registered voters under 50,000,
where campaign limits jump discontinuously again.44 Vi = is the forcing variable, that
42During 2012–2015 the average wage in municipalities ranged from 0.5 M COP, (equivalent to $197
USD) to 1.9 (M COP)
43Based on Harvard’s Colombian Atlas of Economic Complexity, which gathered wage data from the
Integrated Report of Social Security Contributions, managed by the Colombian Ministry of Health.
44At 50,000 registered voters the limit jumps to 330M COP, from 110 M COP
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is the number of registered voters around the 25,000 voters’ cut-off, from 0 to 50,000.
Vi = is centered around 0, so CampaignLimiti = 1 if (Vi > 0). In particular:
CampaignLimiti =
CampaignLimiti = 1 if Vi > 0CampaignLimit = 0 if Vi < 0 (2.6)
The premise is that the instrument is determined by an arbitrary institutional cut-
off, and in a narrow margin h its assignment is uncorrelated with both municipality
covariates and winning candidate characteristics. As with other RDD designs in a
narrow margin of the campaign limit, it would be expected that there are smooth
covariates on both sides of the cut-off.
Exclusion restriction
There could be other potential effects of campaign limits affecting the exclusion
restriction. According to the formal model by Avis et al. (2017), fewer candidates may
participate in elections where there are campaign limits. Yet Table 2.25 shows that
when there are looser campaign limits, there are no differences in the total number of
candidates participating in elections or the total number of donors. Another potential
concern is that when there are more registered voters, municipalities are bigger, and
more covariates could change, like politicians’ salaries or the income of the municipality
which could in turn affect the probability of giving a contract to a donor. A further
concern is that with looser campaign limits there could be a selection effect. For
example, donors may prefer certain types of candidates (i.e., more right-wing), or
certain types of candidates could be motivated to participate in elections if there is
more campaign money to be raised.
In order to empirically check this potential violation of the exclusion restrictions, I
check whether any municipality or individual-level covariates jump discontinuously at
the cut-off. The results show that across 7 municipality covariates (See Table 2.26), and
10 individual-level covariates (See Table 2.27), when there are looser campaign limits
there is 0.2% total less income from natural resource royalties in the municipality and
a lower proportion of winners from an indigenous background. These differences could
be by chance, since I am testing for numerous covariates, or potentially correlated with
the outcome. As an additional robustness check in order to disentangle the effect of
money from other characteristics, I include the fuzzy RDD specifications both with
and without these individual and municipality controls, and the results hold.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Effects of electing a donor-funded politician
This section compares the effect of electing a donor-funded politician vs. a non-donor-
funded politician – i.e., it compares municipalities with different types of elected politi-
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cians. Before running this RDD I check if there is manipulation of the electoral out-
come. It could be the case that mayors who receive campaign donations systematically
barely win (or lose), which would indicate that there is some electoral manipulation.
Running the McCrary test (McCrary, 2008b) (see Figure 2.7) to check if there is any
discontinuity in the density of vote share around the winning cut-off shows no discon-
tinuity in the distribution at the winning cut-off.45 As an additional robustness check,
I test whether other measures of electoral manipulation jump discontinuously when
the donor-funded politician wins. For this I used measures of vote buying and turnout
suppression used in Rueda and Ruiz (2017). It could be the case that the additional
funding received by donor-funded politicians is used for vote buying in order to win
elections. In addition I use the measurements of violence developed by Restrepo et al.
(2003), which identify violent attacks by armed groups. Violent groups could be pres-
suring the population to vote for a certain group, and then ask for contracts once their
favored candidate wins. The results in Table 2.9 show that there is no difference in
vote-buying reports, turnout suppression reports, or actual violence, which indicates
that in a narrow margin, when the donor-funded candidate won, there is no electoral
manipulation.
In order to conduct a valid RDD estimate, another potential threat to identifica-
tion is that there are other covariates that jump discontinuously when a donor-funded
candidate wins. Running an RDD estimate with the predetermined covariates as a
dependent variable, I show that there is no difference among treatment and control
groups in a broad range of covariates (see Tables 2.10 and 2.11). Municipality total
income, mayors’ salaries, and income from royalties do not vary discontinuously at the
cut-off.
Another potential explanation for the outcome is that in races in which the donor-
funded politician won, there were more donors, and that is why more contracts were
awarded to donors. However results in Table 2.11, show this is not the case: a similar
number of donors appear in the races whether the donor-funded candidate wins or loses.
The same results holds for the size of the donations, and the number of contracts
available in the municipality. Of the 16 covariates I checked to see if they jumped
discontinuously at the cut-off, there is only a systematic difference in the size of the
local council (see Table 2.11). This could be a potential concern, since giving more
contracts to donors could be explained by buying support of the local council via
awarding contracts. In order to address this concern, I control for council size to
determine whether results change.46
What is expected to be different across treatment and control groups are the indi-
vidual characteristics of politicians, given that receiving donor funding implies potential
45Similarly, for the arbitrary campaign cut-offs, there is no sorting of registered voters around the
25,000 voters’ cut-off (see Figure 2.8).
46These unbalanced covariates can be explained by chance given that I tested for discontinuities for
16 covariates and one could be significant.
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differences in characteristics. The results on individual characteristics (reported in Ta-
ble 2.5) show that there is a difference in ideology: 28% of donor funded mayors are
right-wing in a narrow electoral margin.47 This could imply that donors prefer candi-
dates who are ideologically aligned with them; they could prefer more pro-enterprise
candidates, who tend to be more right-wing. Another individual covariate that jumps
at the cut-off is political experience (having participated in an election before). It could
be argued that candidates become more skilled at raising funds the more they partici-
pate in elections, or that donors prefer candidates with more experience in elections.
To further investigate whether ideology or experience affects whether contracts are
awarded to donors, I ran two separate RDDs in which the treatment is barely electing
a right-wing politician or barely electing a politician who has political experience.48
The results (available in Table 2.12) show that electing a right-wing candidate does
not result in awarding more contracts to donors. Moreover, the proportion of donor-
funded politicians remains constant, and donor income as a percent of the total do not
vary discontinuously. Therefore, given the same level of donor involvement, electing a
right-wing candidate by itself does not lead to more contracts given to donors. Table
2.13 shows similar results: electing a candidate with previous political experience does
not lead to more contracts given to donors, with similar level of funding at both sides
of the cut-off. As stated earlier this result is intuitive given that it is difficult to find
a reason why either ideology or political experience would cause politicians to award
contracts to donors, except for the fact that donors provided a financial contribution.
Estimating equation (3) in Table 2.7, both with polynomials of order 1 and 2, and
using both the conventional RDD estimate and the bias-corrected estimate proposed
by Calonico et al. (2014), I find that when a donor-funded politician wins, the proba-
bility that he or she will award a contract to a donor increases by 9.5%. This result is
robust to including the unbalanced covariate, council size in column (2) and the indi-
vidual characteristics in column (3). However as discussed above, the later specification
is only indicative given the the individual characteristics of donor funded politicians,
are covariates that are part of the treatment (post-treatment). Nevertheless, the effect
ranges from around 103–164% of the mean, which means that the probability of receiv-
ing a contract more than doubles when the donor-funded candidate wins. The results
(displayed on Figure 2.9), show that the effect is slightly stronger close to the winning
cut-off point, which could suggest that donor-funded politicians are more willing to
award contracts when they win by a narrow margin. This could be to buy support for
the next election, while a secure win may indicate less need to repay donors.49 In order
47This finding is in line with the US evidence reviewed in Stratmann (2005), which shows that
campaign donors select candidates with the most experience who best align with their ideological
preferences (Snyder, 1992).
48Evidence of smooth covariates around the winning cut-off and the McCrary test for these RDDs
is available upon request.
49However, the farther I go from the cut-off, the fewer balance covariates there are, so this inter-
pretation is only indicative
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to check if the result holds for a variety of bandwidths, I estimate the result for band-
widths in small intervals and find that the results also hold across larger bandwidths
(see Figure 2.10).
In addition to measuring the outcome the probability of receiving a contract, I
measure the number of contracts obtained by donors. The results (presented in Table
2.8) show that donor-funded politicians give 5.9 more contracts to donors if the links
are measured directly (i.e., a company/person donated and got the contract). However
it is important to note that the result in total number of contracts is not significant
using robust estimates nor for higher order polynomials, which indicated that electing
a donor funded politicians, increases the probability of obtaining a contract, but does
not increase the total number of contracts for donors, which would show the effect is
on the extensive margin. The results so far show that electing donor-funded politicians
indeed leads to higher probability for campaign donors to obtain a contract. But does
this result necessarily entail more corruption and waste?
Table 2.14 shows that electing a donor-funded politician does not lead to having
a higher income during the incumbency period, more tax collection, less operational
expenditure or more investment in the budget, or a lower deficit. However Table 2.15
shows that the probability of a mayor receiving a disciplinary sanction increases consid-
erably when a donor funded politician wins, from an average of 2.45% to 9–11.6%. This
result is robust to a variety of bandwidth sizes (see Figure 2.11) and different functional
forms in Table 2.15. In order to check if the sanctions were related to contracting, I
use my coding of whether the sanction or investigation was related to contracting as
the dependent variable. Due to power restrictions I pool sanctions and investigations
related to contracts.50 The results, shown in Table 2.16, show that electing a donor-
funded politician increases sanctions or investigations related to contracting by 8.6%,
which is a sizable effect compared to the 6.1% mean. This result is only suggestive
because it is not robust to using a higher-order polynomial, or including controls, how-
ever it is significant when the biased corrected estimate is used. The result is valid
only for bandwidths up to 10% (see Figure 2.12), yet the coefficient remains positive
across larger bandwidths. This result is suggestive that the type of corruption taking
place in the municipality is related to contracting. But what exactly are the mayors
doing to benefit their donors?
2.5.2 Mechanism for benefiting donors: underlying contract
characteristics
One way of understanding how donor-funded politicians may benefit their donors is
to compare the contracts awarded to donors to regular non-donor contracts. When a
donor funded politician wins, I expect to find that contractors who were funders will
get more beneficial contract terms than those who were not funders. Similarly, when
50There were only 13 cases of sanctions related to contracting
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a non-donor-funded politician wins, they could be less likely to reward the donors of
the runner-up, or may provide less favorable contract terms as punishment. Table 2.17
reports the conditions under which the contracts were given.
According to Table 2.17, when the donor-funded politician wins, contracts are
awarded to donors using the minimum-value modality 60.9% of the time, and using
waiver contracts only 27% of the time. The proportion of minimum-value contracts
for non-donors is lower, and this difference is statistically significant. This modality
can provide a significant advantage for donors, since contracts under this modality are
awarded under a minimum value modality, where it is only required to publish the
call for applicants only for a day or more, it is not required to publish the call in the
national on-line system, the sole criteria for awarding contracts is the lowest bidder,
and there is no need of a committee to evaluate proposals. This is in sharp contrast
with a regular bid, where it is required to publish call for applications between 5 to 10
working days, this call has to be in the on-line system an evaluation committee can be
used, and the award of the contract has to be justified publicly. And is in contrast to
contracts assigned via waivers where it is necessary to legally justify and prove with
evidence why the contract was given.
A potential for donors drawback of employing this modality of contracting for
donors is that the contract value has to be under a minimum threshold which is 10%
of the municipality income. However a way to circumvent this, used by donor-funded
politicians is to issue several contracts under minimum value modality. In Table 2.20
I check difference in donor characteristics, vs. regular contractor characteristics. Ef-
fectively, on average donors receive over 5 minimum value contracts, while regular
contractors obtain 1.23 contracts. Moreover, the donor contracts in more sectors of the
economy compared to a regular contractor.
Looking at aggregate evidence of contracts, in Table 2.17, for donors, the average
duration is much shorter, 60.5 days compared to 102.7 days for non-donors, and 83.5%
of donor contracts finished execution by September 201651 while only 40% of contracts
for non-donors finished by September 2016. Moreover contracts for donors are signed
earlier in the incumbency term, mostly in the second year of incumbency, while regular
contracts are given in the last two years of incumbency. Given the short duration and,
and earlier assignment it is more likely that contracts finish during a Mayor incumbency
term, compared to regular contracts. Moreover donors who are contractors tend to be
regular individuals, rather than established companies. Interestingly, if a non-donor
Mayor is elected, there is no statistically significant difference in how contracts are
assigned to donors compared to non-donors, so there is no punishment to donors of the
runner-up, rather donors of the loser candidate face the same contracting conditions
as any other contractor in the municipality. Moreover they the donors who are able to
obtain a contract despite being a donors of the runner-up tend to be more established
51Date when the dataset was obtained
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companies.
Table 2.19 shows the sector of the economy of contracts for donors and non-donors
under different mayor types. When the donor-funded politician wins and donors are
awarded contracts, 44% of these contracts are given in the personal services sector52.
Interestingly, donor-funded contracts have a larger proportion of supplies of materials
and machinery, as well as supplies for the municipality. These types of contracts can
be quickly executed (and paid off). Surprisingly, non-donors tend to be awarded more
construction contracts (15.6%, compared to 12.5% to donors). This discrepancy may be
because construction contracts take longer to execute, and therefore they are less likely
to finish during an incumbency period. Moreover, they tend to be larger contracts, and
are therefore legally required to open up for competitive bids. It is easier for mayors to
award contracts under the minimum-value modality, which tend to be smaller contracts
and pay them off quickly if they are supply contracts. Looking at the legal type of
contract in Table 2.18, I verify that donor contracts tend to be more concentrated in
supplies compared to non-donors contracts.
Multiplier of contracts for donors
In order to quantify the potential benefits for donors, in this section I measure the
amount obtained in contracts compared to the amount donated using the following
multipliers. I do this in a narrow electoral margin, where municipality characteristics
are similar when a donor-funded politician is elected compared to when the non-donor
funded politician is elected. Since municipality underlying characteristics are similar:
municipality income, number of contracts in the municipality, number of donors in the
race, it would be expected that overall market conditions for contracting are similar,
except the favorable conditions for contractors who were donors. In particular it would
be expected that rewards for donors are higher when the donor funded politician wins:
Multiplier = Total Value of Contracts Received/ Total Value of Donations Made
(2.7)
MultiplierScaled =
(TotalV alueofContractsReceived− TotalV alueofDonationsMade)
TotalV alueofDonationsMade
(2.8)
Donors receive a total value in contracts that is, on average, 10.67 times the value
they donated (see Table 2.21). This value is very large, and Table 2.21 reveals that
this result is driven by several outliers in the distribution of the multiplier, which
implies that for several donors there can be a huge return. Table 2.22 shows that
when a donor-funded candidate is elected, donors obtain 13.76 times the value they
52For example, consultancies, accountants, drivers.
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donated. Surprisingly, even when the non-donor politician is elected, donors still obtain
a positive multiplier of 6.57, which is driven by high-value contracts for the few donors
(see Table 2.22) who obtain large contracts despite donating to the candidate who lost
by a narrow margin. In order to compare the multiplier for donors when a donor is
elected vs. when a non-donor is elected, I employ a t-test and a comparison of medians
using the Fisher exact test to account for outliers. The evidence shows that there
is a difference of 7.1 in the multiplier, and this difference is statistically significant,
which shows that there are higher benefits to donors when the donor-funded politician
wins. Most interestingly, average donor contributions in the race when a donor funded
politician barely wins or loses are similar, 9 M COP and 7.8 M COP respectively, but
the benefits for donors diverge substantially if the donor funded politician wins.
Price premium for donors
A key part of this paper is determining whether there was a price reward for donor
contracts compared to non-donors contracts for similar contracts. As explained in the
empirical set-up section, I compare contracts for donors to non-donor regular contracts
within a narrow electoral margin of donor-funded incumbencies. This is to capture
how the same type of mayor can treat contractors differentially.
Using the detailed purpose of the contract, and after stripping the purpose of the
contract of irrelevant words (stop-words) and comparing identical-purpose contracts
(similarity score=1), I found 31 identical contract purposes between donors and non-
donors. The price premium for the donor contracts was 1.7 local wages53 higher. In
order to increase the sample size, I compared contracts with a similarity score of 0.9
or above, and obtained 81 similar contracts that have a difference of 2.3 local wages
(See Table 2.23). A more systematic comparison of the price inflation across different
similarity scores can be found in Figure 2.13. Independent of the score, the price
premium for donors is 3M to 2M COP, which is around 2.2 to 1.9 average local monthly
wages. That contracts awarded to donors have a systematically higher pay for a broad
range of similar contracts indicates that there is indeed a premium for being a donor.
This evidence is indicative because the price differences could be explained by the fact
that the quality of goods provided by donors systematically are higher. However, given
that donors contract in more sectors of the economy according to results in Table 2.20,
it less likely that the quality of the good provided is higher, given the lack of economic
specialization.
53That is the total value of the contract divided by the local wage
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2.5.3 Case Study
A more detailed case study54 can further the understanding how contracts are provided
for donors and if there is a price premium.
The case of municipality “Village town”, in the department of Meta.55
The 2011 election was one of the closest in the history of “Village town”, Meta.
The candidate “Juan” of the traditional political party was elected mayor by a narrow
electoral margin. According to the National Registry office, “Village town” had less
than 25,000 registered voters in 2011, and therefore each candidate could legally raise
a maximum of 58M COP. The traditional party candidate was donor funded and was
able to raise approximately 31M COP, while the runner-up was self-funded (his wife
gave him 2M COP).
Systematic use of minimum value modality contracts:
“Donor A” was one of the donors for the winner electoral campaign, with 1.2 M
COP. During “Juan’s” incumbency period he obtained 122 public contracts for over
950 M COP, 791 times the value donated. 117 of the contracts awarded were given
via minimum value contracts, representing 880M COP of the total contracts received.
Looking at the contracting process for “Donor A” particularities can be found. Most
of the 117 contracts were awarded for “Donor A” as the unique bidder and the bid
was open for one day, which is the minimum required by law. This suggests that any
person or firm interested in providing the good or service had to present its proposal
and comply with all the Colombian regulations for being a contractor within 24 hours.
Another interesting aspect is that the contracts assigned for “Donor A” covered a
broad range of goods and services, indicating lack of specialization. “Donor A” was a
regular contractor for “support” for municipality meetings, and was also hired for IT
and software maintenance for the Mayor’s office. “Donor A” also was one of the main
suppliers of the municipality, he received contracts for providing food and lodging for
the municipality’s events, he was also hired for providing sound equipment, stationery,
clothes and even propellers, among other things. Due to the lack of specialization it
would be difficult to argue that the quality of products provided by “Donor A” were
higher to justify a price premium. However this evidence is just suggestive, since I
don’t have an assessment on quality.
Same purpose of the contract, higher price for donor:
54This is useful according to Franzese (2009) and Mahoney and Villegas (2009) who argue that
qualitative studies can help understand the underlying causal mechanisms behind two variables in
econometrics; this because qualitative studies allow for more detail
55Name of the municipality and names of the people involved have been changed for security reasons.
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In November 2014, the municipality of “Village Town”, headed by “Juan”, signed a
contract with “Donor B”, who had donated 1.5M COP to the campaign. The project
involved technical support for monitoring infrastructure projects in the municipality.
The Mayor’s office justified contracting this service directly by noting the relatively
high degree of specialization that this project required, as it was necessary to hire a
contractor with knowledge of civil engineering or architecture. This implied that a
public tender or competitive process was not opened. The contract had a duration of
six months and a total value of 24M COP. The contractor received monthly payments
of 4M COP upon completion of its monthly duties. The project was executed on a
regular basis, with no additions or abnormal activities. By the end of the contract, the
contractor had received 100% of the contract amount, which was 16 times the value of
his donation.
In April 2015 the Municipality of “Village Town” signed a contract with “Non-donor
A”, a non-donor contractor. Both the main objective and all the specific tasks of the
contract were exactly the same as those specified in “Donor B”contract. However, the
duration of the contract was only 4 months. Furthermore, even though the technical
specificities of both contractors were identical, “Non-donor A” received monthly pay-
ments of 3.2M COP, for a total of 12.9M COP. Thus for the same tasks, the value of
the non-donor contract was 53% of the total value of the donor contract.
Both qualitative and quantitative evidence in these sections show that donors of
the donor funded politician, have a higher multiplier, enjoy contracts under the mini-
mum value modality that could limit competition, and could potentially enjoy a price
premium for the same purpose of the contract. The latter could indeed affect public
good provision, because with limited budgets, municipalities end up paying more for
the similar type of good provided. This could provide a reason why campaign limits
should to be enacted. But are they effective?
2.5.4 Effects of campaign limits
At 25,000 registered voters, campaign limits jumps from 58M COP to 110M COP,
and the law establishes that individual donors can donate up to 10% of the total
limit. Figure 2.14 illustrates that under 25,000, the average donor contribution per
municipality is consistently under the 5.8M COP limit which show that limits are
indeed binding. There is a small standard deviation and average donations tend to
be close to the limit. Above the cut-off where the individual contribution limit is
11 M COP, the average contribution increases and has a bigger standard deviation.
Running the RDD using the arbitrary campaign limits, I find that when there are looser
campaign limits (moving from 5.8 M to 11 per individual contribution), the average
donor contribution increases to 3.8M COP (see Table 2.24), and candidates reduce
self-funding of their own campaigns, however this latter difference is not statistically
significant. Most interestingly, according to evidence in Table 2.24 there isn’t a higher
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total campaign income product of looser campaign limits, rather a substitution effects
from using less own income to finance campaign to using donors. As a result, the
participation of donor income as a percent of total campaign income increases by 27%.
Moreover looking at results in Table 2.25 show that the total number of donors remain
constant. So essentially there are similar numbers of donors, increasing average size of
the donation, and increasing their participation in the politician campaign portfolio.
As discussed in the exclusion restriction section, a potential concern with using the
campaign limits as an instrument for proportion of donors funds, is that there are other
variables jumping discontinuously at the cut-off. According to (Avis et al., 2017) there
can be fewer candidates, but this is not the case according to results in Table 2.25.
Moreover testing across a broad range of municipality characteristics (Table 2.26), and
winner candidate characteristics (Table 2.27) there are almost no differences when there
are looser campaign limits. The sole difference I find is that there are more mayors
with an indigenous background and less income from royalties, in municipalities with
looser campaign limits. Therefore I include controls in the fuzzy-RDD as an additional
robustness check.
Estimating the fuzzy RDD, the results in Table 2.28 indicate that allowing looser
campaign limits leads to 27–32% more donor income as percent of total income, which
in turn leads to 49–52 more contracts for donors, and this result is robust to including
unbalanced controls. As an additional robustness check instead of instrumenting the
proportion of donor funds, I instrument a dummy whether the politician was donor-
funded, and the result holds: (columns 3 and 4), looser campaign limits lead to an
increase of 31–32 more contracts to donors.
Interestingly changing the dependent variable from the number of contracts for
donors to the probability that donors receive contracts, in Table 2.29 there is a positive
coefficient but not significant. Looking back at Table 2.24, the number of donors remain
constant but rather the average contribution increases, therefore the effect of campaign
limits is on the intensive margin, rather than increasing the probability for donors.
2.6 Discussion
Political selections of donors funded politician do matter. If donor funded politicians
are elected, it increases the probability of donors receiving contracts. Indicative evi-
dence suggests that this can lead to more investigations or sanctions towards the Mayor
due to improper contracting. Moreover this paper shows that contract assignment does
not necessarily strictly depend on the economic capacity of companies/individuals; but
rather depends on political contributions made during the campaign. The size of the
payoff for donors depends on the electoral victory of the candidates supported. This
result is important because economic returns of a company could depend on an event
unrelated to the actual economic capacity of companies. Finally the paper shows that
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looser campaign limits leads to more higher level of contributions by donors, and less
own funding, increase the participation of donor funds as a % of total income, and
therefore conferring more contracts to donors. Campaign limits, reduce the size of the
reward for donors.
Most importantly from the social welfare perspective, giving donors to contracts
can be costly because they result in procurement processes that are less transparent,
and can limit competition by other bidders; in particular the minimum value modality
used allows for short calls and there is no advertisement online for the procurement bid.
Also, these practices can be costly because donor contracts receive a price premium
compared to non-donor contracts of the similar type. However, the size of distortion for
donors does not affect the overall budget deficit or investment level in the municipality.
Moreover my study represents a lower bounds estimate of money in politics, because
there are other forms that money participates in politics, such as lobby or bribes that
could lead to benefits for donors.
It is important to note that the price differential observed could be attributed
to a difference in quality of the good provided. I provide suggestive qualitative and
quantitative evidence that indicates that this is not necessarily the case given the lack
of expertise and specialization of some donors in an economic sector, where is difficult
to argue they provide higher quality goods in a multitude of sectors. However more
systematic evidence can be collected.
Given the evidence collected in this paper I can ask again: Is democratic government
inevitable something of a sham? (Arrow, 1978) Evidence by this paper suggests that
voter political selection of donor funded politicians make a difference. However this
could depends on the proportion of informed voters of the sources of financing of
candidates (Coate, 2004). More advertising about the transparency system of campaign
sources could increase the proportion of informed voters. Moreover, this paper finds
that institutional rules under democracies, such as campaign limits, can reduce the
influence of money in contract assignment. So decisions and rules within democracies,
can limit the influence of money and make the system less of a sham.
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2.7 Tables and figures
2.7.1 Figures
Figure 2.1: Example of a contract in the Dataset
Source: Colombia Compra Eficiente contract reporting system.
Figure 2.2: Summary of linking contracts with donors
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Figure 2.3: Colombian municipalities where the donor funded politician
placed first or second. 2011 Election
Figure 2.4: Colombian municipalities where the donor funded politician
placed first or second in a electoral narrow margin of (6.4%). 2011 Election
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Figure 2.5: Spatial autocorrelation index (Morans I) for municipalities
where the donor funded politician placed first or second in a narrow
margin.
Figure 2.6: Example of mayoral election ballot of 2011
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Figure 2.10: Robustness check: Different bandwidth sizes. Effect of
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Figure 2.11: Robustness check: Different bandwidth sizes. Effect of
electing a donor funded politician on disciplinary sanctions
Figure 2.12: Robustness check: Different bandwidth sizes. Effect of
electing a donor funded politician on investigation/sanction related to
contracting
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Figure 2.14: Average Donor contribution and campaign limits
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2.7.2 Tables
Table 2.1: Donations Codebook
Revenues
101 Credits or contributions from the income of the candidates, or direct relatives
102 Contributions, grants and loans, in cash or kind, by private donors
103 Credits obtained in financial institutions to finance the campaign
104 Income originating from public events, or publications by the party or movement
105 State funding
106 Political parties direct financing
Expenditure
201 Administrative expenses
202 Office expenses and acquisitions
203 Investment in materials and publications
204 Public acts by the candidates
205 Transport and mail service costs
206 Political research and training of party members
207 Judicial accountability and expenses related to campaign accounts
208 Electioneering expenses
209 Financial costs
210 Expenses that exceed the amount set by the National Electoral Council
211 Other expenses
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2.7.3 Effects of electing a donor funded politician
Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics
N mean sd min p50 max
Panel A. Main outcomes
Probability of donors receiving contract 408 0.059 0.121 0.000 0.000 0.667
Total # of contracts for donors 408 2.576 12.256 0.000 0.000 137.000
Mayor sanctioned 408 0.025 0.155 0.000 0.000 1.000
Investigations/sanctions related to contracting 408 0.061 0.240 0.000 0.000 1.000
Panel B - Contract types
Minimum value contracts 405 0.50 0.212 0.021 0.477 0.964
Waiver contracts 405 0.39 0.221 0.000 0.409 0.937
All directly assigned contracts 405 0.90 0.104 0.132 0.929 0.995
Contract Value (COP M) 405 401.17 5577.840 6.108 32.119 110587.734
Contract Value addition (COP M) 405 4518.86 60293.782 5.959 33.755 1125156.000
Contract Duration (Days) 405 102.01 50.855 12.000 97.812 598.500
Percent time addition 405 0.02 0.033 0.000 0.006 0.232
Percent value addition 405 2.15 42.370 -0.000 0.004 852.696
Avg. contracts that did not finish 405 0.34 0.344 0.000 0.196 0.964
Avg. contracts that finished 405 0.03 0.050 0.000 0.005 0.327
Panel C - Fiscal policy variables during incumbency period
Total Income Y(COP M) 408 20478.85 27711.652 3119.273 13347.738 274440.156
Sources of Income
Land Taxes (%Y) 408 3.77 4.646 0.000 1.964 35.093
Industry (%Y) 408 3.13 5.786 0.000 1.260 60.728
Sources of Spending
Funct. expen. (%Y) 408 13.07 4.930 3.955 12.750 33.224
Investment (%Y) 408 86.93 4.930 66.776 87.250 96.045
Deficit (%Y) 408 11.30 10.621 -4.037 8.203 81.869
Panel D - Individual Characteristics of incumbent
Women 408 0.105 0.307 0.000 0.000 1.000
Age 377 44.398 9.318 18.000 44.000 71.000
Black 377 0.050 0.219 0.000 0.000 1.000
Indigenous background 377 0.122 0.328 0.000 0.000 1.000
Left Wing 408 0.034 0.182 0.000 0.000 1.000
Right Wing 408 0.221 0.415 0.000 0.000 1.000
Sanctioned before holding office 408 0.100 0.301 0.000 0.000 1.000
Registered illegally to vote 408 0.007 0.086 0.000 0.000 1.000
Has political experience 408 0.449 0.498 0.000 0.000 1.000
Has electoral experience 408 0.355 0.479 0.000 0.000 1.000
Panel D - Potential manipulation variables
Vote buying reports 408 0.301 0.784 0.000 0.000 7.000
Turnout suppression reports 408 0.096 0.430 0.000 0.000 5.000
Total Attacks 408 0.400 1.321 0.000 0.000 18.000
Paramilitary Attacks 408 0.120 0.617 0.000 0.000 8.000
Note: 408 is the base sample where the donor funded candidates places first or second.
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Table 2.3: Sources of campaign income across candidate types, % of Total
Income
Non Donor-Funded Donor-Funded Mean Difference
Self and family 0.948 0.561 0.387***
Only self funding 0.734 0.382 0.352***
Donor funded campaign 0.000 0.399 -0.399***
Credits obtained financial institutions 0.009 0.007 0.002
Party Public Events fund-raisers 0.013 0.021 -0.008
State funding 0.006 0.000 0.006
Direct Party funding 0.023 0.011 0.011
Total Income of Campaing (M COP) 32.087 40.765 -8.677***
Note: The number of observations are 164 and 244 for non-donor and donor-funded group
respectively. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.4: Sources of campaign spending across candidate types, % of
Total Spending
Non Donor-Funded Donor-Funded Mean Difference
Administrative expenses 0.116 0.125 -0.010
Office expenses and acquisitions 0.037 0.041 -0.004
Investment in materials and publications 0.116 0.097 0.019
Public acts 0.271 0.312 -0.042*
Transport and mail service costs 0.383 0.322 0.061**
Training costs and political research 0.004 0.005 -0.001
judicial accountability and expenses accounts 0.004 0.004 0.000
Total Spending (M COP) 24.750 30.882 -6.132***
Note: The number of observations are 164 and 244 for control and treatment group respectively.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.5: Differences in individual characteristics between donor funded
politicians and non-donor funded
Dependent variable Mean Std. Dev. Donor fund. won Std. Error. Obs Bandwidth P-value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Individual covariates
Women 0.105 0.307 0.051 0.109 241 0.083 0.640
Age 44.398 9.318 -4.353 3.218 209 0.075 0.176
Black 0.050 0.219 -0.037 0.126 165 0.051 0.766
Asian 0.122 0.328 0.042 0.118 203 0.074 0.721
Leftist party 0.034 0.182 0.007 0.091 206 0.069 0.936
Rightwing 0.221 0.415 0.281** 0.127 178 0.054 0.028
Previously sanctioned 0.100 0.301 -0.048 0.105 196 0.062 0.643
Ilegal Registration of ID. 0.007 0.086 0.004 0.012 204 0.067 0.727
Has political experience 0.449 0.498 0.352** 0.164 168 0.050 0.031
Has electoral experience 0.355 0.479 0.132 0.151 191 0.061 0.380
Notes: Columns 1 and 2 report the basic descriptive statistics of each variable. Column 3 reports RDD point estimates of
the effect of a donor funded victory in Mayor elections on each variable, using (Calonico et al., 2014) optimal bandwidths
(reported in column 6), bias correction, and robust standard errors (column 4), with linear local polynomials and triangular
kernels. Column 5 reports the number of observations including in each estimation.
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Table 2.6: Donors assignment of contracts in donor funded vs non-donor
funded incumbencies:
Donor Funded Elected Non-Donor Funded Elected
Donor got contract Donor got contract
No Yes Total No Yes Total
Donors of winner 1,251 166 1,417 132 0 132
Donors of winner (%) 88.29 11.71 100 100 0 100
Donors of runner-up 351 4 355 891 38 929
Donors of runner-up (%) 98.87 1.13 100 95.91 4.09 100
Total Donors (#) 1,602 170 1,772 1,023 38 1,061
Total Donors (%) 90.41 9.59 100 96.42 3.58 100
Note: The base sample is 408 municipalities where the race was contested between donor funded
politicians and non-donor funded politicians. There are 132 “donors” of the winner when a non
donor funded politician wins. These are contributions by the candidates themselves. Similarly, 355
“donors” of the runner-up when the donor funded is elected, are contributions by the candidates
themselves. 4 of these runner-up candidates got a contract.
Table 2.7: Effect of electing a donor funded politician on Contract Given
to any donor
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Loc. Linear Pol-1 Loc. Linear Pol-2
Donor Funded Elected 0.086** 0.077** 0.061* 0.097** 0.083* 0.076*
(Conventional Estimate) (0.033) (0.033) (0.031) (0.041) (0.040) (0.040)
Donor Funded Elected 0.096** 0.085** 0.067* 0.104** 0.089* 0.082*
(Robust Estimate) (0.040) (0.040) (0.037) (0.046) (0.045) (0.045)
Council size X X X X
Individual Characteristics X X
Observations 196 198 200 266 274 254
Mean 0.059 0.059 0.059 0.059 0.059 0.059
Effect Mean(Per) 145.76 130.51 103.39 164.41 140.68 128.81
Bandwidth 0.062 0.064 0.065 0.096 0.100 0.092
(Local) polynomial order 1 1 1 2 2 2
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Robust estimate includes robust standard errors and the optimal bandwidth
by Calonico et. al (2014)
Individual characteristics: Rightwing and poltical experience
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Donor Funded Elected 5.935* 8.880
(Conventional) (3.482) (7.091)




Effect Mean(Per) 259.01 402.83
Bandwidth 0.129 0.111
(Local) polynomial order 1 2
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Includes robust standard errors and the
optimal bandwidth by (Calonico et al., 2014).
Table 2.9: Smooth manipulation covariates across the donor funded
victory cut-off
Dependent variable Mean Std. Dev. Donor fund won Std. Error. Obs Bandwidth P-value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Vote buying reports 0.301 0.784 -0.085 0.256 187 0.059 0.739
Turnout suppression reports 0.096 0.430 0.147 0.095 212 0.071 0.123
Total Attacks 0.400 1.321 0.038 0.254 155 0.047 0.882
Paramilitary Attacks 0.120 0.617 -0.030 0.110 129 0.040 0.786
Notes: Columns 1 and 2 report the basic descriptive statistics of each variable. Column 3 reports RDD point estimates of the effect of a donor-
funded victory in Mayor elections on each variable, using (Calonico et al., 2014) optimal bandwidths (reported in column 6), bias correction, and
robust standard errors (column 4), with linear local polynomials and triangular kernels. Column 5 reports the number of observations including
in each estimation.
Table 2.10: Smooth municipality covariates across the donor funded
victory cut-off
Dependent variable Mean Std. Dev. Donor fund won Std. Error. Obs Bandwidth P-value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Municipality socio-economic characteristics
Altitude (meter) 1144.824 1486.769 -340.316 340.187 204 0.068 0.317
Sq km 788.174 1753.898 30.936 368.174 190 0.059 0.933
Distance Deparment capital 81.875 54.137 17.519 15.284 192 0.061 0.252
Distance to Bogota 314.941 186.395 -96.564 113.773 155 0.047 0.396
Literacy rate 83.978 8.422 0.298 3.082 176 0.053 0.923
Rurality index (0-1) 0.566 0.223 -0.134 0.092 173 0.052 0.147
Unsatisfied basic needs 44.593 20.008 8.080 6.312 175 0.053 0.201
Notes: Columns 1 and 2 report the basic descriptive statistics of each variable. Column 3 reports RDD point estimates of the effect of a donor-
funded victory in Mayor elections on each variable, using (Calonico et al., 2014)’s optimal bandwidths (reported in column 6), bias correction, and
robust standard errors (column 4), with linear local polynomials and triangular kernels. Column 5 reports the number of observations including
in each estimation.
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Table 2.11: Smooth campaign and municipality covariates across the
donor funded victory cut-off
Dependent variable Mean Std. Dev. Donor fund won Std. Error. Obs Bandwidth P-value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Campaign covariates
Total Number of Donors (Winner + Runner-up) 7.642 5.714 1.651 1.816 196 0.062 0.364
Total Value Donations (Winner + Runner-up) 67.565 57.108 35.337 27.952 188 0.059 0.206
Total Number of Contracts in municipality 801.040 687.561 24.935 211.029 197 0.064 0.906
Covariates potentially related to contracting
Disposable Income (mw) 6788.060 10678.524 -790.892 2941.446 229 0.081 0.788
Municipal category 5.870 0.552 0.033 0.180 212 0.071 0.852
Mayor wages 6.265 1.141 -0.067 0.360 212 0.071 0.851
Council size 10.779 2.287 1.138* 0.680 254 0.091 0.094
Total population 20091.512 21779.559 9041.764 6872.333 220 0.074 0.188
Income from royalties 0.080 0.167 0.037 0.058 279 0.105 0.530
Education establishments 280.079 158.969 -86.886 53.183 188 0.059 0.102
Notes: Columns 1 and 2 report the basic descriptive statistics of each variable. Column 3 reports RDD point estimates of the effect of a donor-
funded victory in Mayor elections on each variable, using (Calonico et al., 2014)’s optimal bandwidths (reported in column 6), bias correction, and
robust standard errors (column 4), with linear local polynomials and triangular kernels. Column 5 reports the number of observations including
in each estimation.
Table 2.12: Effect of electing rightwing politician on probability of giving
contracts to donors
(1) (2) (3)
Contract Given to donor Donor Fund. Elec % of Donor Income
Right-Wing Elected 0.074 0.166 0.016
(Conventional) (0.053) (0.130) (0.082)
Right-Wing Elected 0.092 0.183 0.002
(Robust) (0.063) (0.155) (0.097)
Observations 262 278 258
Mean 0.049 0.418 0.321
Effect Mean(Per) 151.02 39.71 4.98
Bandwidth 0.079 0.089 0.077
(Local) pol. order 1 1 1
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Robust estimate includes robust standard errors and the optimal bandwidth by
Calonico et. al (2014).
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Table 2.13: Effect of electing a politician with political experience on
probability of giving contracts to donors
(1) (2) (3)
Contract Given to donor Donor Fund. Elec % of Donor Income
Politically Experienced Elected -0.035 0.124 0.102
(Conventional) (0.040) (0.131) (0.076)
Politically Experienced Elected -0.046 0.131 0.092
(Robust) (0.047) (0.157) (0.092)
Observations 247 261 267
Mean 0.049 0.418 0.321
Effect Mean(Per) -71.43 29.67 31.78
Bandwidth 0.072 0.075 0.077
(Local) pol. order 1 1 1
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Robust estimate includes robust standard errors and the optimal bandwidth by
Calonico et. al (2014).
Table 2.14: Effect of electing a donor funded politician on fiscal policy
variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total Income (Y) Land Taxes Indus. Taxes Funct. expen. Investment Deficit
(M COP) (%Y) (%Y) (%Y) (%Y) (%Y)
Donor Funded Elected 8940.041 0.974 0.863 -0.369 0.369 1.051
(Conventional) (6510.759) ( 1.152) ( 1.046) ( 1.846) ( 1.846) ( 2.899)
Privately Funded Elected 10006.696 1.152 1.462 -0.220 0.220 1.435
(Robust) (7857.657) ( 1.374) ( 1.059) ( 2.302) ( 2.302) ( 3.405)
Observations 213 200 179 200 200 206
Mean 47102.906 3.889 3.377 13.284 86.716 11.346
Effect Mean(Per) 18.98 25.04 25.56 -2.78 0.43 9.26
Bandwidth 0.072 0.065 0.056 0.066 0.066 0.070
(Local) pol. order 1 1 1 1 1 1
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Robust estimates includes robust standard errors and the optimal bandwidth by
(Calonico et al., 2014).
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Table 2.15: Effect of electing a donor funded politician on mayor being
sanctioned
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Loc. Linear Pol-1 Loc. Linear Pol-2
Donor Funded Elected 0.091* 0.090* 0.096* 0.114* 0.110 0.112*
(Conventional Estimate) (0.049) (0.050) (0.051) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063)
Donor Funded Elected 0.106* 0.105* 0.110* 0.116* 0.112 0.116*
(Robust Estimate) (0.058) (0.059) (0.060) (0.070) (0.070) (0.070)
Council size X X X X
Individual Characteristics X X
Observations 215 212 200 248 248 246
Mean 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.025
Effect Mean(Per) 364.00 360.00 384.00 456.00 440.00 448.00
Bandwidth 0.073 0.071 0.066 0.086 0.086 0.085
(Local) polynomial order 1 1 1 2 2 2
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Robust estimate includes robust standard errors and the optimal bandwidth
by Calonico et. al (2014)
Individual characteristics: Rightwing and poltical experience
Table 2.16: Effect of electing a donor funded politician on investigation or
sanctions related to contracting
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Loc. Linear Pol-1 Loc. Linear Pol-2
Donor Funded Elected 0.066* 0.057 0.038 0.061 0.048 0.034
(Conventional Estimate) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053)
Donor Funded Elected 0.086* 0.077 0.056 0.056 0.044 0.032
(Robust Estimate) (0.047) (0.048) (0.049) (0.060) (0.061) (0.060)
Council size X X X X
Individual Characteristics X X
Observations 156 167 169 187 189 191
Mean 0.061 0.061 0.061 0.061 0.061 0.061
Effect Mean(Per) 108.20 93.44 62.30 100.00 78.69 55.74
Bandwidth 0.048 0.049 0.051 0.058 0.059 0.060
(Local) polynomial order 1 1 1 2 2 2
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Robust estimate includes robust standard errors and the optimal bandwidth
by Calonico et. al (2014)
Individual characteristics: Rightwing and poltical experience
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2.7.4 Contract Level results
Table 2.17: Comparison of contracts by Mayor type, and whether the
contractors were donors.
Donor-funded Mayor Non-donor funded Mayor
Contractors were: Non-donors Donors Mean Difference Non-Donors Donors Mean Difference
Avg. minimum value contracts 0.477 0.609 -0.132*** 0.427 0.488 -0.060
Avg. assigned directly contracts 0.434 0.278 0.155*** 0.470 0.390 0.080
Avg. all directly assigned contracts 0.910 0.887 0.023* 0.898 0.878 0.020
Avg. Contract Duration (Days) 102.734 60.535 42.198*** 111.058 119.512 -8.454
Avg. Percent time addition 0.024 0.015 0.008 0.022 0.037 -0.015
Avg. Percent value addition 0.013 0.019 -0.005 0.015 0.033 -0.017
Avg. contracts that finished 0.398 0.835 -0.436*** 0.378 0.427 -0.049
Contract for a company 0.307 0.278 0.029 0.282 0.585 -0.304***
Contract for an individual 0.608 0.696 -0.089*** 0.645 0.415 0.230***
Contract finished during incumb 0.140 0.267 -0.127*** 0.136 0.159 -0.023
Year 1 contract signed 0.190 0.202 -0.012 0.173 0.159 0.014
Year 2 contract signed 0.252 0.327 -0.074*** 0.241 0.220 0.022
Year 3 contract signed 0.280 0.253 0.028 0.301 0.268 0.032
Year 4 contract signed 0.277 0.218 0.059*** 0.285 0.354 -0.068
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: The number of observations are 70661 and 514 for control and treatment group in columns
(1) and (2) respectively. For columns (3) and (4), the number of observations are 60850 and 82
for control. (*) Finished by September 2016 when this data was gathered.
Table 2.18: Comparison of contract types by Mayor type, and whether the
contractors were donors.
Donor-funded Mayor Non-donor funded Mayor
Contract type: Non-donors Donors Mean Difference Non-Donors Donors Mean Difference
Lease 0.008 0.008 0.001 0.007 0.061 -0.054**
Consultancy 0.023 0.000 0.023*** 0.020 0.000 0.020***
Audit 0.017 0.004 0.013*** 0.014 0.000 0.014***
Other Type of Contract 0.041 0.004 0.037*** 0.044 0.024 0.020
Service Provision 0.524 0.500 0.024 0.561 0.524 0.037
Supply 0.239 0.387 -0.149*** 0.247 0.305 -0.058
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: The number of observations are 76902 and 514 for control and treatment group in columns
(1) and (2) respectively. For columns (3) and (4), the number of observations are 65389 and 82
for control. (*) Finished by September 2016 when this data was gathered.
Table 2.19: Comparison of contracts sector by Mayor type, and whether
the contractors were donors.
Donor Funded Elected Donor Funded non Elected
Non-Donor Gave Donation Mean Difference Non-Donor Gave Donation Mean Difference
Agriculture and others 0.011 0.029 -0.018** 0.011 0.000 0.011***
Construction 0.156 0.125 0.031** 0.133 0.122 0.011
Manufacture and Industry 0.010 0.021 -0.011* 0.009 0.037 -0.027
Materials and machinery 0.103 0.161 -0.059*** 0.101 0.110 -0.008
Medicine and health 0.020 0.014 0.006 0.039 0.000 0.039***
Environment 0.027 0.019 0.008 0.027 0.000 0.027***
Mining and energy 0.003 0.004 -0.001 0.002 0.000 0.002***
Municipality administrative supplies 0.102 0.160 -0.058*** 0.104 0.049 0.055**
Services 0.485 0.447 0.038* 0.501 0.366 0.135**
Transport 0.083 0.019 0.064*** 0.073 0.317 -0.244***
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: The number of observations are 76902 and 514 for control and treatment group in columns
(1) and (2) respectively. For columns (3) and (4), the number of observations are 65389 and 82
for control
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2.7.5 Donor Level results
Table 2.20: Comparison of contractors by Mayor type, and whether the
contractors were donors.
Donor-funded Mayor Non-donor funded Mayor
Contractors: Non-donors Donors Mean Difference Non-Donors Donors Mean Difference
Total # of Municipalities 10.020 1.298 8.721*** 10.145 2.647 7.498***
Total # of Contracts 2.723 9.018 -6.294** 2.851 4.824 -1.972
Total # of Min. Value Cont. 1.121 5.298 -4.177* 1.083 2.059 -0.976
Total # of Economic Sectors 1.233 1.930 -0.697*** 1.230 1.412 -0.182
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: The number of observations are 28239 and 57 for control and treatment group in columns
(1) and (2) respectively. For columns (3) and (4), the number of observations are 22934 and 17
for control. (*) Finished by September 2016 when this data was gathered.
Table 2.21: Descriptive statistics multiplier to investment and contract
value
Variable mean sd min p50 p75 p95 max
Total donation value(COP M) 8.536 12.149 0.000 5.000 10.000 50.000 180.000
Total contract value (COP M) 17.299 188.914 0.000 0.000 0.000 325.713 4780.517
Multiplier 10.677 86.875 0.000 0.000 0.000 357.533 1410.801
Multiplier scaled 9.677 86.875 -1.000 -1.000 -1.000 356.533 1409.801
Note Multiplier is Total contract value/Total donated value. For multiplier scaled see
equation (8)
Table 2.22: Donor average returns conditional on electoral victory of
donor funded politicians
Non-Donor Elected Donor-Elected Mean Difference P-value means P-value-medians
Total donation value(COP M) 7.894 9.030 -1.136 0.073* 0.120
Total contract value (COP M) 6.128 25.888 -19.761 0.045** 0.000***
Multiplier 6.673 13.759 -7.086 0.118 0.000***
Multiplier scaled 5.673 12.759 -7.086 0.118 0.000***
Note: The number of observations are 662 and 847 donors for non-donor elected incumbencies
and donor-elected incumbencies respectively. Multiplier is Total Contract Value/Total donated
value. P-values for means comes from a t-test of difference in means. P-values for medias comes
from a Fisher exact test. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
2.7.6 Price premium for donors
Table 2.23: Price Comparison of similar type of contracts for donors and
non-donors
Contract Value Contract value in local wages
Donor-Contracts Regular Mean Difference Donor-Contracts Regular Mean Difference
Score=1 (31) 11.691 9.844 1.847** Score=1 10.222 8.447 1.775**
Score>0.9 (81) 11.448 8.608 2.840* Score=0.9 9.817 7.453 2.364**
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: T-test paired comparison. Number of observations in parenthesis. Score is the similarity
score in contract purpose contents. The score removes stop words, and combines the sequence
and edit distance.
115
2.7.7 Results on Campaign Limits
Table 2.24: Effect of looser campaign limits on:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Average own Average donation Total Campaign Donor Income
campaign contribution Income as % of total
Looser Campaign Limits -8.471 3.827* -13.779 0.268*
(Conventional Estimate) (7.024) (1.763) (-9.902) (0.134)
Looser Campaign Limits -9.374 3.225 -16.286 0.273*
(Robust Estimate) (8.693) (2.388) (-11.947) (0.165)
Observations 143 55 73 141
Mean 19.051 2.640 52.922 0.187
Effect Mean(Per) -44.46 144.96 -26.04 143.32
Bandwidth 8045.595 3499.152 4653.014 7867.652
(Local) polynomial order 1 1 1 1
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Robust estimate includes robust standard errors
and the optimal bandwidth by (Calonico et al., 2014)
Table 2.25: Effect of looser campaign limints on:
(1) (3)
Total candidates Total # of donors
Lower Campaign Limits 1.173 -0.532
(Conventional Estimate) (0.708) (0.372)
Lower Campaign Limits 1.319 -0.484
(Robust Estimate) (0.849) (0.448)
Observations 125 65
Mean 4.054 1.998
Effect Mean(Per) 28.93 -26.63
Bandwidth 6986.524 4323.794
(Local) polynomial order 1 1
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Robust estimate includes robust standard errors and the
optimal bandwidth by (Calonico et al., 2014)
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Table 2.26: Smooth predetermined municipality covariates across looser
campaign limits cut-off
Dependent variable Mean Std. Dev. Donor fund. won Std. Error. Obs Bandwidth P-value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Municipaliy covariates
Disposable Income (mw) 31016.747 410388.781 -643.348 5045.757 76 4849.617 0.899
Municipal category 5.686 1.029 0.213 0.210 57 3649.972 0.310
Mayor wages 6.744 2.634 -0.419 0.420 57 3634.855 0.318
Council size 10.966 2.953 -0.437 0.373 60 3804.922 0.241
Total population 43216.607 267851.336 391.699 2239.875 147 8379.316 0.861
Income from royalties 0.069 0.150 -0.252*** 0.080 122 6813.660 0.002
Education establishments 284.661 171.554 61.102 56.348 98 5835.792 0.278
Notes: Columns 1 and 2 report the basic descriptive statistics of each variable. Column 3 reports
RDD point estimates of the effect of looser campaign limits on each variable, using (Calonico et al.,
2014)’s optimal bandwidths (reported in column 6), bias correction, and robust standard errors
(column 4), with linear local polynomials and triangular kernels. Column 5 reports the number
of observations including in each estimation.
Table 2.27: Smooth predetermined municipality covariates across looser
campaign limits cut-off
Dependent variable Mean Std. Dev. Donor fund. won Std. Error. Obs Bandwidth P-value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Individual covariates
Women 0.096 0.295 -0.044 0.077 95 5582.719 0.569
Age 44.985 9.698 -2.363 5.804 98 6593.576 0.684
Black 0.047 0.211 -0.106 0.103 76 5227.417 0.304
Indigenous background 0.112 0.315 -0.351** 0.153 105 6848.513 0.022
Leftist party 0.026 0.160 -0.021 0.069 96 5624.339 0.759
Rightwing 0.244 0.430 0.442 0.293 122 6782.446 0.132
Previously sanctioned 0.111 0.315 0.012 0.175 80 4921.141 0.945
Ilegal Registration of ID. 0.008 0.089 0.004 0.003 48 3253.438 0.243
Has political experience 0.455 0.498 -0.245 0.217 143 8069.598 0.259
Has electoral experience 0.366 0.482 -0.302 0.269 100 5938.124 0.262
Notes: Columns 1 and 2 report the basic descriptive statistics of each variable. Column 3 reports RDD point estimates of
the effect of looser campaign limits on each variable, using (Calonico et al., 2014)’s optimal bandwidths (reported in column
6), bias correction, and robust standard errors (column 4), with linear local polynomials and triangular kernels. Column 5
reports the number of observations including in each estimation.
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Table 2.28: Effects of looser campaign limits on total number of contracts
for donors
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Fuzzy RDD Estimates
Total Contracts for donors
Looser Campaign Limits 50.367** 47.882* 31.722** 24.086*
(Conventional Estimate) (24.852) (15.619) (15.65) (14.46)
Looser Campaign Limits 52.64* 49.451* 32.838* 23.807
(Robust Estimate) (30.011) (29.96) (18.114) (16.154)
Controls X X
Panel B: First Stage variables
Donor Income(% of Total) Candidate was donor funded
Looser Campaign Limits 0.273** 0.313** 0.428*** 0.616***
(Conventional Estimate) (0.157) (0.156) (0.156) (0.205)
Looser Campaign Limits 0.277* 0.324* 0.456** 0.655**
(Robust Estimate) (0.164) (0.191) (0.182) (0.231)
Controls X X
Observations 921 843 921 843
Bandwidth 7521.765 7873.963 8461.503 6328.584
Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses.
Bandwidths are estimated using (Calonico et al., 2014)’s method.
Controls included: Royalty income as a % of total municipality income
and indigenous background candidates. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.29: Effects of looser campaign limits on probability of donors
obtaining contracts
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Fuzzy RDD Estimates
Probability of donor receiving a contract
Looser Campaign Limits .25455 .1911 .17478 .10707
(Conventional Estimate) (.18494) (.1899) (.13479) (.11857)
Looser Campaign Limits .30088 .22632 .19902 .11957
(Robust Estimate) (.21045) (.2175) (.15512) (.13189)
Controls X X
Panel B: First Stage variables
Donor Income(% of Total) Candidate was donor funded
Looser Campaign Limits .27889** .3233** .39946*** .56986***
(Conventional Estimate) (.13928) (.15351) (.15351) (.19586)
Looser Campaign Limits .27889* .33195* .42732** .59966***
(Robust Estimate) (.15991) (.19023) (.1804) (.22009)
Controls X X
Observations 920 842 920 842
Bandwidth 7273.452 7200.763 9274.245 7095.115
Bandwidths are estimated using (Calonico et al., 2014)’s method.
Controls included: Royalty income as a % of total municipality income
and indigenous background candidates. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
2.7.8 Online Appendix
Table 2.30: Differences in municipality characteristics between campaign
sources reporting municipalities and non-reporting
Non-reporting Reporting Mean Difference
Altitude (meter) 889.571 1172.222 -282.650***
Sq km 2023.016 890.410 1132.606***
Distance Deparment capital 106.297 78.315 27.982***
Distance to Bogota 430.782 307.734 123.047***
Literacy rate 85.733 82.726 3.007***
Rurality index (0-1) 0.653 0.561 0.092***
Unsatisfied basic needs 55.949 44.061 11.887***
Note: Reporting where both the winner and runner-up report on campaign financing. The
number of observations are 126 for on reporting group and 996 for reporting group. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.31: Differences in municipality characteristics between in sample
and out of sample
Out of sample In sample Mean Difference
Altitude (meter) 1166.900 1144.824 22.077
Sq km 931.918 788.174 143.744
Distance Deparment capital 76.697 81.875 -5.178
Distance to Bogota 321.940 314.941 6.999
Literacy rate 83.844 83.978 -0.134
Rurality index (0-1) 0.563 0.566 -0.003
Unsatisfied basic needs 44.670 44.593 0.077
Note: In sample are municipalities where there was a race between a donor funded politician or
non-donor funded. The number of observations are 672 and 408 for out of sample and in sample
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What is the effect of open-list (as opposed to closed-list) in proportional representation
elections on electoral outcomes? We provide new evidence by studying local elections
in Colombia, where parties have unique discretion over fielding open or closed-lists.
Using panel data covering all 1,100 Colombian municipalities for the 2003–2015 pe-
riod, we leverage within-party, within-municipality, and over-time variation to identify
the effect of list type. We find that the adoption of open-lists increases parties’ vote
and seat shares by 88 % and 117%, respectively. Semi-structured interviews with a
representative sample of candidates reveal that parties choosing closed lists struggle
to attract candidates of high-quality for lower positions with little chances of win-
ning a seat, and to incentivize them to campaign. Consistent with these mechanisms,
candidate-level analyses show that candidates running on open lists expend more cam-
paign effort, have more political experience, are more engaged in their constituency,
and less likely to have committed election fraud. Taken together, our findings highlight
that the decision between open and closed-list systems has important implications for
political selection, electoral success, and the quality of representational democracy.
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3.1 Introduction
Scholars have long argued that electoral rules systematically influence the selection of
politicians.5 Furthermore, a large literature shows that the quality of political selection
typically has an effect on policy outcomes, and thus, on the day-to-day life of citizens
(e.g., Besley, 2005; Besley et al., 2011; Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004; Fujiwara,
2015b). Electoral rules cover a broad range of features of the political system, from
the form of (majoritarian or proportional) representation, the usage of primaries, to
the type of ballot. Within the context of proportional representation (PR), parties
commonly use one of two ballot types: open or closed lists. In open-list systems, vot-
ers vote for their preferred candidates and the order in which candidates take seats
is determined by the candidate’s vote totals. In contrast, in closed-list systems vot-
ers choose a party, and the order in which candidates take seats is determined by
their position on the list, that is, by their party. The key difference between open
and closed-lists is that the former gives voters influence over the number of seats each
party wins and also which candidates from a given list take seats. This induces intra-
party competition among candidates (Blumenau, Eggers, Hangartner, and Hix, 2017)
and contrasts with closed-list system, in which the party retains much higher levels
of control. Given these differences between the two list types, we might expect a
sizable literature shedding light on their consequences. Many scholars argue that this
intra-party competition under open-list rewards more experienced candidates (Shugart,
Valdini, and Suominen, 2005), incentives politicians to deliver particularistic services
to their constituencies (Ames, 1995; Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita, 2006; Carey
and Shugart, 1995; Crisp, Escobar-Lemmon, Jones, Jones, and Taylor-Robinson, 2004;
Grimmer, Messing, and Westwood, 2012; Hallerberg and Marier, 2004) and to steer
away from good government to engage in corrupt practices (Chang, 2005, 2005). How-
ever, almost all of this research—the two exceptions that we are aware of are discussed
below—studies politicians’ behavior solely under open-lists and is therefore unable to
answer any comparative question about the effect of open versus closed-list. Hence, we
lack empirical answers even on some of the most basic questions.
What is the effect of open-list as opposed to closed list on electoral outcomes such
as vote shares? What is the effect of list type on candidate selection and effort, and
which list type leads to more preferable selection from the voters’ perspective? As
fundamental as these questions are for our understanding of electoral systems, quan-
tifying their impact is empirically challenging. In most PR countries, the constitution
prescribes either open or closed list, such that comparative research interested in the
effect of electoral system has to resort to cross-country comparisons. However, the em-
5See e.g., Myerson (1999); Carey and Shugart (1995); Besley (2005). For influential work (see
Galasso and Nannicini, 2011), and (Braendle, 2016) for a recent survey. Moreover, among others,
(Persson and Tabellini, 2004, 2003, 2002) argue that the type of electoral system influences policy
outcomes.
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pirical identification of the effect of open and closed lists across countries is typically
plagued by unobserved heterogeneity, raising the spectre of serious confounding.
In this paper, we make considerable progress on this front by studying the unique
PR system of Colombia, where parties can unilaterally choose whether they adopt
open or closed list in local elections. Since the electoral reform of 2003, each party can
(and frequently do) decide to field open lists in one municipality, and closed lists in
another during the same election cycle. This complete discretion over list type leads
to within-party, within-municipality (and within party times municipality), and over-
time variation in the adoption of open- and closed-list. We leverage this variation by
employing panel data models controlling for election year, and party times municipality
fixed effects to identify the effect of list type on political outcomes.
After an extensive effort, we collect novel candidate-level panel data from about
1,100 Colombian municipalities for the 2003-2015 period to analyze the effects of list
type on electoral success. We find that parties adopting open lists benefit from dra-
matically higher vote and seat shares. Building on the insights from semi-structured
interviews with a representative sample of candidates, we next turn to question of what
explains this effect. We find both qualitative and quantitative support for two main
mechanisms. First, open lists induce all candidates, independent of their ranking, to
campaign. This is not the case under closed lists where lower-ranked candidates with
little chance of winning a seat have few incentives to campaign. Second, the qualitative
interviews suggest that open lists are better suited to attract high-quality candidates.
Using a broad set of quality indicators covering candidates’ experience, constituency
engagement, and past election fraud, we find that across all those measures, quality of
candidates is, on average, significantly higher on open-lists.
Finally, we also shed light on the puzzle of why would any party choose a closed
lists given their detrimental impact. Candidates argue that closed lists allow for party
cohesion, and signaling to the voter the cohesion. The empirical evidence shows that
mostly new parties adopt closed lists. Moreover, parties tend to switch from closed to
open lists over time, but not vice versa, implying that maybe the detrimental effects
are learned only by experience.
This paper makes several contributions to the literature. First, we provide some
of the first credible empirical evidence of the effect of list type on electoral outcomes
in a real-world setting. While we are not the first to study the effect of list type,
most of the existing research (e.g., Bergman, Shugart, and Watt, 2013; Nemoto and
Shugart, 2013), is limited by a lack of within-country and over-time variation in list
type, thereby raising the concern that unaccounted heterogeneity between countries,
rather than list type, may be driving the results.6 Relying on credible, subnational and
6There are, however two exceptions. One is (Sanz, 2015) who investigates the impact of closed
versus open list on turnout by exploiting population thresholds determine list type in Spanish local
elections. A second is (Blumenau et al., 2017), as they rely on a survey experiment to study the effect
of open versus closed list on (hypothetical) party choice in the U.K.
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over-time variation, we believe our estimates to be considerably closer to the causal
effects of open versus closed list. Moreover, we provide evidence of the mechanisms
behind the effects of list type on voting: Candidate effort and selection.
Second, using the same empirical strategy, we also contribute to the effect of list
type on candidate selection. Recently, there has been a renewed interest in the selection
of political candidates see see Dal Bo´, Finan, Folke, Persson, and Rickne (2017) and
the fundamental question of democracy’s ability to attract competent leaders. We
expand on this literature by providing some of the first credible empirical evidence on
how electoral systems in general (for rare exemption see Beath, Christia, Egorov, and
Enikolopov, 2016) for comparison of at-large and district elections) and list choice in
PR systems in particular affect political selection .
Third, our study is related to the literature studying the relationship between po-
litical selection and endogenous electoral systems. The choice that parties have on
whether or not to adopt primaries is essentially about deciding whether to adopt open
and closed nomination procedures, and thus, structurally similar to our case. In the
case of primaries, the parties also face the trade-off between keeping control and pop-
ularity among the voters (e.g Snyder and Ting (2011); Serra (2011, 2013); Hortala-
Vallve and Mueller (2015)). These theoretical results are similar to ours in the sense
that open procedures such as primaries increase expected candidate quality. Finally,
Achury, Ramı´rez, and Cantu´ (2017) study Colombian parliamentary elections and fo-
cus on explaining the reasons behind the list type choices. In contrast, we focus also
on the effects of list choice and use both interviewing and large data on individual
characteristics on the candidates.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we describe the
institutional context and the rules according to which parties decide on list type in
municipal elections. In Section 3, we describe the newly collected dataset covering all
municipal elections for the 2003-2015 period and present selected descriptive statistics.
Section 4 presents the main results on the effect of list type on electoral success. Sec-
tion 6 combines insights from qualitative interviews and quantitative candidate-level
analyses to shed light on the main mechanism. Section 7 addresses the question why
any party would choose closed list give their detrimental impact. Finally, section 8
concludes the paper.
3.2 Election Reforms in Colombia
Colombia is home to the third largest population and the fourth largest economy
in Latin America. While endowed by rich natural resources, Colombia is charac-
terized by large economic and social heterogeneity across regions, and high levels of
inequality(Bushnell, 1993).
For most of the 20th century, Colombia had a strong central government and a
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bipartisan system where either the conservative or liberal party holding the presidency.
In the last decades of the 20th century several reforms were enacted to counterbalance
the strong bipartisanship, in order to politically decentralize the country. One of
these reforms, for example, introduced election for local mayors, which were previously
appointed by governors who themselves were appointed by the president (Castro, 1986).
In 1991, a new constitution was enacted that decentralized fiscal resources to the regions
to counterbalance the history of strong fiscal centralization. After 1991, third-parties
began to play a stronger role and their presence began to increase at the local level
(Hoyos, 2005b).
Colombia is currently structured in 1100 municipalities7, which are located within
departments. In each local election, politicians are elected for: local administrative
juntas, municipality councils, municipality mayors, department assemblies, and gov-
ernors for each department. Local elections are held one year after the national level
elections. Municipalities themselves are represented in a group of 32 department as-
semblies and by 32 governors. Local administrative juntas are only present in a handful
of municipalities, while local councils exist for every municipality, and the size is rela-
tive to the population of the municipality. Their role is to approve the annual budget,
and projects proposed by the municipal mayors.
In 2003, a major electoral reform took place. According to Shugart, Moreno, and
Fajardo (2006), before the reform, parties presented multiple candidate lists per dis-
trict. Instead of presenting one list per party, in practice most candidates within a
party would present their own list to take advantage of the proportional representation
formula that benefited small lists. According to Pacho´n and Shugart (2010), by 2002
it was rare that any candidate list would obtain more than one seat, and this led to
high fractionalization of the parties and made them very personalistic (Shugart et al.,
2006).
In order the address these issues, the 2003 reform required that each party would
present one list. But it was difficult to reach an agreement between open or closed lists
(Shugart et al., 2006) and a unique feature was allowed in the electoral system: the
type of ballot would be chosen by the parties themselves, parties could opt to choose for
closed lists or open lists in each district they ran. In closed lists, ranking of candidates
is organized by the party, and votes for the party would be distributed according to
the ranking. In open lists, a numbered list of candidates would be given by the party,
the voter could opt to vote for any person within the list, and the ranking would be
given by the amount of votes each candidate had. In addition to voting for candidates,
in open lists, the voter could opt to vote just for the party. These votes would be for
the party total but would not alter the ranking of candidates given by the votes for
candidates. Most votes in open lists go to specific candidates 8.
7The exact number varies in our period of analysis since new municipalities have been created
between 2003 and 2015.
8Of all open lists for local municipality councils between 2003 and 2015, on average only 9% of the
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Since the 2003 reform, parties can choose their preferred list type in both municipal
and national elections. At the national level the upper house (senate) is elected in a
single district, with 100 seats and plus one district for minority indigenous communities
with 2 seats. The lower house (house of representatives) is representative at the de-
partment level, and each department elects at least two politicians or more depending
on the department population size. In both the upper house and lower house, the party
can chose to opt for open or closed lists. At the local level, parties can chose to go for
open or closed lists when running for the local juntas (only present in 80 municipalities,
and gives representation at the subnational level), and the local councils present for
the over a thousand municipalities.9.
To have a sufficient number of observations and sufficient variation in list type
choices, we focus on elections for municipal councils. Moreover they are conducted
across the country, and thus, allow for geographically representative qualitative and
quantitative analysis. An example of a mixed ballot for a local election in the munic-
ipality of Abejorral is available in the Annex Figure 3.1. The upper-right most party
is the only one that fielded a closed lists.
Parties have to decide on a list type three months before the election, and a few
days before the official start of the campaign is allowed. Table 3.10 in the Appendix
details this timeline for the 2015 election cycle.
3.3 Data, and Sample
We use the electoral data compiled by Pacho´n and Sa´nchez (2014) and gathered by
the Colombian national electoral authority (Registradur´ıa Nacional del Estado Civil).
We updated this data with the 2015 election results. This data identifies results for
local elections for all municipalities in Colombia for the period 2003 to 201110. These
data record the parties participating the local council election, the candidates, and the
votes for each candidate or list. Table 3.1 and show that 3.2 show that most parties
field open list, but that the fraction parties and the share of municipalites using closed
lists stays roughly constant over our study period 2003–2015.
In order to understand the effects of list choice on the type of candidates and their
behavior, we construct a novel dataset that includes information on the amount of
campaigning and a broad range of candidate characteristics before they ran in the
elections.11 To measure the candidates’ political experience, we trace the political
careers of the candidates and code—at the moment of the election—the number of
times the candidate has run for the local council, any other office, and if they have
votes of open lists go to the party and not specific candidates
9In addition, parties can also chose the list type in the 32 department assemblies
10However this data, for local councils had missing information in 2003 for all municipalities that
had at least one closed list. We downloaded all the original electoral ballots and coded the missing
names
11This is to make sure the characteristics observed are not a consequence of the election result.
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ever served in office. To measure other relevant indicators of candidate quality, we
obtained information on their voting registration available at Registradur´ıa del Estado
Civil. Based on this information, we can code if the candidate is registered to vote and
if so, where, to measure whether the candidate is registered in the municipality she is
seeking to represent. Moreover, we have information on whether the candidates were
reported to have been registered to vote illegally in the past, and we code if they had
been reporting on doing so.12 One of the most common acts of political malpractice
and election fraud is the (illegal) voting in a polling in a municipality other than the
one where the voter is registered, typically in exchange for bribes.
We obtained information on the money candidates expend in campaigns. A system
was set in place with help of US Agency for International Development in collaboration
with Transparency International, which requires by law since 200913, to report all
sources of income and expenditures in campaigns. Lack of compliance is punishable
by law. This information is broken down into different sources.14 In order to separate
the effects of personal investment on the campaign from the party investment, we
construct two measures: Individual effort which accounts for the campaign spending
that is directly related to the individual using its own funds or raising own funds, and
the total campaign investment which adds the sources of financing that come from the
party.15.
In order to estimate the effects of list choice on different positions within the lists,
we devised a measurement position conditional on list placement. List placement in
closed list is done by the party, while open list ranking is given by the amount of votes
each candidate receives. Both of these rankings are endogenous, but they key interest
for us is to compare the preferences of voters to those of the party with respect to
how they rank the candidates. For example, Galasso and Nannicini (2015) argue that
12Registering illegally through several means: Use of a dead person fingerprint, having a duplicate
ID, irregular inscription of IDs, using a fake identity, underage registration and migrating illegally to
vote in another polling station. Illegal migration of IDs implies a movement to a new voting site in
mass, typically in exchange of money.
13Resolution 1094 of 2009.
14Whether the campaign income comes from: 1) their own contributions or immediate relatives, 2)
Contributions by private donors, 3) Financial credits. 4) Income from public events by the party. 5)
State financing. 6) Party financing that comes from private resources
15Individual campaign spending consists of the first three categories in the previous breakdown and
total campaigning includes all the categories present in the data. Furthermore, there are campaign
limits conditional on the municipality number of registered voters. For example under 25,000 registered
voters, the campaign limits are 58 M COP These campaign limits are binding: In the case a candidate
spends more money than he/she is allowed to, the sanctions range from a fine to returning the money
to the State or loosing the seat they were elected to. In order to scale the measurement of campaign
investment, we scale the absolute value amount by the corresponding campaign limits, according to
the municipality the candidate is participating in. In 2011 the campaign limits are at the individual
level, but for 2015 the campaign limits were established at list level. In order to establish the 2015
campaign limits comparable to 2011, we divide the total campaign limit per list by the number of
candidates in each list. In order to account potential effects for the change in the law, we use year
fixed effects. Furthermore we estimate the effect of open lists by each year separately and we find
consistent results. On average open lists campaign more than closed lists, and this is driven by the
last placed candidates in the closed lists which campaign less
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in closed lists expressive or naive voters only care about the top ranked candidates in
the lists, whereas rational voter groups would understand that they can only influence
the election of marginal candidates in the lists, and thus, focus their attention those.
Using the list ranking we define marginal candidates to be those that were two seats
above and below the last seat obtained in the party, and if the party didn’t not obtain
a seat, the first two are considered marginal. Top safe candidates, are the ones placed
above the marginal, therefore safely elected, and loser candidates are the ones that are
two seats below the one seat above and below the last seat obtained in the party to
define marginals, and also a scaled measurement where the size of the margin is 20%
of the council size.16
Table 3.3 provides descriptive statistics for our main outcomes. In general, the par-
ties are fairly small with the average vote share of 13% and on average, 30% of parties
are left without any seat. Open list parties are larger in terms of votes, seats and num-
ber of candidates. Open lists candidates campaign more relative to the campaigning
limits. We also observe that top ranked candidates (either by parties or voters) have
more political experience than the other candidates and are more experienced in the
open lists. Data on voting registration shows open list having less candidates with a
record of illegal voting and more candidates registered to vote at the own jurisdiction.
However, these results are merely descriptive and thus not to be seen as our main
evidence.
Regarding municipality characteristics, we obtained a municipality level panel (be-
tween 1993-2014) with a broad range of economic, social and institutional covariates,
thanks to preexisting effort by Universidad de los Andes. A detailed description of
some of these variables is also available in Table 3.11 in the Appendix.
3.4 What is the effect of open-/closed list on par-
ties’ electoral success?
To estimate the effect of list type, we regress our indicators of electoral performance,
the vote and seat share of the party, on a binary indicator for open list, and a full set
of election year and municipality times party fixed effects, as shown in equation 3.1:
yipt = β0 + β1OpenListipt + αi × ρp + τt + εipt (3.1)
Where yipt are the electoral outcomes in municipality i for party p in election period
t, OpenListipt is a dummy if the party chose open list in municipality i in time period
16The results are robust to different definitions of marginal seats and are available upon request.
The mapping between marginal seats and council size is as follows: Council size 21: margin size 4;
Council size: 19 margin size 4; Council size: 17 margin size 3; Council size: 15 margin size 3; Council
size: 13 margin size 3; Council size: 11 margin size 2; council size: 9 margin size 2; Council size: 7
margin size 1).
128
t, αi are the municipality fixed effects, ρp are the party fixed effects, and τt are the year
dummies. Where β1 is the effect of interest.
Therefore, these models identify the effects from those parties that change from
closed to open list (or vice versa) in the same municipality from one election to the
next, while controlling for all time invariant differences between local parties and mu-
nicipalities. While such an analysis might not completely address the endogenous
choice of ballot type, it does render a large set of confounders typically present in
cross-sectional comparisons impotent.
Table 3.4 presents the results from these two-way fixed effects models. The coeffi-
cients on the Open list indicator in Model 1 and 2 reveals that switching from closed-
to open-list increases the party’s vote share by 6.8 percentage points and seat share by
8.6 percentage points, respectively, which corresponds to an 88% and 117% increase at
the average. Adopting open list also decreases the probability of not getting a single
seat by 41 percent. This suggests that running with closed-lists is a risky strategy
even for the top ranked candidates (typically the party leader), who might be willing
to sacrifice seats as long as she is elected. All these effects are not only substantively
large, but also highly statistically significant.
How robust are these findings? Here, we summarize a couple of robustness checks
to gauge the sensitivity of our main result. First, a potential concern is that most of
our results are driven by a single party that is switching between open- and closed list.
To test this, we checked how many parties change the list type and find that more than
577 parties do so over the study period (see Appendix Table 3.19). In addition, we
gauge the sensitivity of the estimates by iteratively dropping each of the main parties.
Table 3.20 in the Appendix reports the results, and shows that estimates remain very
stable and always highly statistically significant, thereby corroborating the robustness
of our results.
Second, our results might be confounded by parties with more experience changing
to open lists more often and achieving more electoral success due to the experience,
rather than directly due to the effect of ballot type. Related concern arises if new
parties switch from closed to open more often and new parties also grow more. In
order to check if our estimates are confounded by party experience (or the lack of it),
we coded two additional variables: the number of elections the party has participated
in any municipality, and the number of elections the party has participated in the
same municipality. The results presented in Table 3.21 in the Appendix show that our
main estimates remain virtually unchanged when controlling for one or both of these
experience indicators.
Together, these tests corroborate the robustness of the result that adopting closed-
list as opposed to open-list has a massive effect on electoral performance.
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3.5 Why Do Parties Fare Better With Open-list?
Our setting provides clear evidence that switching from closed- to open-list dramati-
cally improves the electoral success of parties. What mechanisms might explain this
effect? It is well known that isolating the precise mechanism is very difficult with ob-
servational (and even experimental) data (Imai, Keele, Tingley, and Yamamoto, 2011).
Nonetheless, in the following section we provide evidence that speak to the relative im-
portance of two main mechanisms: how list type condition the selection of high-quality
candidates and how they differentially incentivize candidates to expend campaign ef-
fort. This evidence draws on insights from 32 semi-structured qualitative interviews
with candidates for local councils in a representative sample of municipalities as well
as further candidate-level quantitative analysis. We interviewed candidates for local
councils, during January to March 2016, regarding the municipal elections that took
place in October 2015, across the main 5 main regions in Colombia. The Appendix in
Section 3.10 gives a detailed description of the sampling strategy, questionnaire, and
findings from these interviews.
A first hypothesis is that adopting open-list incentives all candidates to campaign,
while under closed list the candidates in the bottom of the list do not campaign (see
e.g., Bergman et al., 2013; Shugart et al., 2005; Nemoto and Shugart, 2013). What
is the empirical evidence for this mechanism? First, if this incentive mechanism is
important, we would expect party officials and candidates to mention it in the quali-
tative interviews. This is indeed the case. For example, a second placed candidate in
a closed-list stated:
“[A] disadvantage [of closed lists] is that people lower on the list know that
they won’t make it, then they don’t work as hard as people higher on the
list. When the list is open one depends [more] upon oneself.”
Candidate for the Partido de la U party in Tamara, Casanare.
Similarly, an elected open-list candidate criticized closed-list for making it difficult to
appropriate campaign effort, since the votes would go to the top of the list and there
is little recognition for the effort made by other candidates:
“With open-lists, each candidate works, and reaps what he grows, in closed-
list you work for another person, it is not fair.”
Candidate for the Partido de la U party in Tamara, Casanare.
Second, we would expect that candidates on closed-lists to expend on average less
campaign effort, and that this behavior is particularly pronounced among the lower-
ranked with little chances of winning a seat. To test for this incentive mechanism,
we replicate the two-way fixed effect model but using as outcomes candidate-level
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information on campaign effort, measured as the amount of personal funds invested
and the total amount of funds candidates raised. Table 3.5 shows the results. For
both measures of campaign effort, Models 1 and 6 show that on average, open-list
candidates invest 40% more and spend 50% more. Consistent with the hypothesis
that in particular those with a small change of being elected have few incentives to
expend effort, we find that these substantively large and statistically significant results
are exclusively driven by marginal and bottom-ranked candidates, with no differential
effect on top-ranked and elected candidates.17
A second hypothesis is that because closed lists do not reward politicians’ indi-
vidual campaign effort and lower the chances of winning a seat, they fail to attract
high-quality candidates. We also find qualitative and quantitative evidence for this
selection mechanism. First, this mechanism was mentioned many times in the qual-
itative interviews. For example, when asked how the party selects the candidates at
the bottom of the closed-list, the interviews revealed that these are often people affil-
iated with the party but little formal education and no interest in holding office. For
example, a sixth-placed candidate on a closed list with no chances of winning said:
“I don’t understand the difference between open and closed list, I was just
supporting our candidate (top of the list) that didn’t get elected....”
Candidate for the Partido de la U party in Paez, Cauca.
Similarly, we interviewed an indigenous person who was never engaged in politics before
but apparently lured into signing the paperwork to run as a candidate on a closed-list,
without properly understanding what that implies. It seems that in this case the
party’s sole goal was to simply fill the list. Another lower placed, closed-list candidate
mentioned that parties sometimes “trick” people that enjoy local popularity to run as
low-ranked candidates on closed lists to garner votes for the top candidate:
”In this municipality people take advantage of others, of the peasants, hon-
est people who want to work. (...) Sometimes a popular person who has
support in their districts but doesn’t know much about politics is placed low
in the closed-list, so the people placed highlist win those votes without doing
anything.’
Candidate for the Partido de la U party in Tamara, Casanare.
Another aspect of the same pattern, mentioned several times in the interviews, is the
placement of women on closed lists. In 2007, Colombia enacted a gender quota that
stipulated that all lists need least 30% of women. For example, we learned from one
case where several female administrators working in party offices were used to fill the
17The differences between top-ranked and marginal, and top and bottom candidates, are also highly
significant.
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last places of a closed list in order to comply pro forma with the gender quota. Our
candidate-level data confirms that indeed, women are disproportionally often placed
at the bottom of the closed lists (during the electoral period of 2003-2015, women on
average were placed in the percentile 67 in closed lists, while in open lists they were
placed higher in percentile 58. This difference is statistically significant).18
Second, we can again leverage our candidate-level data to quantitatively explore the
implications of this selection mechanism. First, we test whether candidates on open
lists have more political experience, measured as the number of times the candidates
have ran in previous municipal elections, the number of times they have been elected
to the municipal council, and the number of times they participated in any other
election. When interpreting the results, it is important to keep in mind that while the
average differences in candidate quality between open and closed lists are the results
of their differential attractiveness to high-quality candidates, the ultimate rank of the
candidates under open list is an expression of the preferences of voters over candidates.
We discuss both channels in turn. First, Model 1, 6, and 11 in Table 3.6 show that on
average, open lists are able to attract significantly more experienced candidates. This
pattern holds for all three experience measures, with effect sizes ranging between 15%
for running in previous elections to 91% for having experience in office. Second, we
find that voters express clear preferences for experienced candidates when they have
the chance to do so. For all three outcomes, the Models 2–5, 7–10, and 12–15 show
that differences in candidate quality between open-and closed list are larger for those
in top seats compared to marginal and bottom-ranked candidates.
As a second measure of candidate quality, we focus on the candidate’s dedication
to and engagement in the municipality they seek to represent by measuring whether
he/she registered to vote in the municipality he/she is running for office before the
election. Table 3.7 shows the results. The overwhelming majority of candidates is
indeed registered in the municipality where they are running, we find that, on average,
candidates, open-list candidates are 6% more likely, a statistically significant effect.
Consistent with the previous results, we also find evidence that voters are systemati-
cally punishing candidates for not registering in the same municipality close to their
constituency when they have the chance to do so under open list.
As a third measure of candidate quality, we focus on two indicators of election
fraud. We code whether candidates registered to vote illegally, or illegally moved to
a different polling station than where they are registered before the election. Table
3.8 shows the results. While only a small minority of candidates engaged in election
fraud, we find that on average, open-list candidates are 17% less likely to register to
vote illegally, and 19% less likely to vote in a polling station without registering. Both
effects are statistically significant effect, and mostly driven by candidates in marginal
seats.
18We explore the compliance with and effect of these gender quotas under open and closed list in a
separate paper.
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In sum, we find strong qualitative and quantitative evidence for both mechanism.
Open-list create more incentives for all candidates to expend higher levels of campaign
effort, and parties adopting open lists manage to attract more experienced candidates,
that are more committed to their constituency, and less likely to have engaged in
election fraud.
3.6 Why Do Some Parties Sometimes Choose Closed-
List?
Given their detrimental impact on electoral performance, one has to wonder why some
parties sometimes decide to field closed-lists. One hypothesis is that parties can exert
more control over the candidates and who gets elected. Consistent with this, several
candidates mentioned in the interviews that closed-lists are a means for strong party
leaders to exert control. One president of a local party even frankly admitted as much:
“With closed lists the party has more control over candidates, and me as
a president could control more the candidates, while in open list they are
autonomous”
Candidate for Polo Democra´tico Alternativo at Balboa, Cauca.
Another advantage of closed lists, proposed by several interviewees, is that they both
induce and signal party cohesion. For example, one candidate sees the benefits of closed
lists for ideological cohesion
“When the list is closed the party is strengthened institutionally, because
you are voting for a party and not a person, and this could lead to more
ideological party cohesion.”
Candidate for the Alianza Verde party at Cartago, Valle.
while another thought the signal it sends is more important:
“We were a group of friends interested in the welfare of the municipality
(...) we chose closed list because we thought it was the best way to present
ourselves to the community, as a group, a family, rather than a party with
people who each walked their own path. The idea is that the community
would see us as a team (...)”
Candidate for the Polo party for Pasto, Narin˜o.
But even after accounting for the benefits of closed lists for party control and
cohesion, one might wonder if running with closed lists is a viable long-term strategy.
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Given their massive effect on vote and seat shares, we might expect expect that choosing
closed lists in an election, and suffering the associated electoral losses, most parties
would switch to open lists in the next election cycle. The transition matrix presented
in Table 3.9 explores the dynamics of adopting list types. Indeed, we find that if a
party uses closed list in election t, chances are very high that it switches to open list
in the next election t+ 1. Moreover, and not surprising given our main findings on the
electoral repercussions closed lists, the party, and the candidate, is more likely to not
run again in t+ 1. This suggests seems that open lists are absorbing state, and closed
lists would be absent were it not for the new party entrants that initially adopt closed
lists.
Tables 3.14 and 3.18 explore this pattern in more detail. Table 3.14 shows that
among the ten major parties, closed lists are generally rarely used, and their use be-
comes even rarer over time. Among the major parties, only the new entrant in 2015,
the Centro Democratico, decided to field almost 50% closed lists. (Our prediction is
that they will also switch to open list for the next election). Table 3.18 provides further
evidence that closed lists are mainly popular among new and small parties, and that
they switch to open list if they survive their first election cycle.
3.7 Conclusions
Previous studies have shown associations suggesting that electoral rules influence po-
litical competition, selection and policy outcomes. We provide novel evidence focusing
on the unique case of Colombia, where parties are free to choose between open and
closed list in local PR elections. This provides rare within-country variation in election
system that we use to study three questions. First, what is the effect of list type on
parties electoral performance? Second, what is mechanism behind our result that open
lists generate dramatically more votes than closed lists? Third, why would any party
choose closed list given its detrimental effect on the election outcomes.
As the key contribution of the paper, we use a novel, candidate-level panel dataset
covering all 1,100 Colombian municipalities for the 2003 – 2015 period. Exploiting
variation in list type within municipalities and parties over time operationalized with
a municipality times party fixed effects regressions, we find that the adoption of open
list is associated with dramatically higher vote and seat shares.
In order to understand the party’s and the candidates’ decision making processes,
we conduct extensive semi-structured interviews with a representative sample of can-
didates. Using the insights from these interviews, we explore the main mechanism
that might explain the vote share effects. First, we find evidence of list-type induced
differences in campaign effort as lower-ranked candidates in closed lists have little in-
centives to invest effort in campaigning. Second, closed lists have trouble attracting
high-quality candidates to other than the top seats.
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We go further and provide also strong quantitative evidence for both these mech-
anisms using data on campaigning and candidate types. We show that by influencing
the incentives for all candidates to expend more effort, by attracting more experienced
candidates, that are more committed to their constituency, and less likely to have en-
gaged in election fraud, the seemingly narrow choice between open and closed has major
repercussions: not only for the party facing that choice, but also for the politicians and
their quality, and thus, for representative democracy more generally.
Finally we show that mainly new parties adopt closed lists, and often change to
open in the next election if they do not exit. On the contrary open list parties stick
to the open list also in the next elections. This indicates that new parties may make
seemingly uninformed decisions regarding list type but do learn with experience.
It seems likely that our results on the incentives induced by different list types
would also generalize outside the Colombian mixed system to comparing pure open
list to pure closed list systems. In particular, closed lists would likely have the same
difficulties in attracting high-quality candidates to low-ranked positions and to make
them exert effort also in pure closed list system. However, the effects of list type on
vote shares or who gets elected may vary depending on the choices of all parties, not
just the own party choice, and thus, be different in a mixed than pure system. In future
work, we construct a game-theoretic model of list choice to rationalize the findings of
this paper and to evaluate how these results generalize.
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3.8 Tables
Table 3.1: Share of municipalities (of total municipalities) with number of
closed lists
Number of Closed lists
Panel A. - All parties
Year 0 1 2 3 4 5 6+
2003 59.8 22.0 9.8 4.4 2.2 1.1 0.6
2007 80.5 16.4 2.6 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.0
2011 72.9 23.6 2.9 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.0
2015 54.7 32.6 10.4 1.8 0.4 0.2 0.0
Notes: Total number of municipalities in sample: 2003: 1087, 2007: 1098, 2011: 1099, 2015: 1101. Panel A: All parties
participating in elections.
Table 3.2: Share of municipalities with %of closed lists.
— % of Closed lists (# of Closed lists/ Total Lists in Municipality):
Year 0-10% 10-20% 20-30% 30-40% 40-50% 50-60% 60+%
2003 0.62 0.14 0.11 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.02
2007 0.83 0.10 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
2011 0.78 0.15 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
2015 0.62 0.24 0.11 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00
Notes: Total number of municipalities in sample: 2003: 1087, 2007: 1098, 2011: 1099, 2015: 1101.
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Table 3.3: Descriptive Statistics and Differences in Means Across List
Type
Variable N Mean SD Min Max
Averages within List
Open Closed diff. sig
A. Electoral Variables
Party Vote Share 30793 0.13 0.14 0.05 *** 0.11 0 1
% of Seats Obtained by the party 30778 0.14 0.15 0.04 *** 0.14 0 1
Party obtained one seat 30804 0.7 0.74 0.22 *** 0.46 0 1
% of list Size filled 30766 0.81 0.83 0.55 *** 0.26 0.05 3.25
B. Characteristics of Candidates in the list:
B1. Campaign Data (**)
Total Campaign Investment (Millions COP) - Avg 14,491 1.71 1.70 1.81 3.99 0 128
Total Campaign Investment (Millions COP) - Top 3,163 4.85 4.77 11.35 ** 14.2 0 195
Personal Campaign Investment (Millions COP) - Avg 14,479 1.63 1.64 1.55 3.8 0 126
Personal Campaign Investment (Millions COP) - Top 3,163 4.62 4.58 8.07 13 0 178
% of Campaign Limit (Total Investment) - Avg 14491 0.06 0.06 0.04 *** 0.09 0 3.11
% of Campaign Limit (Total Investment) - Top 3163 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.18 0 1.29
% of Campaign Limit (Personal Investment) - Avg 14479 0.06 0.06 0.04 *** 0.09 0 2.57
% of Campaign Limit (Personal Investment) - Top 3163 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.17 0 1.29
B1. Voting Registration (Illegal Registration)
Registered Illegally to vote (*) (Avg) 30779 0.04 0.04 0.05 *** 0.09 0 1
Registered Illegally to vote (*) (Top) 7756 0.02 0.01 0.06 *** 0.10 0 1
Moved Illegally to vote in another polling station (Avg) 30779 0.04 0.04 0.05 *** 0.08 0 1
Moved Illegally to vote in another polling station (Top) 7756 0.01 0.01 0.06 *** 0.10 0 1
B2. Candidate experience
# of times cand. ran for any public elected post (Avg) 30779 1.79 1.81 1.51 *** 0.53 1 6
# of times cand. ran for any public elected post (Top) 7043 2.63 2.64 2.15 *** 1.12 1 6
# of times cand. in list ran for local council (Avg) 30779 1.57 1.58 1.33 *** 0.40 1 4
# of times cand. in list ran for local council (Top) 7043 2.18 2.19 1.63 *** 0.90 1 4
# of times cand. in list got elected to council (Avg) 30779 0.35 0.36 0.11 *** 0.35 0 4
# of times cand. in list got elected to council (Top) 7043 1.76 1.77 1.33 *** 0.79 1 4
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Number of total party lists: 30804. Sample: Party lists
in 1101 municipalities in Colombia council elections: 4 elections between 2003- 2015. (*) Use of
a dead person fingeprint, having a duplicate ID, irregular inscription of ID, using a fake identity,
Underage registration, Illegal migration of IDs implies a movement of ID to a new voting site in
mass, typically in exchange of money.(**) Only available for 2011 and 2015.
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Table 3.4: Effect of Open lists on electoral outcomes
(1) (2) (3)
Party vote share % Seat party Party one seat
Open list 0.068*** 0.086*** 0.410***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.013)
Year dummies X X X
Mun FE (x) Party FE X X X
Mean Dep. Var 0.0769 0.0734 0.392
Effect Size (∆%) 88.80 117.7 104.4
95% CI LB 80.87 107.7 98.16
95% CI UB 96.72 127.6 110.7
Municipalities 1101 1101 1101
# Observations 30793 30778 30804
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis and clustered at the municipality level.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.5: Effects of Open List on Campaign Investment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
% of Campaign limit (Personal investment) % of Campaign limit (Total investment)
Avg Top Safe Marginal Loser Elected Avg Top Safe Marginal Loser Elected
Open list 0.015*** -0.016 0.021*** 0.017*** 0.012 0.015*** -0.015 0.022*** 0.018*** 0.006
(0.003) (0.039) (0.004) (0.002) (0.011) (0.003) (0.039) (0.004) (0.002) (0.012)
Year dummies X X X X X X X X X X
Mun FE(x)Party FE X X X X X X X X X X
Mean Dep. Var 0.028 0.078 0.035 0.023 0.061 0.037 0.078 0.055 0.028 0.092
Effect Size (∆ %) 52.05 -20.5 61.11 72.3 19.01 39.87 -19.01 39.82 64.88 6.762
95% CI LB 32.61 -117.7 39.55 54.99 -17 25.15 -115.9 25.49 50.52 -17.9
95% CI UB 71.49 76.71 82.67 89.62 55.02 54.6 77.88 54.14 79.24 31.42
Municipalities 1101 1004 1101 1099 1101 1101 1004 1101 1099 1101
# Observations 14479 2770 14040 13161 10758 14491 2770 14053 13182 10762
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis and clustered at the municipality level.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.6: Effects of list type on political experience.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
# of times cand. ran for any public elected post # of times cand. in list ran for local council
Avg Top Safe Marginal Loser Elected Avg Top Safe Marginal Loser Elected
Open list 0.256*** 0.454*** 0.264*** 0.225*** 0.236*** 0.194*** 0.457*** 0.230*** 0.148*** 0.237***
(0.013) (0.081) (0.019) (0.011) (0.056) (0.010) (0.065) (0.015) (0.009) (0.044)
Mean Dep. Var 1.71 2.41 1.94 1.51 2.44 1.521 2.046 1.686 1.372 2.080
Effect Size (%) 14.94 18.87 13.61 14.90 9.710 12.78 22.32 13.66 10.77 11.41
95% CI LB 13.49 12.24 11.73 13.41 5.242 11.55 16.10 11.93 9.476 7.265
95% CI UB 16.39 25.49 15.49 16.39 14.18 14.01 28.53 15.39 12.07 15.56
Municipalities 1101 1096 1101 1101 1101 1101 1096 1101 1101 1101
# Observations 30779 7043 30771 28978 21582 30779 7043 30771 28978 21582
(11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
# of times cand. in list got elected to council
Avg Top Safe Marginal Loser Elected
Open list 0.177*** 0.342*** 0.271*** 0.028*** 0.107***
(0.008) (0.048) (0.011) (0.003) (0.034)
Mean Dep. Var 0.194 1.626 0.326 0.0353 1.559
Effect Size (%) 91.14 21.01 83.14 79.31 6.837
95% CI LB 83.28 15.22 76.43 64.02 2.568
95% CI UB 98.99 26.81 89.85 94.61 11.11
Municipalities 1101 1096 1101 1101 1101
# Observations 30779 7043 30771 28978 21582
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis and clustered at the municipality level.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.7: Effects of list type on engagement in constituency.
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Registered vote same place running
Avg Top Safe Marginal Loser Elected
Open list 0.052*** 0.076** 0.059*** 0.036*** 0.061***
(0.007) (0.031) (0.008) (0.007) (0.017)
Year dummies X X X X X
Mun FE (x) Party FE X X X X X
Mean Dep. Var 0.896 0.961 0.897 0.897 0.955
Effect Size (∆%) 5.842 7.898 6.577 3.975 6.365
95% CI LB 4.381 1.667 4.906 2.392 2.892
95% CI UB 7.302 14.13 8.248 5.558 9.838
Municipalities 1101 1096 1101 1101 1101
# Observations 30706 6903 30615 28781 21206
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis and clustered at the municipality level.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.8: Effects of list type on election fraud.
(11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20)
Registered illegally to vote Voted illegally in different polling station
Avg Top Safe Marginal Loser Elected Avg Top Safe Marginal Loser Elected
Open list -0.008*** -0.024 -0.015*** 0.001 -0.008 -0.008*** -0.026 -0.015*** 0.000 -0.008
(0.003) (0.019) (0.004) (0.003) (0.008) (0.003) (0.019) (0.004) (0.003) (0.007)
Year dummies X X X X X X X X X X
Mun FE (x) Party FE X X X X X X X X X X
Mean Dep. Var 0.045 0.012 0.044 0.046 0.020 0.043 0.012 0.040 0.045 0.014
Effect Size (∆ %) -17.18 -203.4 -33.11 1.121 -41.03 -19.45 -218.1 -36.69 0.698 -53.01
95% CI LB -29.48 -516.7 -50.02 -12.57 -117.3 -32.34 -530.9 -54.88 -13.07 -151.3
95% CI UB -4.874 109.8 -16.20 14.81 35.20 -6.559 94.75 -18.50 14.46 45.24
Municipalities 1101 1096 1101 1101 1101 1101 1096 1101 1101 1101
# Observations 30779 7043 30771 28977 21582 30779 7043 30771 28977 21582
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis and clustered at the municipality level.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.9: Transition Matrices
Parties
Closed List t+1 Open List t+1 Exit t+1 N
Closed List t 0.088 0.256 0.656 1181
Open List t 0.010 0.533 0.457 17807
Candidates
Closed List t+1 Open List t+1 Not running t+1 N
Closed List t 0.03 0.183 0.787 6881
Open List t 0.06 0.319 0.676 162543
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3.9 Figures
Figure 3.1: Example of a mixed ballot in Colombia.
Source: National Registry Office, local ballot for 2003. Party MOIR chose to go for closed
list.
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Figure 3.2: Map of council candidates interviewed. Colombia local elections
2015.
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3.10 Appendix A: Interviews
3.10.1 Interviews
In order to understand how the decision makers themselves think about the list choice
and its effects, we conducted a series of semi-structured interviews. We interviewed
candidates for local councils, during January to March 2016, regarding the municipal
elections that took place in October 2015 in every municipality of Colombia.
The candidates to be interviewed were selected from the 5 main regions of Colombia:
The Andean region, the Caribbean region, the pacific region, the Orinoquia region, and
Amazon region. In each region we selected a representative municipality in terms of
several covariates that had only open lists, and then matched it with a closed-list
municipality within the same department with similar covariates.19
In terms of parties, we selected parties that both used open and closed lists, and
aimed to maintain a representative sample across the political spectrum. We selected
the centrists Partido Alianza Verde, the leftist Polo Democra´tico Alternativo, and the
center right Cambio Radical, and Partido de la U Party. Within each list we selected
the candidate at the top of the list and the candidate in the middle of the list or the
candidate who barely lost. All together we sampled 102 candidates.
We received their phone numbers from the national party office. Out of the 102
base sample, 4 had no phone number, of those 98 with a phone number (which is not
necessarily their own private number, but may belong to a neighbor for example), 42
picked up the phone and 10 of them said they were not interested. Therefore, in total
32 interviews were conducted. Luckily, we still have a well balance sample of 16 in
open lists and 16 in closed lists. 7 interviews were conducted in Cambio Radical, 8 in
Partido de la U, 11 in Polo Democra´tico Alternativo, and 6 in Alianza Verde. A map
of the interview distribution across the country can be found in Figure 2.
The interview questionnaire aimed to capture who makes the decision about list
types; which factor do the decision-makers take into account when choosing between




A1. Who did decide to go with open or closed list in this election? Is it a deci-
sion at the national, department or local level? Is there a local party leader?
19Matching within the same department is to minimize the physical distance between different
municipalities, which could ensure closer cultural similarity and similar policies within the depart-
ment. As stated in the introduction Colombia is very diverse culturally across its regions and making
comparisons within departments ensured a better comparison.
143
A2. How was that decision made? (describe the process if there are more people
involved than just the party leader).
A3. When was that decision made? (There is a deadline for submitting list choice,
let’s ask what happened around that deadline).
A4. Was the decision pro/contra closed list a contentious issue in the party?
A5. Generally speaking, who was in favour of closed list?
A6. Generally speaking, who was in favour of open list?
A7. Is it difficult to attract candidates in closed (open) lists?
A8. Who decides the ranking? Are candidate characteristics are taken into account
for the ranking? Which ones?
-Was there any special consideration of placing women within the list in different rank-
ings?
A9. What do you think the voters think about the list choice? Do you think voters
prefer open or closed lists? Why?
B. General characteristics:
B1. Do you have clear idea what the other parties will do? (Before the electoral
ballot is published).
B2. Is your list- type decision influenced by what system you think the other parties
are going to adopt?
B3. Is the choice influences by how competitive the race is with other parties?
C. Advantages Open list:
C. In your personal opinion, what is the advantage of open list...
1. for the party?
2. for the politicians on the list?
3. for voters?
D. Advantages Closed list:
D. In your personal opinion, what is the advantage of closed list...
1. for the party?
2. for the politicians on the list?
3. for voters?
E. Open ended question:
Is there anything that you think is important for us to know about open and closed
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list and how parties decide to favour one over the other?
F. On party permission:
How was the process of obtaining the party credentials to run (aval)? Did you ob-
tain the party permission aval with this party or you applied to others?
3.10.3 Who decides on list type?
Our interviews showed that the decision to go open or closed list is typically made by
the council candidates on the list. They gather before the deadline by which they have
to submit the list choice to the National Registry Office, and either vote on the list
choice, or discuss the issue until they reach a consensus.
However, the list choice is not always made by the candidates on the list. Often, if
there is a strong leader in the party, he/she would take the decision. Similarly, if the
party runs for the Mayor’s office, the mayor candidate would decide the list type, and,
if closed list was chosen, the ranking of the candidates on the list. In a few other cases,
the central office of the party instructs which list type to use. From our interviews, we
noticed that the parties are highly decentralized and most of the times they just give
the party credentials for a group of candidates to run; therefore, in many municipalities
the decision over open or closed list is taken by all members of the list.
3.10.4 Advantages of open and closed lists?
Arguments for open lists
Party list members decide on the list type, conditional of what other parties were
choosing, as part of a more general discussion on how to best compete with other
parties. Most parties simply choose the same list type that other parties in their
municipality adopted (or are expected to adopt). For example, competing parties were
believed to choose open list, and therefore, the party in question would choose open
also20. Another important consideration is the history of the type of lists that has been
used in the municipality. If there is a tradition of open lists in the municipality, parties
were more likely to stick to open list, not the least because they could expect voters
to be proficient in using this somewhat more complex list type. In this context closed
lists were seen as a costly decision to the party:
We chose closed list (...) and, unfortunately, here there is a culture of open
lists. Voters were disconcerted when we told them they only had to vote for
20In fact only 9% (2837) lists presented for council elections between 2003 and 2015 were closed, is
also consistent with most parties mimicking each other.
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a party and no number was necessary. I think they felt strange when no
code was given to them.”
Candidate for the Partido de la U in Valparaiso, Antioquia.
Considerations about internal competition are also taken into account when decid-
ing the list type. In some cases adopting a closed list was considered at length, but no
consensus could be reached about who would get the top spot on the list. In this case,
open list is adopted to avoid this bargaining problem. Thus, open list can work as a
device to solve possible internal party disputes:
”We [the candidates on the list], suggested to go open list, and the suggestion
was well taken. If the list were closed: Who would be the head of the list?”
Candidate for the Cambio Radical party in Cartago, Valle.
Another recurring topic mentioned in favor of open lists is that under closed list,
only the party head campaigns for votes. People at the bottom of the list have few
incentives to put in effort, given their low probability of being elected. Along these
lines, a second placed candidate in a closed list stated:
”Another disadvantage (of closed lists) is that people lower on the list know
that they won’t make it, then they don’t work as hard as people higher on
the list. When the list is open one depends [more] upon oneself.”
Candidate for the Partido de la U party in Tamara, Casanare.
Similarly, a winning candidate of an open list criticized closed lists because it is
difficult to appropriate the vote seeking effort, since the votes would go to the top of
the list and there wouldn’t be recognition for the effort made by other party members:
”With open lists each candidate works, and reaps what he grows, in closed
lists you work for another person, it is not fair.”
Candidate for the Partido de la U party in Tamara, Casanare.
Furthermore, due to the lower placed candidates’ low probability of winning in
closed lists, the parties struggle to recruit high-quality candidates to fill the last places
of the closed lists. We asked several interviewees who the people at the end of the list
are and sometimes they are the party administrative officers or people with no interest
in holding office. Along these lines, candidate placed in 6th place on a closed list said:
”I don’t understand the difference between open and closed list, I was just
supporting our candidate (top of the list) that didn’t get elected....”
Candidate for the Partido de la U party in Paez, Cauca.
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This indigenous interviewee has never engaged in a political campaign but was lured
into signing the paperwork to be put on the closed list, without properly understanding
what that implies. Clearly, this was done in order to simply fill the list. A lower placed
candidate in a closed list also claimed that the closed lists could be used as a mechanism
to get easy votes for higher placed candidates, by tricking people into politics:
”In this municipality people take advantage of others, of the peasants, honest
people who want to work. (...) Sometimes a popular person is put lower
in the closed list, that has support in their districts but doesn’t know much
about politics, so the people placed up in the list win those votes without
doing nothing.’
Candidate for the Partido de la U party in Tamara, Casanare.
Finally, another aspect that was mentioned several times, is the placement of women
within the list. After 2007, Colombia enacted a quota, which stipulated that lists should
have at least 30% of women. In many instances, the women were placed at the bottom
of the closed lists. In one list, for example, several female administrators working in
party offices were used to fill the last places of a closed list in order to comply pro
forma with the gender quota.21
Arguments for choosing closed list
As discussed above, most parties adopt open lists, in part because other parties are
doing so. In the case of the leftist Polo, their local party heads sometimes choose
closed lists in order to differentiate themselves from the parties fielding open lists and
to signal strong party cohesion. They claim:
”We were a group of friends interested in the welfare of the municipality
(...) we chose closed list because we thought it was the best way to present
ourselves to the community, as a group, a family, rather than a party with
people who each walked their own path. The idea is that the community
would see us as a team (...)”
Camilo Chapuel, candidate for the Polo party for Pasto, Narin˜o.
In a similar vein, several candidates manifested statements that could be interpreted
such that closed lists were seen as better in order to maintain party cohesion and not
fragment the party. Under open lists, personal vote would be cultivated and would
lead to candidates moving from one party to the other.
21We explore the compliance with and effect of these gender quotas under open and closed list in a
separate paper.
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”When the list is closed the party is strengthened institutionally, because
you are voting for a party and not a person, and this could lead to more
ideological party cohesion.”
Candidate for the Alianza Verde party at Cartago, Valle.
”With closed lists the party has more control over candidates, and me as
a president could control more the candidates, while in open list they are
autonomous”
Candidate for Polo Democra´tico Alternativo at Balboa, Cauca.
Also when there was a popular person in a list, some parties opted to go for closed
to enjoy the benefits of placing a well known candidate among the community at the
top of the list.
”She (the party head) is in charge of an NGO in Cartago that works with
women householders (...) She was the one who worked the hardest one year
before the election, therefore, we all agreed she should be head of the list,
she was the leader.”
Candidate for the Alianza Verde party at Cartago, Valle.
The other candidates less well known that the party head, could enjoy the votes
that were targeted to her but would spill over into the lower people in the ranking.
So for closed lists, usually the most experienced candidate (number of times elected or
years in politics), would be placed on top of the list in order to attract votes.
Other aspects that were considered when taking the list choice was the invalid votes.
A recurrent claim was that using open lists would lead to more invalid votes since it
is more difficult for voters to vote for the party and then choose a candidate number
within the party. On the other hand, closed lists would be easier to vote for since
marking the party logo would be required.
Some interviewees claimed that the success of closed lists would depend on the
conditions of the municipality. A list in the U party, choose closed list because it was
easier for voters to vote for their party since the main voter support were indigenous
people who didn’t know how to read and write and it would be easier for them to vote
just for a party logo and not a number.
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3.11 Appendix C: Additional results and variable
descriptions
Table 3.10: Timeline for list type decisions
Date List type decision
25 July 2015 Inscription of Candidates in the Local Registry (selection of type of list)
28 July 2015 Parties can start political campaign
31 July 2105 Last day to announce changes in the party lists only if a candidate quits
2 August 2015 Publication on the web-page of final list of candidates
25 October 2015 Election date
1 January 2016 Elected officials take office
Table 3.11: Variables and sources
Variable Description Source
Panel A. Electoral. Party level covariates:

















Dummy =1, if the party at least got one seat Electoral Data
from the Na-
tional Registry
% of party list
filled
Total number of candidates in List / Maximum




% of Women in
party list





Continued on next page
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Table 3.11 – Variables and sources, continued from previous page
Variable Description Source
Left wing party Dummy =1 if the party is was coded as left wing Fergusson et. al.
(2016)
Party is the in-
cumbent party
Dummy = 1, if the party holds the Mayor office




Total number of candidates who has held council
























Number of times the head of the list hold any
elected public post
Own coding
Panel B. Electoral. Municipality level covariates:
Invalid vote % Total Invalid Votes (Null votes + Unmarked votes)











Total Null Votes / Total Votes in Election Electoral Data
from the Na-
tional Registry





Number of sets available for local councils Electoral Data
from the Na-
tional Registry
Continued on next page
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Table 3.11 – Variables and sources, continued from previous page
Variable Description Source





Index of fiscal performance based on (+ improves
the index, - deteriorates it): size of municipality’s
debt (-), % of income from own resources (+), %








Index based on whether the municipality is comply-
ing with the legal rules on how to do their spending,
comparing budgeted and executed resources as well







Index aggregating: stability of directives in the mu-
nicipality, personnel qualifications, extent to which
























Campaign effort in the campaign. Includes contri-
butions i) from personal income, spouses or family.





Continued on next page
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Table 3.11 – Variables and sources, continued from previous page
Variable Description Source
Campaign Ef-
fort - % of
limit.











Dummy=1, if the candidate was also a candidate
in an election in the following election.
Own coding.




Corruption. Dummy=1, if the candidate has been accused, and
sentenced by a judge for committing a fiscal crime,






Dummy=1, if the candidate has registered illegally
to vote. By using a dead person ID, a duplicate
ID, a fake identity, registered while underage of ID





Paid to vote in
another polling
station.
Dummy=1, if the candidate has been paid to vote





vote at the same
municipality
where running.
Dummy=1, if the candidate registered to vote in





Table 3.12: Descriptive Statistics and Differences in Means Across List
Type
Variable N Mean SD Min Max
Averages within List
Open Closed diff. sig
A. Electoral Variables
Party Vote Share 30793 0.13 0.14 0.05 *** 0.11 0 1
% of Seats Obtained by the party 30778 0.14 0.15 0.04 *** 0.14 0 1
Party obtained one seat 30804 0.7 0.74 0.22 *** 0.46 0 1
% of list Size filled 30766 0.81 0.83 0.55 *** 0.26 0.05 3.25
B. Characteristics of Candidates in the list:
B1. Campaign Data (**)
Total Campaign Investment (Millions COP) - Avg 14,491 1.71 1.70 1.81 3.99 0 128
Total Campaign Investment (Millions COP) - Top 3,163 4.85 4.77 11.35 ** 14.2 0 195
Personal Campaign Investment (Millions COP) - Avg 14,479 1.63 1.64 1.55 3.8 0 126
Personal Campaign Investment (Millions COP) - Top 3,163 4.62 4.58 8.07 13 0 178
% of Campaign Limit (Total Investment) - Avg 14491 0.06 0.06 0.04 *** 0.09 0 3.11
% of Campaign Limit (Total Investment) - Top 3163 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.18 0 1.29
% of Campaign Limit (Personal Investment) - Avg 14479 0.06 0.06 0.04 *** 0.09 0 2.57
% of Campaign Limit (Personal Investment) - Top 3163 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.17 0 1.29
B2. Corruption Sanctions
Corruption Sanction Before Election (Avg) 30779 0.027 0.027 0.024 * 0.067 0 1
Corruption Sanction Before Election (Top) 7756 0.033 0.032 0.072 *** 0.15 0 1
B3. Voting Registration (Illegal Registration)
Registered to vote (Avg) 30779 0.93 0.93 0.92 *** 0.11 0 1
Registered to vote (Top) 7756 0.96 0.96 0.90 *** 0.16 0 1
Regist vote same place running (Avg) 30706 0.91 0.92 0.85 *** 0.16 0 1
Regist vote same place running (Top) 7612 0.96 0.96 0.90 *** 0.17 0 1
Registered Illegally to vote (*) (Avg) 30779 0.04 0.04 0.05 *** 0.09 0 1
Registered Illegally to vote (*) (Top) 7756 0.02 0.01 0.06 *** 0.10 0 1
Moved Illegally to vote in another polling station (Avg) 30779 0.04 0.04 0.05 *** 0.08 0 1
Moved Illegally to vote in another polling station (Top) 7756 0.01 0.01 0.06 *** 0.10 0 1
B4. Candidate experience
# of times cand. ran for any public elected post (Avg) 30779 1.79 1.81 1.51 *** 0.53 1 6
# of times cand. ran for any public elected post (Top) 7043 2.63 2.64 2.15 *** 1.12 1 6
# of times cand. in list ran for local council (Avg) 30779 1.57 1.58 1.33 *** 0.40 1 4
# of times cand. in list ran for local council (Top) 7043 2.18 2.19 1.63 *** 0.90 1 4
# of times cand. in list got elected to council (Avg) 30779 0.35 0.36 0.11 *** 0.35 0 4
# of times cand. in list got elected to council (Top) 7043 1.76 1.77 1.33 *** 0.79 1 4
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Number of total party lists: 30804. Sample: Party lists in 1101
municipalities in Colombia council elections: 4 elections between 2003- 2015. (*) Use of a dead person
fingeprint, having a duplicate ID, irregular inscription of ID, using a fake identity, Underage registration,
Illegal migration of IDs implies a movement of ID to a new voting site in mass, typically in exchange of
money.(**) Only available for 2011 and 2015.
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Table 3.13: Effects of use of closed lists on municipality electoral outcomes.
(1) (2) (3)
voter turnout % of invalid votes % of unmarked votes
% of parties with closed lists -0.0166 -0.00289 0.0321***
(0.0111) (0.00326) (0.00387)
Constant 0.540*** 0.0788*** 0.0505***
(0.00230) (0.000392) (0.000466)
Mun FE X X X
Year FE X X X
Observations 4385 3295 3294
R2 Adjusted 0.385 0.646 -0.204
Dummy = 1 if municipality had 0.00412 0.000829 0.00217***
at least one closed list (0.00268) (0.000629) (0.000758)
Constant 0.536*** 0.0785*** 0.0512***
(0.00228) (0.000393) (0.000474)
Mun FE X X X
Year FE X X X
Observations 4385 3295 3294
R2 Adjusted 0.385 0.646 -0.238
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis and clustered at the municipality level. Top of the list is run using a probit
model since the dependent variable is a dummy. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 . Note that in (2) and (3) there is
only data for 2007, 2011
Table 3.14: Presence and list type choice across municipalities,
10 largest Colombian parties in local council elections 2003-2015
2003 2007 2011 2015
Name of party Share of: Munip Closed list Munip Closed list Munip Closed list Munip Closed list
PART. LIBERAL COLOMBIANO 0.7838 0.0012 0.8333 0.0197 0.8717 0.0167 0.8765 0.0166
# of municip 852 852 915 915 958 958 965 965
PART. CONSERVADOR COLOMBIANO 0.647 0.023 0.770 0.002 0.869 0.001 0.878 0.000
# of municip 703 703 845 845 955 955 967 967
PART. CAMBIO RADICAL COLOMBIANO 0.216 0.174 0.674 0.007 0.887 0.007 0.913 0.022
# of municip 235 235 740 740 975 975 1005 1005
PART. SOCIAL DE UNIDAD NACIONAL 0.628 0.016 0.894 0.008 0.936 0.012
# of municip 0 0 690 690 982 982 1030 1030
POLO DEMOCRATICO ALTERNATIVO 0.567 0.069 0.444 0.113 0.433 0.115
# of municip 0 0 623 623 488 488 477 477
ALIANZA SOCIAL INDIGENA . 0.536 0.037 0.607 0.040
# of municip 0 0 0 0 589 589 668 668
PARTIDO VERDE 0.241 0.030 0.692 0.063
# of municip 0 0 265 265 761 761 0 0
AUTORIDADES INDIGENAS DE CO.. 0.046 0.300 0.085 0.022 0.284 0.035 0.360 0.038
# of municip 50 50 93 93 312 312 396 396
CENTRO DEMOCRATICO 0.738 0.429
# of municip 0 0 0 0 0 0 813 813
UNION PATRIOTICA UP 0.729 0.030
# of municip 0 0 0 0 0 0 803 803
Total number of municipalities in sample: 1087 1098 1099 1101
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Table 3.15: Effects of candidate placement on campaign investment within
closed lists.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Tot. Cam Invt. Tot. Cam Invt. (% of lim.) Camp Effort Camp Effort (% of lim.) Camp Effort Alt Camp Effort Alt (% of lim.)
Top safe Candidate 7683000** 0.0766*** 7457000* 0.0740*** 7433000*** 0.0742***
(3.848e+06) (0.0195) (3.799e+06) (0.0187) (3.786e+06) (0.0187)
Marginal Candidate 2.156e+06*** 0.0286*** 1.383e+06*** 0.0195*** 1.435e+06*** 0.0202***
(811,219) (0.00508) (471,416) (0.00424) (505,906) (0.00428)
Constant 2.293e+07*** 0.0633*** 1.845e+07*** 0.0587*** 1.847e+07*** 0.0583***
(2.485e+06) (0.0113) (2.545e+06) (0.0130) (2.523e+06) (0.0130)
Year Dummies X X X X X X
Municipality FE X X X X X X
Party FE X X X X X X
Observations 3485 3485 3469 3469 3469 3469
R-squared 0.548 0.437 0.499 0.466 0.507 0.466
Notes: These regressions are the individual level for open lists. Marginal candidates are those that were two seats
above and below the last seat obtained in the party, if the party did not obtain a seat the first two are considered
marginal. Top safe candidates, are the ones placed above the marginal, and loser candidates are the ones that are
below the marginals. Standard errors in parenthesis and clustered at the municipality level. Top of the list is run using
a probit model since the dependent variable is a dummy. Campaign effort is: Money raised by the candidates, and
their immediate family, donations by particulars, and financial credits obtained at a financial institution. The (alt)
measurement includes the previous ones plus income generated by public activities by the party. For 2011 a candidate
level campaign spending limit was established at the individual level. For 2015 the campaign limit was modified and
place at the list level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 3.16: Effects of candidate placement on campaign investment within
open lists.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Tot. Cam Invt. Tot. Cam Invt. (% of lim.) Camp Effort Camp Effort (% of lim.) Camp Effort Alt Camp Effort Alt (% of lim.)
Top Safe Candidate 5.356e+06*** 0.101*** 5.066e+06*** 0.0978*** 5.198e+06*** 0.0991***
(1.508e+06) (0.00642) (1.348e+06) (0.00604) (1.405e+06) (0.00621)
Marginal Candidate 1.829e+06*** 0.0401*** 1.716e+06*** 0.0388*** 1.744e+06*** 0.0391***
(286,701) (0.00197) (255,551) (0.00189) (262,767) (0.00193)
Constant 2.293e+07*** 0.0633*** 1.845e+07*** 0.0587*** 1.847e+07*** 0.0583***
(2.485e+06) (0.0113) (2.545e+06) (0.0130) (2.523e+06) (0.0130)
Year Dummies X X X X X X
Municipality FE X X X X X X
Party FE X X X X X X
Observations 115236 115236 115088 115088 115088 115088
R-squared 0.322 0.319 0.308 0.321 0.308 0.321
Notes: These regressions are the individual level for open lists. Marginal candidates are those that were two seats
above and below the last seat obtained in the party, if the party did not obtain a seat the first two are considered
marginal. Top safe candidates, are the ones placed above the marginal, and loser candidates are the ones that are
below the marginals. Standard errors in parenthesis and clustered at the municipality level. Top of the list is run using
a probit model since the dependent variable is a dummy. Campaign effort is: Money raised by the candidates, and
their immediate family, donations by particulars, and financial credits obtained at a financial institution. The (alt)
measurement includes the previous ones plus income generated by public activities by the party. For 2011 a candidate
level campaign spending limit was established at the individual level. For 2015 the campaign limit was modified and
place at the list level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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3.12 Appendix D: Determinants of list choice
To understand further why parties are willing to choose closed list even when it tremen-
dously decreases their seat shares and the probability that even a single of their can-
didate will get a seat, we will first explain the list choice with various party and
municipality characteristics in Table 3.17. We base our discussion on specification (8)
that contains the richest set of explanatory variables. The other results are reported
for robustness.
The first interesting finding is that choosing closed list before increases the prob-
ability that they choose closed list again. This result simply reflects what we learned
from the transition matrix in Table 3.9. No one with open list at time t will change
to closed list at time t+1, and even if most parties with closed list at time t change to
open list at t+1, at least some of the keep the closed list. Furthermore, more experi-
enced or important parties choose closed lists less often suggesting that closed lists are
mistakes made by smaller new entrants.
Closed lists are less common in municipalities with more available seats. This is
as expected because in larger districts the closed list candidates’ personal ability to
gain votes matters less and they have less incentives to campaign (e.g. (Carey and
Shugart, 1995)). (Achury et al., 2017) report a similar result for Colombian parlia-
mentary elections. This results is present only conditional on the number of voters.
In municipalities with more voters, the closed lists are more common. Overall the
variables in Table 3.17 are able to explain only very little of the variation in the list
choice.
To shed further light on the list choice, we study in Table 3.18 whether previous
election results influence list choice. Conditional on the previous election list choice,
having received more votes in the previous election decreases the probability of choosing
closed lists. Again we see that close lists are chosen by younger parties.
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Table 3.17: Determinants of choosing closed list. Colombian parties
2003-2015.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent variable: Dummy =1, if party chose closed list.
Party Characteristics: Municipality Characteristics All
Closed list before 0.149*** 0.178*** 0.177*** 0.171***
(0.0170) (0.0168) (0.0168) (0.0182)
# of Years party ran in munic. -0.0300*** -0.0291*** -0.0294***
(0.00121) (0.00125) (0.00131)
Party holds the Mayor office during elec. -0.0118*** -0.0111***
(0.00229) (0.00239)
Total seats in the municip. 0.00293*** 0.00224*** 0.00321** 0.00346 -0.00528**
(0.000415) (0.000557) (0.00159) (0.00228) (0.00212)
log(Distance to Depart Capital, km) -0.00584*** -0.00610*** -0.00588** -0.00257
(0.00200) (0.00204) (0.00251) (0.00227)
log(# of registered voters) -0.00277 -0.00383 0.0147***
(0.00427) (0.00590) (0.00534)
Years since municipality foundation 2.01e-05 2.79e-05*
(1.59e-05) (1.48e-05)
Constant 0.0489*** 0.117*** 0.116*** 0.0329*** 0.0649*** 0.0807*** 0.0842** 0.0463
(0.00158) (0.00405) (0.00407) (0.00511) (0.0109) (0.0267) (0.0346) (0.0310)
Observations 23804 23804 23804 30802 29085 29085 28679 22223
R-squared 0.013 0.036 0.037 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.036
R2 Adjusted 0.0131 0.0363 0.0365 0.00158 0.000840 0.000820 0.000838 0.0358
Notes: (1), (2), (3) and (8) exclude year 2003 since it is the first year in the sample, and there is no before period
for them in the data. Standard errors in parenthesis and clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
Table 3.18: Determinants of choosing closed list based on previous
electoral results of parties. Colombian parties 2003-2015.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: Dummy =1, if party chose closed list.
Vote share for the party in t-1 -0.158*** -0.0947*** -0.0718*** -0.155*** -0.102*** -0.0751***
(0.0151) (0.0136) (0.0143) (0.0163) (0.0150) (0.0157)
Party chose closed list before 0.171*** 0.174*** 0.168*** 0.170***
(0.0173) (0.0173) (0.0187) (0.0187)
# of Years party has participated in the same munic. -0.0122*** -0.0133***
(0.00215) (0.00221)
Constant 0.0545*** 0.0333*** 0.0684*** 0.0895*** 0.0607* 0.0884***
(0.00363) (0.00302) (0.00719) (0.0343) (0.0317) (0.0327)
Municipality controls X X X
Observations 11597 11597 11597 10755 10755 10755
R-squared 0.014 0.074 0.077 0.014 0.068 0.071
R2 Adjusted 0.0136 0.0739 0.0768 0.0132 0.0674 0.0709
Notes: The sample size is smaller since not all parties participate in the same municipality. Standard errors in
parenthesis and clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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3.13 Appendix E: Additional robustness checks
Table 3.19: Distribution of switchers across parties % of Total
Party Name 2007 2011 2015 Total
MOVIMIENTO MIRA 21.51 31.84 34.96 29.98
POLO DEMOCRATICO ALTERNATIVO 0 28.49 25.22 18.72
PARTIDO CAMBIO RADICAL COLOMBIANO 18.02 8.38 10.18 11.96
PARTIDO LIBERAL COLOMBIANO 6.4 12.85 8.85 9.36
PARTIDO SOCIAL DE UNIDAD NACIONAL PARTID 0 6.7 6.64 4.68
PARTIDO NACIONAL CRISTIANO PNC 0 0 10.62 4.16
MOVIMIENTO AUTORIDADES INDIGENAS DE COLOMBIA 4.07 2.79 3.54 3.47
MOVIMIENTO ALIANZA SOC INDIGENA ASI 11.63 0 0 3.47
PARTIDO CONSERVADOR COLOMBIANO 8.14 2.79 0 3.29
MOVIMIENTO APERTURA LIBERAL 9.88 0 0 2.95
MOVIMIENTO COLOMBIA VIVA 6.98 0 0 2.08
MOVIMIENTO CONVERGENCIA CIUDADANA 6.98 0 0 2.08
PARTIDO VERDE 0 6.15 0 1.91
PARTIDO COLOMBIA DEMOCRATICA 5.23 0 0 1.56
MOVIMIENTO COMPROMISO CIVICO CRISTIANO C 0.58 0 0 0.17
MOVIMIENTO DE SALVACION NACIONAL 0.58 0 0 0.17
Total Switchers 172 179 226 577
Table 3.20: Electoral results omitting one party at a time
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Party vote share Percentage seat party One seat party Fill per
Open List 0.059*** 0.074*** 0.387*** 0.194***
(LIBERAL PARTY) (0.003) (0.004) (0.012) (0.008)
Open List 0.066*** 0.083*** 0.407*** 0.205***
(CONSERVATIVE PARTY) (0.003) (0.004) (0.013) (0.008)
Open List 0.067*** 0.084*** 0.404*** 0.205***
(CAMBIO RADICAL) (0.003) (0.004) (0.013) (0.008)
Open List 0.067*** 0.085*** 0.407*** 0.206***
(UNIDAD NACIONAL) (0.003) (0.004) (0.013) (0.008)
Open List 0.070*** 0.089*** 0.408*** 0.190***
(POLO DEMOCRATICO ALTERNATIVO) (0.003) (0.004) (0.013) (0.008)
Open List 0.069*** 0.087*** 0.409*** 0.205***
(MOVIMIENTO ALIANZA SOCIAL INDIGENA) (0.003) (0.004) (0.012) (0.008)
Open List 0.068*** 0.086*** 0.403*** 0.200***
(PARTIDO VERDE) (0.003) (0.004) (0.013) (0.008)
Open List 0.070*** 0.088*** 0.413*** 0.203***
(AUTORIDADES INDIGENAS COLOMBIA) (0.003) (0.004) (0.012) (0.008)
Mean Dep. Var 0.0693 0.0643 0.365 0.623
Note: Omitted party in parenthesis
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.21: Electoral results controlling for party experience
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Party VS Party VS Party VS % Seats Party % Seats Party % Seats Party One Seat One Seat One Seat List fill % List fill % List fill %
Open List 0.068*** 0.062*** 0.063*** 0.086*** 0.076*** 0.079*** 0.410*** 0.381*** 0.391*** 0.205*** 0.195*** 0.200***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
No. of times party in municip 0.025*** 0.038*** 0.109*** 0.037***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002)
No. of times party any municip 0.021*** 0.030*** 0.082*** 0.019***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.002)
Year Dummies X X X X X X X X X X X X
Mun FE (x) Party FE X X X X X X X X X X X X
Mean Dep. Var 0.0769 0.0769 0.0769 0.0734 0.0734 0.0734 0.392 0.392 0.392 0.634 0.634 0.634
Effect Size (%b3) 88.80 80.39 82.50 117.7 104.2 108.2 104.4 97.21 99.67 32.29 30.77 31.59
95% Conf. Inter Lower B 80.87 72.56 74.67 107.7 94.44 98.50 98.16 91.06 93.44 29.95 28.45 29.25
95% Conf. Inter Upper B 96.72 88.21 90.34 127.6 113.9 118 110.7 103.3 105.9 34.63 33.09 33.93
Observations 30793 30793 30793 30778 30778 30778 30804 30804 30804 30766 30766 30766
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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